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ABSTRACT 
Our current understanding of tribunal resource allocation decision-making is via judicial 
review of tribunal decisions and/or the capacity, independence and appointment process 
of tribunal members. This analysis of tribunals provides incomplete information.  
 
This qualitative five year case study asked the three following questions: 
 
Research Question #1:  
Do procedures statistically affect the resource allocation decisions of the Board? If so, 
what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect?
 
 
 
The author analyzed the quantitative research results relative to the A4R theory‘s four 
procedural conditions of transparency and concluded that the A4R theory it bwas not 
‗fine grain‘ enough to identify the complexity of the tribunal resource allocation decision 
making. Quantitative analysis revealed that Board decisions were influenced by elements 
of the Board‘s procedure. In particular, the author‘s statistical analysis found that the 
Board‘s procedures statistically did affect resource allocation decisions by disadvantaging 
self- represented parties and, for a certain year, parties not participating in the tribunal‘s 
hearing orally/in person.  
 
Research Question #2:  
What substantive arguments affect the resource allocation decisions of the Board?
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This study confirmed that submissions by the parties – the patient and OHIP - affected 
resource allocation decisions. However, within these substantive arguments the research 
found that patients and administrative requirements played a key role in determining out 
of country coverage of nonemergency inpatient health services (OCCNEIHS). The 
research also identified that more patients requesting OCCNEIHS argued for treatment to 
be considered acceptable than argued that treatment domestically would be delayed. The 
research also identified that there was an absence of arguments regarding the economic 
implications of OCCNEIHS.  
 
Research Question #3 
What Should Be the Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making Mechanism?  
It is recommended that any non-neutral procedures be further examined and potentially 
eliminated. It was also recognized that significant expert consensus on multiple factors 
was required in order to make resource allocation decisions. As a result of this research, it 
is recommended that resource allocation decisions should be based on a multi factorial 
algorithm comprised of ongoing expert consensus, available publicly and utilized by 
OHIP for the determination of resource allocation. The Board‘s jurisdiction should be 
revised.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Why allocate resources? Scarcity. Scarcity assumes more people want a given resource 
than is available. When more people want a resource than is available, difficult choices 
have to be made. So how do we – as a society – decide how to allocate a limited 
resource? What is the decision making process? Do certain factors influence the decision 
making process? What is the theoretical, actual and revised resource allocation decision 
making process? This thesis attempts to answer these questions 
 
Adjudicative administrative tribunals
1
 are one mechanism for making decisions regarding 
the allocation of resources. Tribunals in Ontario are a quasi-judicial decision making 
mechanism which provide parties - who have been denied a government resource by a 
government agency – a forum to appeal the resource allocation decision. Tribunals are 
important because the vast majority of Ontario residents will not access the judicial 
system for resource allocation decision making but may access the quasi-judicial system 
of tribunals. As such, tribunals have a larger impact on the residents of Ontario than the 
courts. However, very little is known about Canadian tribunals – and Ontario tribunals in 
particular - and the factors which influence tribunal resource allocation decision making. 
Our current understanding of tribunal resource allocation decision making has taken 
place – in the author‘s opinion – in the following two waves.  
 
                                                 
1
 Hereinafter ―tribunals‖. 
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The first wave of attempting to understand tribunal decision making was the result of the 
legal analysis of judicial review. While courts typically defer substantive decision making 
to the tribunal, they review the tribunal‘s decision in accordance with procedural 
requirements according to the law. The courts have also provided tribunals with direction 
concerning what the courts consider appropriate procedural elements. As such, the 
court‘s oversight and direction to a tribunal through judicial review has been an important 
factor in understanding tribunals. 
 
The second wave of attempting to understand tribunals and the factors which may 
influence their resource allocation decision making came from the examination of 
tribunal members themselves – typically in terms of the members‘ expertise, 
independence, potential bias and appointment processes.  
 
Both the first wave and the second wave - in the author‘s opinion – provide important but 
preliminary information on tribunal procedures. However, judicial review and tribunal 
member attributes do not provide a holistic view of resource allocation decision making 
by tribunals. This limited view of tribunal decision making about resource allocation is 
not only providing an incomplete picture of tribunal decision making but is also a missed 
opportunity to proactively address problems before they come before the tribunal. A 
more comprehensive empirical analysis of actual tribunal decision making is required. 
  
In this thesis, the author seeks to develop a novel third wave in understanding tribunal 
resource allocation decision making. The premise of the third wave is that a tribunal‘s 
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decision cannot be understood in isolation from the tribunal‘s procedures, the 
submissions by the parties, an understanding of who is appearing before the tribunal and 
why they are submitting a request.
2
  These elements cannot be separated from the 
decision arrived at by the tribunal and must be viewed together in order to understand 
tribunal decision making. In this respect, unlike the first wave of judicial review for 
tribunal compliance with court sanctioned procedures or the second wave of tribunal 
membership attributes, this thesis looks at the interplay between patient profiles, 
procedures, substantive arguments and the ultimate tribunal decisions.   
 
An example of the interplay between profiles, process and substantive argument could be 
seen in a basketball game. In a basketball game, the focus is not just on the referee‘s 
capacity to referee, his/her appointment as a referee or the independence he/she has to 
call certain plays. The focus is not on a sports networks‘ review of the referee‘s 
decisions. The interest in basketball is on the game played between the teams. It is 
important to know who is on the home team and who is on the visitor team. Assuming the 
home team is a constant professional basketball team, observers may wish to know who 
is on the visitor team. The seven foot tall home team of professional basketball players 
may be playing a competitive game against another seven foot tall professional basketball 
team from a rival city. The home team may also be playing against a first grade school 
team that is three feet tall and never played a competitive game. In this respect, knowing 
                                                 
2
 In this study, one party is constant while the other party is constantly changing.  The party that is 
constantly changing – in this study it is the patient - activates the hearing before the tribunal. It is also the 
patient who is affected by the tribunal‘s decision. However, it is not known who the patients are, where 
they reside, why they come before the tribunal and what remedy the patient of the tribunal. In order to 
provide a more fulsome context, the author analyzed each of the decisions in this case study in order to 
create a ‗patient profile‘ for the study period. The patient profile data are outline in Chapter 7.  
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who the parties are gives the observer a sense of the game which is about to be played – 
or in the case of parties before the tribunal, a sense of the hearing that is about to take 
place. 
 
In terms of process, the basketball teams are required by the rules to play within a 
basketball court. They do not play outside the court line and into the stands. The players 
also do not bring a ping pong table onto the court and try to play ping pong while the 
basketball game is underway. The rules of the game are assumed to be understood. If the 
rules of the game are not abided by, it may be because a player does not understand the 
rules or they may understand the rules but wish to make a point contrary to the rules. 
Applied to a tribunal hearing, the tribunal has a jurisdiction within which a hearing takes 
place. The parties cannot expand the jurisdiction of the tribunal (e.g. play in the stands) or 
bring into the tribunal those elements which are not within the jurisdiction (e.g. a ping 
pong table). A party before the tribunal may truly not understand the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal, may want to make a point or may not have another suitable forum in which to 
bring forth concerns.  
 
Also in terms of process, the basketball league does not purposely disadvantage the teams 
– such as putting rocks on one side of the basketball court thus disadvantaging one of the 
teams. Instead, the basketball league tries to ensure that the basketball court is a level 
playing field for both teams so the teams can concentrate on playing the game rather than 
navigating the rocks. The venue may inadvertently disadvantage a team if the game is 
continually played on one team‘s home court or if the venue lights are too bright for one 
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team to play to their potential. Applied to a tribunal hearing, the tribunal‘s procedures are 
intended to create a level playing field with no intentional barriers (e.g. the rocks on one 
half of the court) upon which the game can be actually played. While not intended, the 
tribunal‘s procedures may inadvertently disadvantage one of the parties if self 
represented or unable to attend the hearing in person.   
 
In terms of substantive issues, it is helpful to know whether a particular team plays well 
in the first part of the game but not in the second part of the game or if the team has a 
particular technical skill in one area of play but not in another. Applied to the tribunal, it 
is helpful to know if a party excels in one part of the substantive argument before the 
tribunal but not in another substantive argument.  
 
Overall, it is important for the observer not just to know who won the basketball 
game/granted a resource but rather to know who the teams/parties were, if they played 
within the court/jurisdiction, where they were inadvertently disadvantaged by the 
venue/procedures to the point of losing the game/not attaining the resource requested and 
where in the process a party won the game/what substantive argument(s) attained the 
resource requested.  
 
Continuing with the basketball example, most players and teams are assessed over an 
extended time period. In this respect, trends can be observed both within one player and 
between teams. This assessment over time is important in order to determine if a 
particular game reflects a trend or if it reflects an outcome that occurred by chance and is 
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not a trend. Applied to the tribunal, it is important to understand if the elements of patient 
profile, procedures, substantive arguments and the Board decision occurred by chance or 
if the elements reflect a trend. To date, most legal research is based on case analysis. The 
academic discussion, outlined in Chapter 3, identifies that case analysis is insufficient and 
empirical research is required. However, there is little legal research on multiple cases 
over an extended period of time which is analyzed statistically to distinguish between 
chance occurrences and trends. This thesis seeks to analyse multiple cases over an 
extended period of time and to statistically analyse the data in order to determine if the 
results were due to chance occurrences or if the results reflected a trend or trends.  
 
Empirical Research  
In order to understand the effect of procedural elements and the substantive arguments on 
tribunal resource allocation decisions and how this compared to theoretical models, a 
case study of a tribunal was undertaken. In this respect, one section of a regulation – 
section 28.4(2) of Regulation 552
3
 of the Health Insurance Act,
4
 which deals with the 
funding of health care outside of Canada, was critically analyzed over a five year period. 
When the government denies publicly funded health insurance for health care requested 
outside of Canada, the government‘s decision can be appealed to the Health Services 
Appeal and Review Board (HSARB). It should be noted that the statutes and regulation 
related to HSARB do not require HSARB to act primarily as a health service resource 
allocation decision making body. However, that is the effect of what it does, and in the 
course of fulfilling its legislative mandate, HSARB does operate though a resource 
                                                 
3
 R.R.O. 1990, [hereinafter ―Regulation 552‖]. 
4
 R.S.O. 1990, c.H.6, [hereinafter ―the HIA‖]. 
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allocation lens.  This resource allocation lens can be seen throughout the approximately 
400 decisions regarding s.28.4(2). The decisions were empirically analysed with respect 
to the following: the characteristics of the parties before the tribunal, the procedural 
elements of the tribunal hearing, the substantive arguments of the parties before the 
tribunal and the effect these latter two elements had on the tribunal‘s ultimate decision to 
grant or deny resource allocation. The resource being allocated was public financing of 
health care outside of Canada.  
 
The five year period was selected for a number of reasons. First, the study time period 
represented a period of relative stability. One provincial government party was in power 
during this period suggesting little philosophical or political change to out of country 
health care policy and/or legislation during this period. Second, the leadership of the 
HSARB as a tribunal and the office secretariat remained constant during the period. 
Third, the position of the appellate courts in Ontario was not finalized during this period, 
resulting in an absence of changes to social policy or the legislation.
5
 This relative 
stability on multiple fronts allowed for a focus on actual tribunal resource allocation 
decision making rather than a focus on changes to the legislation and regulatory 
framework or structural changes to the decision making mechanism. It was also assumed, 
at the beginning of this thesis research, that HSARB decisions during the study period 
would be easily accessible electronically. This latter point turned out not to be the case. 
                                                 
5
 One major case decision from the Ontario Divisional Court was released in 2007 - Flora v. Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan, 2007 CanLII 339 (ON S.C.D.C.). However, this decision was on appeal to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. The Ontario Court of Appeal‘s decision was released in July of 2008 - Flora v. Ontario 
Health Insurance Plan, 2008 ONCA 538 (CanLII) after the thesis study period ending March 2008. While 
on appeal, major changes to the HSARB resource allocation process or the provincial legislation did not 
take place.  
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It should be noted that this study deliberately did not empirically research Board 
members‘ capacity, independence, potential bias or appointment process. This decision 
was made because of methodological challenges. This study attempted to objectively 
quantify variables for analysis. However, details regarding the Board members‘ 
appointment process, duration of appointment, availability, preference or expertise to 
hear certain cases and the capacity, independence or potential bias of the scheduler were 
not available from the data source. For example – in terms of the appointment process -- 
nominations for Board member appointments are submitted to a legislative committee 
comprised of all political parties. Each political party is required to approve an 
appointment. Appointed Board members serve for a non-tenured, part time period of two 
to three years. The two to three year part time appointment was not the same for all 
appointees in the study, such that some appointees may be nearing the end of their 
appointment while other appointees are just beginning their appointment. Once 
appointed, the Board members submit their availability to a scheduler who formulates 
panels of three appointees to collectively hear and deliberate on a case. None of the above 
information – along with Board members‘ capacity, independence and potential bias -- 
was available through this study‘s data source of Board decisions.  
 
Resource allocation decision making, as previously discussed, has typically focused on 
the neutrality of the decision maker. There is a long standing debate within the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) academic literature  regarding the neutrality of 
mediators and the affect on the process and outcome of disputes between parties. More 
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recently, this debate has shifted to include the role of the decision making system. 
Lawrence Susskind
6
 argues that mediators should not be neutral during the process or 
outcome of mediation. Mediators need to play an active role in the process of mediation 
by guaranteeing full participation and a balanced exchange between capable parties as 
well as being accountable for the negotiated outcomes.  
 
Josh Stulberg
7
 argues that mediators need to exhibit neutrality regarding the outcome but 
not in the process to arrive at the outcome. If a mediator assumes responsibility for the 
fairness of the agreement between the parties then the mediator is abandoning a neutral 
stance and creates an unwarranted role expansion. He states that the mediator is not 
equipped or entitled to assume the role of social conscience or social critic.  
 
Bernie Mayer
8
 states that the focus on the neutrality of the mediator is misleading as the 
fairness of an outcome is largely reliant on the system structure rather than the mediator‘s 
behavior. In fact, he states that it is the role of the system not the role or obligation of the 
mediator to provide a socially responsible process. In this respect, the design, safeguards 
and management of the system, the training of people who work within the system and 
the ability to address system problems needs to be considered. Mayer states that a 
mediator can still be neutral and yet intervene when the system has not allowed for 
                                                 
6
 Lawrence Susskind, ―Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem‖ (1981) 6 VT. L. REV. 
1. 
 
7
 Joseph B. Stulberg, ―The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind‖ (1981) 6 
VT. L. REV. 85. 
 
8
 Bernie Mayer, ―Core Values of Dispute Resolution: Is Neutrality Necessary?‖ 95 Marq. L. Rev. 805 
2011-2012. 
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participants to have an effective voice,including having the right parties at the table 
and/or have ignored important issues.  
 
This thesis aligns with the scholarship of Mayer by focusing on  the system as opposed to 
focusing on the decision maker. Of particular interest is Mayer‘s comment regarding the 
need to consider system problems. The consideration of system problems can only be 
undertaken if the system problems are identified. An empirical review undertaken in this 
thesis of Board processes, substantive legal arguments and outcome decisions over 
multiple years is designed to help identify system problems which may subsequently be 
addressed. 
 
It must be stressed that the empirical quantitative research that was undertaken in this 
study examined preliminary correlations not causation relationships. In other words, the 
study cannot report that one factor caused another factor. The study can only say that 
there was a correlation between the factors. As a correlation, the factors must be more 
closely examined in order to determine the meaning behind this result. It is highly 
recommended that further qualitative research be undertaken to further explore the 
correlations. 
 
In terms of research questions, this study focused on analyzing the association of the 
Board‘s procedures and the parties‘ substantive arguments on Board decisions. In terms 
of procedures, the prevailing assumption is that procedures do not influence the resource 
allocation decision but rather create a ‗level playing field‘ upon which the parties can 
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make their substantive arguments. This assumption was questioned in this thesis. In this 
respect, the thesis asks the following question:Research Question #1: 
Do procedures create a statistically significant effect on resource allocation 
decisions of the Board? If so, what elements of the procedures create this 
statistical effect?
 9
 
 
The quantitative results of the Board‘s procedures were analyzed relative to the leading 
process theory – Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) - in order to determine if the 
theory of resource allocation decision making reflected the actual practice of resource 
allocation decision making. If the actual practice did not reflect the A4R theory, 
expecting the A4R theory to explain tribunal decision making is questionable. 
 
This thesis also critically examined why some Applicant/Patients are granted resources 
while others are not. As such, this thesis asks: 
  
 Research Question #2: 
What substantive arguments affect resource allocation decisions of the Board?
 10
  
 
Based on the research results of actual tribunal decision outlining procedures, the 
substantive arguments taking place before the Board and an analysis of the literature, this 
author proposes a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism in order to 
answer the following question: 
                                                 
9
 Chapter 8 – What It Is Now: Procedures: Quantitative Research Results  
10
 Chapter 9 – What It Is Now: Substantive Arguments: Quantitative Research Results  
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 Research Question #3 
 What Should Be the Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making 
Mechanism?
11
  
 
The revised resource allocation decision making mechanism should increase the 
likelihood of decision acceptance by ensuring a fair, transparent neutral process for 
determining resource allocation and taking into consideration a multiple of factors that 
affect substantive arguments.  
 
Outline of this Thesis 
This thesis is laid out in the following manner: Chapter 2 outlines the legislative context 
within which the Board operates. Chapter 2 is important because the analysis of this 
study relative to the A4E theory became largely dependent on the legislative framework 
rather than on the study‘s data. In this respect, at least two of the four A4R theory criteria 
are established in legislation as opposed to quantitative data. For example, the A4R 
requirement for the ‗appeals‘ condition and the ‗enforcement‘ condition were found in 
the statutes rather than within the Board‘s decision.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 review the literature regarding resource allocation mechanisms. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 review the literature in terms of the lack of empirical research, the 
judicial and quasi-judicial systems of decision making and the existing procedures and 
substantive theories regarding decision making. More specifically, Chapter 3 reviews the 
                                                 
11
 Chapter 11 – What It Should Be: Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making Mechanism 
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literature regarding the academic discussion of the overall lack of empirical research in 
legal studies. This chapter specifically examines the dearth of tribunal empirical research 
and lack of academic discussion and debate on the topic. Chapter 3 also critically 
analyses the existing qualitative and quantitative tribunal research. The existing 
qualitative and quantitative research on tribunals was analyzed in an effort to inform the 
author of existing research methodologies and potential variables for analysis. This 
methodological review formed the basis of this thesis‘ research design. Chapter 4 reviews 
the academic debate regarding the use of judicial and quasi-judicial as decision making 
mechanisms. In particular, Chapter 4 reviews the debate regarding the role of the courts 
in health care decision making, their overview of tribunals via judicial review and their 
deferral of difficult resource allocation decisions to tribunals. Chapter 5 reviews the 
academic literature on substantive and procedural decision making theories with specific 
reference to the A4R theory. 
 
Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 outline the study‘s methodology and the results. For example, 
Chapter 7 examines who is coming before the Board, why they are coming before the 
Board and what treatment and facilities they are requesting. Chapter 8 analyses the first 
research question -- whether the Board‘s procedures statistically affect resource 
allocation decisions. If procedures are associated statistically with resource allocation 
decisions, the study analyzes what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect. 
Chapter 9 analyses the second question - what submissions by the parties affect resource 
allocation decisions.   
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Chapter 10 analyses the study results relative to the academic discussion regarding the 
lack of empirical research and relative to the A4R theory. Chapter 11 answers the third 
research question by outlining a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism 
– based on the results of Chapter 7-10. Chapter 12 summarizes the study‘s conclusions. 
Chapter 13 presents a final thought regarding the potential to use the OCCNEIHS 
situation to pilot test and study alternative health care delivery models. Chapter 14 is an 
Epilogue which outlines some legislative development since the end of the study period.  
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Chapter 2 
Legislative Framework 
 
1. Introduction 
 
2. Legal Framework 
a. Canadian Constitution - Division of Powers 
b. Human Rights Code 
c. Canada Health Act  
d. Ontario Health Insurance  
e.  Health Services Appeal and Review Board 
i. Statute, Regulation, Jurisdiction and Composition 
ii. The Board‘s Procedures  
Dates (file/hearing/decision);  
Format (oral/written/teleconference/combo);   
Self-representation/lawyer 
Interpreter 
Review by HSARB 
iii. Substantive Arguments of the Parties 
Insured Services 
Excluded Services 
Out of Country Coverage – ‗test‘ criteria under s.28.4(2) 
 Generally Acceptable 
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 Identical / Equivalent 
 Delay 
Prior Approval Requirement for OCCNEIHS: s.28.4(5) 
 
3.  Conclusion  
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Chapter 2 
Legislative Framework 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the existing Canadian health care 
legislative system within which HSARB is situated. It is within this system and legal 
constraints that Board decisions regarding the out of country coverage of health care 
services are made. Chapter 2 is important because the analysis of this study‘s results 
relative a leading theory, Accountability of Reasonableness,
12
 was largely dependent on 
the legislative framework rather than on the study‘s quantitative data. For example, at 
least two of the four A4R theory criteria – the appeals condition and the enforcement 
condition -- are established in legislation as opposed to the quantitative data. Chapter 2 is 
also important because it provides the legislated definitions and criteria for the Board‘s 
procedures (Research Question #1) and the substantive legal arguments of the parties 
before the Board (Research Question #2).  
Summary of Ontario‘s Out of Country Coverage  
In order to provide a context for this research, it is important to understand how health 
care services are provided to Ontario residents. Health care services are provided to 
Ontario residents in three major situations in three main geographic areas.  
 
The three major situations include – an emergency, a non-emergency outpatient situation 
and a non-emergency inpatient situation. Emergency situations involve a serious or life 
                                                 
12
 Hereinafter ―A4R‖. 
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threatening event for the patient where immediate action must be taken - such as a heart 
attack or a severe car accident. Non-emergency outpatient situations involve a health care 
situation that is not considered serious enough to require admission into the hospital or 
health facility. Non-emergency inpatient situations involve events where the patient is 
admitted into the hospital or health facility for a serious health care issue.   However, 
while the health care issue is considered serious enough for admission to the hospital, it is 
not considered serious enough to qualify as an emergency situation.  
 
In addition to the three major situations in which health care services are provided, 
Ontario residents are able to receive health care in three main geographic locations: (1) 
within Ontario, (2) outside Ontario but within Canada and (3) outside Canada. It should 
be noted that any form of health care services outside Canada is – theoretically -- 
available to Ontario residents. The question is who pays for health care service outside 
Canada.  If the patient pays for the health care services outside Canada through a private 
health insurance plan or out-of-pocket – often referred to as ‗medical tourism‘ -- the 
Ontario government and the publicly insured health plan are not involved and have no 
say in what services are or are not to be funded. However, if the Ontario government is 
asked to use public funds to pay for out of country health care, then Ontario legislation – 
specifically the HIA- is invoked.  
 
The Ontario government‘s public insurance program that administers the HIA is called 
the Ontario Health Insurance Plan – or as commonly referred to – OHIP. The criteria by 
which OHIP determines which health care services provided outside Canada are publicly 
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insured are set out in the HIA and Regulation 552. Under Regulation 552, section 28 
determines whether health care provided outside of Canada will be paid for by OHIP. 
Specifically, section 28.4(2) contains the regulatory criteria – or the ‗test‘ - to determine 
whether non-emergency inpatient health services provided on an inpatient basis outside 
of Canada are or are not publicly insured by OHIP. Out of country coverage for non-
emergency inpatient health services will be referred to as OCCNEIHS for the purpose of 
this thesis.  In terms of the process to receive OCCNEIHS, the patient – based on 
approval from their physician - appeals to OHIP to approve and thus fund an 
OCCNEIHS. OHIP may grant, deny or partially grant the requested OCCNEIHS based 
on the test in section 28.4(2). Where OHIP has denied or partially denied the requested 
OCCNEIHS, the patient may appeal the request to HSARB.
13
 Based on the submissions 
of the parties at a hearing, HSARB issues a written decision stating whether or not the 
health care service is financially covered by the provincial publicly insured health plan. 
The patient and/or OHIP may appeal the HSARB decision to the Ontario Divisional 
Court,
14
 then the Ontario Court of Appeal and ultimately with leave to the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC). 
  
2. Legal Framework 
The Board‘s decision regarding an OCCNEIHS takes place within a larger legislative 
framework. The legislated framework reviewed included the Canadian Constitution, the 
Ontario Human Rights Code, the Canada Health Act, the Ontario Health Insurance Act, 
                                                 
13
 HIA Supra Note 4 at s.20. 
14
 Ibid at s.24. 
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the Ministry of Health Appeal and Review Boards Act. Thus, the Board must determine 
resource allocation based on the parties‘ submissions within these legal constraints.  
a. Canadian Constitution: Division of Powers 
It is important to understand the overall constitutional context within which HSARB 
operates. The overriding statute that affects all laws within Canada is the Canadian 
Constitution
15
  of 1867. The Constitution has played an important role in the federal 
government and the provincial government with respect to the Ontario health care 
system. The Constitution divided the governance powers of the federal and provincial 
governments under section 91 and section 92. According to section 91 of the 
Constitution, the federal government has jurisdiction to deal with national issues that 
affect all Canada such as taxation (s.3), census and statistics (s.6) and marine hospitals 
(s.11). The federal government also has jurisdiction over Canadian issues outside 
Canadian borders such as trade and commerce (s.2). Thus, the federal government has 
Constitutional powers for some matters across Canada as well as issues outside or 
coming into or out of Canada. Provincial jurisdiction is outlined in s.92 of the 
Constitution. In addition to provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s.13) in 
the province and matters of a local nature (s.16), section 92(7) has been interpreted to 
assign the bulk of the jurisdiction over health to the provinces.
16
 As such, the delivery of 
health care is interpreted to be largely a provincial responsibility.  
 
                                                 
15
 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30&31 Vict., c. 3. 
16
 Section 92(7) states that province s have jurisdiction over health care delivery: 
The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and 
Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than Marine Hospitals. 
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In 1982, the Canadian Charter
17
 was enacted. While the Constitution applies to the 
provincial and federal governments, the Charter applies to the government relative to its 
residents in that it protects individual rights and freedoms from unjustified governmental 
actions.
18
 The Charter does not explicitly protect a right to health care but the Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC) has stated that when the government puts in place a system to 
provide health care, that scheme must comply with the Charter.
19
 
 
In 2002, the Ontario legislature clarified that the Board did not have constitutional 
jurisdiction to inquire into or make a decision concerning the constitutional validity of a 
provision of an Act or regulation. Thus, the Board‘s enabling legislation, the Ministry of 
Health Appeal and Review Boards Act,
20
 expressly prohibits the Board from having 
authority to inquire into or decide questions concerning the constitutional validity. 
Section 6(3) of that MOHARBA states:   
 
 Limit on jurisdiction 
6(3)  Despite subsection (2),
 
the Board shall not inquire into or make a decision 
concerning the constitutional validity of a provision of an Act or a regulation.
21
  
 
                                                 
17
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),1982, c.11 [hereinafter ―the Charter‖] 
18
 Nola M. Ries, ―Charter Challenges‖ in Jocelyn Downie et al. eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy 3rd ed 
(LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 541. 
19
 Chaoulli  v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
―Chaoulli‖] at para 104 per McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.. 
20
 S.O. 1998, Chapter 18, Schedule H [hereinafter ―MOHARBA‖]. 
21
 Ibid. 
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Prior to this amendment, the Board did interpret the legislation to include jurisdiction to 
determine constitutionality.
22
 However, given the 2002 legislative prohibition and the 
subsequent five year study period of 2003/04 to 2007/08, the Board would have operated 
under a jurisdiction which excluded Constitutional jurisdiction. The Board itself has 
recently recognized the argument that it should have Charter review powers but clearly 
stated that this scope is beyond its jurisdiction.
23
 
b. Ontario Human Rights Code 
While the Board does not have jurisdiction over constitutional questions, it does have 
jurisdiction to apply the Ontario Human Rights Code
24
. The application of the Code to a 
tribunal‘s statutory mandate was clarified on April 21, 2006 in the decision of 
Tranchemontagne.
25
 In that decision, the majority of the SCC held that administrative 
tribunals must apply the Code and consider whether any aspects of the tribunal‘s 
legislation are inconsistent with the Code when rendering their decisions. The majority of 
                                                 
22
 L.H. v. General Manager of OHIP, September 19, 2001 – unreported decision 
23
 In EH v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan), 2011 CanLII 67509 (ON HSARB), <http://canlii.ca/t/fnlpj> 
retrieved on 2012-02-13 the Appellant had made a number of submissions as to why the Board ought to 
proceed with a hearing on the Charter issues. The Board stated at para 10-11: 
―One such submission, to which there may be considerable merit, is that a Charter challenge made 
to legislation before the Board is considerably more expeditious, less time consuming and less 
expensive to the parties than proceeding before a Court.  The Appellant also submits that 
disadvantaged individuals would have a greater opportunity to participate in Charter challenges 
whether before this Board or other administrative tribunals than they would in a court proceeding.  
11.      As sympathetic as this Board may be to the Appellant‘s submissions, the fact remains that 
Section 6(3) of MHARBA presents an insurmountable hurdle for the Appellant to overcome.  This 
section does not allow the Board to even ―inquire‖ into the constitutional validity of an Act or 
Regulation, which is the very inquiry the Appellant asks the Board to make.  The Appellant has 
given no authority that deals with any other Board‘s jurisdiction regarding constitutional inquires 
in the face of such a prohibition.  On any principle of statutory construction or interpretation, the 
Board is foreclosed from granting the relief requested by the Appellant in paragraph 20.D of her 
submissions.  The question whether the legislature‘s erection of the hurdle faced by the Appellant 
was constitutional will have to be answered in another forum.‖ 
24
 R.S.O.. 1990, c. H.19 [hereinafter ‗the Code‘]. 
25
 Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] 1 SCR 513 [hereinafter 
―Tranchemontagne‖]. 
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the SCC also stated that tribunals that are properly seized with human rights complaints 
cannot decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in favour of referring the complainant to a 
human rights commission, unless the legislature has granted the tribunal the power to do 
so. The SCC stated: 
 
The importance of the Code is not merely an assertion of this Court.  The Ontario 
legislature has seen fit to bind itself and all its agents through the Code:  s. 47(1).  
Further, it has given the Code primacy over all other legislative enactments:  s. 
47(2).  As a result of this primacy clause, where provisions of the Code conflict 
with provisions in another provincial law, it is the provisions of the Code that are 
to apply.
26
 
 
As such, the Code is a statute with quasi-constitutional status, which the Ontario 
Legislature has given primacy over all other provincial legislation – including the HIA 
and Regulation 552.
27
  
 
The Board itself recognized its right to apply the Code in D.G. v. Ontario (Health 
Insurance Plan):
28
 
 
                                                 
26
 Ibid at para 34. 
27
 The importance of Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 and Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 (2009) should be noted – i.e. where a reasonableness standard of 
review applies, reviewing courts cannot substitute their own view of a preferable decision, but must 
determine whether the tribunal‘s outcome falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes supported 
by the evidence. 
28
 2009 CanLII 85052 (ON HSARB), <http://canlii.ca/t/2c035> retrieved on 2013-02-24 [hereinafter D.G. 
v. Ontario]. 
  24       
In the Appellant‘s Appeal, the Appellant states that the policy which does not 
provide for insured PSA screening tests is wrong and flagrantly discriminatory to 
males.  Accordingly, the Appellant‘s application raises a matter of alleged 
discrimination which may be contrary to the Human Rights Code of Ontario. 
Although this Appeal Board does not have jurisdiction to determine the 
constitutional validity of the statute (Ministry of Health Appeal and Review 
Board Act, Section 6(3)), this Appeal Board does have jurisdiction to consider 
whether a matter before this Appeal Board may be a violation of the Ontario 
Human Rights Code, since the recent Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC 
14 (CanLII), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513. More specifically, the Appeal Board may have 
jurisdiction to consider whether or not the exclusion of screening tests for prostate 
cancer in asymptomatic men and the failure to fund them is discriminatory under 
the Human Rights Code.   
  
The Appeal Board raised this matter with both the Appellant and the Respondent, 
and provided the Appellant with a number of options, including adjourning this 
Hearing in order to be in a position to provide evidence and argument on the 
matter of the alleged discrimination under the Human Rights Code, or obtain 
advice with respect to his rights in that regard, or proceed with the hearing in the 
absence of advancing such a submission before this Appeal Board.  The Appeal 
Board notes that its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Ontario Human 
Rights Tribunal.   
  25       
  
The Appellant chose to proceed with the hearing, and makes no argument with 
respect to whether the insurability of PSA screening tests was discriminatory 
against men.  The Appeal Board proceeded with this matter on that basis.
29
  
 
It is a challenge to understand how the Board must apply the Code – a quasi-
constitutional statute – yet the Board does not have the jurisdiction to deal with 
constitutional matters. This is a topic for another discussion. 
 
c. Canada Health Act 
In Canada, the Canada Health Act,
30
 instituted in 1986, is the legal foundation for the 
distinguishing characteristic of the Canadian single payer health care system of uniform 
and universal access to a comprehensive range of publicly insured physician and hospital 
services.
31
 To date, the CHA only has one Regulation, which outlines the prohibition of 
extra-billing and user fees.
32
  
 
The federal government uses its jurisdiction for taxation under section 91(3) of the 
Constitution to assist in the funding of the Canada-wide publicly funded health care 
system. The CHA is the umbrella legislation governing the conditions provinces must 
                                                 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [hereinafter ‗the CHA‘]. 
31
 William Lahey, ―Medicare and the Law: Contours of an Evolving Relationship‖ in Jocelyn Downie et al. 
eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3d (LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 1 [hereinafter ―Lahey‖] at 2. 
32
 CHA, Supra Note 30 Extra-billing and User Charges Information Regulations  SOR/86-259. 
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meet to qualify for full cash transfers of federal taxation funds to the provincial health 
care programs.
33
 Tax funding takes place through the Canada Health Transfer (CHT).
34
  
 
According to section 3 of the CHA, the objective of Canadian health care policy is to 
protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of Canada 
and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other barriers. 
The purpose
35
 of the CHA is to establish criteria and conditions for provincial insured 
health services in order to receive federal taxation funds/full cash contributions.  The 
CHA outlines, among other elements, the principles which underlie the publicly funded 
Canadian health care system and act as the criteria for the ‗full cash contributions‘ from 
the federal government to the provinces. These five principles – in addition to user fees 
and extra billing being banned
36
 -- are outlined in section 7. Section 7 states that the five 
                                                 
33
 It should also be noted that the federal government has extensive jurisdiction under other federal 
legislation governing health issues across Canada and across borders. Statutes outlining such federal 
jurisdiction include: the Department of Health Act, to protect against disease, to engage in health 
surveillance activities and to conduct research; the Canadian Institutes of Health Research Act which 
provides federal jurisdiction over the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, a major funding body which 
supports health research regarding individual and population health; and the International Health 
Regulations which seeks to prevent, protect, control and respond to the international spread of disease 
while avoiding unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade. 
34
 The CHT came into effect on April 1, 2004. Prior to that time, starting in 1996, block funding was 
provided under the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2011-02-e.htm, 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/fihc-ifass-eng.asp 
35
 Section 4 states: The purpose of this Act is to establish criteria and conditions in respect of insured health 
services and extended health care services provided under provincial law that must be met before a full 
cash contribution may be made.  
36
 Extra-billing 
18. In order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a fiscal 
year, no payments may be permitted by the province for that fiscal year under the health care insurance 
plan of the province in respect of insured health services that have been subject to extra-billing by medical 
practitioners or dentists. 1984, c. 6, s. 18. 
User charges 
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principles are public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability and 
accessibility.
37
 
38
 The federal government does not contribute revenue to all provincial 
health care – the federal government only contributes to provincial health care that is paid 
for by the provincial government and not by individual out of pocket payments or by a 
private insurance plan, and that falls within the statutory definition of publicly ‗insured 
health service‘.39 Under the Canada Health Act, ―insured health services‖ refers to 
hospital services, physician services and surgical-dental service. The provinces may 
choose to add additional health care services and practitioners to the provincially funded 
health care plan – but this is not required by the federal Canada Health Act. 40 41 
                                                                                                                                                 
19. (1) In order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a 
fiscal year, user charges must not be permitted by the province for that fiscal year under the health care 
insurance plan of the province.  Canada Health Act R.S., 1985, c. C-6. 
37
 CHA, Supra Note 27 Program criteria – section 7 states: In order that a province may qualify for a full 
cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a fiscal year, the health care insurance plan of the province 
must, throughout the fiscal year, satisfy the criteria described in sections 8 to 12 respecting the following 
matters: (a) public administration;(b) comprehensiveness;(c) universality;(d) portability; and (e) 
accessibility. 
38
 Lahey states at page 37 that health care services outside of Canada must be paid for at the rate that would 
have applied if the services had been provided within the province in question. This author cannot find the 
citation within the CHA for this direction. As such, the CHA does not appear to require this action. Rather, 
the payment by the province appears to be a provincial decision rather than a requirement under the CHA. 
39
 Insured health services are defined in section 2 of the CHA as: "insured health services" means hospital 
services, physician services and surgical-dental services provided to insured persons, but does not include 
any health services that a person is entitled to and eligible for under any other Act of Parliament or under 
any Act of the legislature of a province that relates to workers' or workmen‘s compensation. 
40
 The Canada Health Act, in section 2, also defines hospital services and physician services. ―Physician 
services‖  is defined as ‗medically required‘ services delivered by a person lawfully entitled to practice 
medicine in the place in which the practice is carried on by that person:  
―Physician services‖ means any medically required services rendered by medical practitioners.40 40 
―Hospital services‖ are ‗medically necessary‘ services provided both to in-patients or out-patients at a 
hospital. 
―hospital services‖ means any of the following services provided to in-patients or out-patients at a 
hospital, if the services are medically necessary for the purpose of maintaining health, preventing 
disease or diagnosing or treating an injury, illness or disability, …40 40 
 
41
 This author notes that physician services under the CHA are referred to as ‗medically required‘ services 
and hospital services are referred to as ‗medically necessary‘ services. The HIA, as we shall see, defines 
physician services as ‗medically necessary‘ and hospital services as ‗medically required‘. Hence, there is a 
definitional discrepancy between the federal and provincial definition of ‗medically necessary‘ as well as 
‗medically required‘. This is a fundamental definition difference. The scope of service inclusion for 
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It is important to note that within Canada, the vast majority of health care providers, 
including doctors, are either self employed professionals in private practice or employees 
of institutions or firms controlled and operated by independent corporate bodies.
42
 In the 
case of physicians, the benefit of this autonomy allows physicians to treat patients 
according to their own skill and judgment and not managerial direction. The downside of 
this autonomy complicates managerial direction, particularly for the health care system as 
a whole.
43
 So while provincial governments are responsible for regulating the quality of 
health services and whether or not a health service is publicly funded, they are not 
responsible for the clinical judgment of autonomously practicing doctors. A doctor is able 
to use his/her clinical judgment regarding needed health care services for a given patient. 
According to Lahey, physician generated demand for health care services is a leading 
preoccupation in health care policy.
44
 Given that the government funds medically 
necessary health care provided by such professionals as physicians, the government 
might attempt to reduce its costs by limiting health care budgets and the services that can 
be provided by doctors. This budget and service limitation has contributed to the public‘s 
perception and/or experience of long wait times to access health care deemed by the 
physician to be medically necessary.  
 
d. Ontario Health Insurance Act:  
                                                                                                                                                 
‗medically required‘ services and ‗medically necessary‘ services is not defined in the CHA/federal or in the 
HIA/provincial statutes and regulations. 
42
 Lahey, Supra Note 31 at 13. 
43
 Ibid at 13. 
44
 Ibid at 19. 
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In Ontario, the provincial government pays for insured health care services for Ontario 
residents via the publicly funded Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP).
45
 
46OHIP‘s 
funding sources are based on both provincial taxation revenue and federal taxation 
revenue, discussed earlier. OHIP is governed by the HIA. The Minister of Health is 
ultimately responsible for the administration and operation of OHIP as it relates to the 
CHA.
47
 As of 2006, both the Ontario Minister of Finance and the Ontario Minister of 
Health and Long Term Care ―may‖ negotiate federal government contributions/cash 
contributions regarding ‗insured‘ health services provided by a hospital or health 
facility.
48
 
49
 The provincial and federal taxation revenue which pays for health care is not 
unlimited, yet it is anticipated that more Ontarians will continue to seek publicly insured 
health care - including out-of-country health care. The increased demand is likely due to 
advances in medical technology coupled with an increasingly mobile and aging 
                                                 
45
 The determination of Ontario based medically required and medically necessary health care services is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
46
 It is unclear to the author at this time, what percentage of the Ontario government‘s annual budget is and 
has been spent on out-of-country health services – both for those cases coming before the Board as well as 
cases settled outside of Board Hearings. It is also not clear how much of the budget is spent on out-of-
country health service administration and litigation. It is not clear how much is spent on the actual out of 
country health service and the impact – medically and fiscally – from subsequent related health care follow 
up in Ontario. These questions, although important, are not answered in this thesis as they were beyond the 
scope of the Board‘s decisions.  
47
 HIA Supra Note 4 at s. 2(1), (2). 
48
 Ibid at s.3(1), (2). 
49
 This author notes that as of 2006, the Ontario Finance Minister began to represent the Ontario 
Government and to become involved in financial agreements with the federal government regarding 
insured services. Prior to 2006, it appears that only the Ontario Minister of Health represented the Ontario 
Government in financial agreements with the federal government. With these two Ontario government 
representatives – the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Health – it is unclear who has the final 
decision making authority regarding financial cost contribution from the federal government. Given the 
increased role of the Ontario Finance Minister as of 2006 to represent the Ontario Government in 
discussions with the federal government regarding insured health services, it is speculated by this author 
that financial discussions regarding insured health services began to take on legislative importance. The 
increased prominence of the Minister of Finance in OHIP legislation may indicate a more important role of 
fiscal and economic matters in the determination of insured services. However, the increased role of the 
Minister of Finance – in addition to the Minister of Health - in insured service negotiations with the federal 
government regarding cash contributions means that there are two political stakeholders from Ontario who 
may or may not be in agreement as to what constitutes ‗medically necessary‘ and ‗medically required‘ 
publically insured health care. 
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population. Recent research suggests that an aging demographic has an increased health 
care utilization.
50
 If there is an increased utilization of the health care system then it is 
likely there would be an increase in the government expenditure on health care services 
and/or a decrease in the number of publicly insured health services. Ideally, the demand 
for publicly insured health care aligns with the purpose of the insurance.
51
 How decisions 
are made about what is covered by public insurance is at the heart of the system.
52
 
Difficult decisions must be made regarding what is and is not covered by OHIP. 
Currently, in Ontario, the government and representatives from the Ontario Medical 
Association negotiate ‗behind closed doors‘ what health care services will be insured by 
OHIP.
53
 
 
It has been said that the process derives political legitimacy from the participation 
of governments and clinical legitimacy from the participation of medical 
associations. But these sources of legitimacy are likely to be undermined by the 
                                                 
50 Jason Nie, Li Tracy Wang, Shawn C, Rahim Moineddin, Ross Upshur, Health care service utilization 
among the elderly: findings from the Study to Understand the Chronic Condition Experience of the Elderly 
and the Disabled (SUCCEED project), 2008, 14:6 December, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 
1044-1049 
51
 Purpose of insurance 
10.  The Ontario Health Insurance Plan is continued for the purpose of providing for insurance against the 
costs of insured services on a non-profit basis on uniform terms and conditions available to all residents of 
Ontario, in accordance with this Act, and providing other health benefits related thereto. R.S.O. 1990, 
c. H.6, s. 10. 
52
 Lahey, Supra Note 31 at 39. 
53
 The process of determining insurance coverage does include government decision makers and clinical 
decision makers. However, it is unclear if this process of determining insurance coverage is based on 
medically necessary and medically required health care or if the process is based on the government‘s 
interest in cost controls and the clinicians‘ interest in reimbursement for their services or both. Either way, 
the process is not transparent and the substantive arguments for inclusion and exclusion of insured health 
care unclear.  
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primary focus of the process on physician incomes and by the pervasive concern 
of governments for cost-containment as an overriding policy objective.
54
  
 
e. Health Services Appeal and Review Board 
As will be outlined below, the academic literature has discussed the role of the courts and 
the use of the Charter in health care decision making. In Ontario, there is a statutory right 
for insured persons to appeal government health care decisions regarding denied insured 
services to the Board, and the statutory right to appeal Board decisions to the Divisional 
Court. However, the Board‘s actual procedures and the substantive arguments of the 
parties and their association with Board decisions are under researched. It is not known 
on a quantitative research basis if procedures involved in Board hearings have an effect 
on the Board‘s outcome decision to grant or deny the request for health care services out 
of country. It is also unknown statistically why the Board grants out of country health 
care coverage in some cases and denies coverage in others. A closer examination is 
required of the Board‘s statutes, regulation, jurisdiction, composition, procedures, 
substantive legal arguments presented by the parties and the outcome decision given by 
the Board. This section of Chapter 2 examines what is known about the Board from 
legislation and released Board decisions.  
 
i. Statutes, Regulation, Jurisdiction and Composition   
HSARB was created in 1998 by the amalgamation of five tribunals.
55
 The Board‘s 
enabling legislation is the Ministry of Health Appeal and Review Boards Act 
                                                 
54
 Lahey, Supra Note 31 at 39. 
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(MOHARB). While HSARB is the appeal mechanism for multiple pieces of legislation,
56
 
the majority of the Board‘s work is with respect to one piece of legislation --the HIA. 
 
Under the HIA, the Minister of Health has the authority to create an advisory panel 
comprised of physicians to advise on the interpretation of insured services within the 
Schedule of Benefits. An opinion from this advisory panel is required within 30 days of a 
request from the Minister of Health or a physician.
57
 The HIA also authorizes the 
Minister to create a Medical Advisory Committee
58
 whose duties are to be defined by the 
Minister.
59
  
                                                                                                                                                 
55
 The Health Services Appeal Board, the Health Facilities Appeal Board, the Health Protection Board, the 
Nursing Homes Review Board and the Health Protection Board 
56
  MOHARBA, Supra Note 20 at section 6.(1) The Board‘s duties are to conduct the hearings and reviews 
and to perform the duties that are assigned to it under the following Acts: 
1. The Ambulance Act. 
2. Repealed: 2007, c. 8, s. 216. 
3. The Healing Arts Radiation Protection Act. 
4. The Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004. 
5. The Health Facilities Special Orders Act. 
6. The Health Insurance Act. 
7. The Health Protection and Promotion Act. 
8. The Home Care and Community Services Act, 1994. 
9. The Immunization of School Pupils Act. 
10. The Independent Health Facilities Act. 
11. The Laboratory and Specimen Collection Centre Licensing Act. 
12. The Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007. 
13. Repealed: 2007, c. 8, s. 216. 
14. The Private Hospitals Act. 1998, c. 18, Sched. H, s. 6 (1); 2006, c. 19, Sched. L, s. 8; 2007, c. 
8, s. 216. 
57
 HIA Supra Note 4 at s.5. 
58
 Ibid at s.7. 
59
 Ibid s.7(9)  
Duties 
The Medical Eligibility Committee shall perform such duties as are assigned to it under the Act or 
by the Minister. 1996, c. 1, Sched. H, s. 6. 
  33       
 
The General Manager of OHIP has the authority to grant or deny enrolment in OHIP, to 
confirm if a health service is an insured service under OHIP and to fund this service. 
Under the HIA, the jurisdiction of the Board is to hear appeals from ‗insured persons‘ 
who have been refused health care coverage and/or the reimbursement of claims by the 
General Manager of OHIP.
60
 Based on the Hearing, the Board can determine if the 
requested out of country health service is or is not an ―insured service‖ under OHIP. The 
Board can direct OHIP to take action or amend an OHIP decision as the Board sees fit as 
long as it is in accordance with the HIA. 
61
 
 
The HIA specifies that facts presented as evidence at a Board Hearing must be based 
―exclusively on evidence admissible or matter that may be noticed under section 15 and 
16 of the Statutory Powers and Procedures Act‖.62 63 Under the Board‘s Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, it is at the Board‘s discretion whether to admit oral or written evidence 
that is subject matter of the Hearing – at the Hearing if it is admissible in court but does 
not have to be proven under oath.
64
 
                                                 
60
 Ibid at s.20(1). 
61
 Ibid at s.21(1)  
Powers of Appeal Board 
21.  (1)  If a person requires a hearing, the Appeal Board shall appoint a time for and hold the 
hearing and may, by order, direct the General Manager to take such action as the Appeal Board considers 
the General Manager should take in accordance with this Act and the regulations. 2002, c. 18, Sched. I, 
s. 8 (12). 
Same 
(1.0.1)  For the purposes of making an order under subsection (1), the Appeal Board may amend a 
direction of the General Manager or a practitioner review committee and shall do so in accordance with this 
Act and the regulations. 2002, c. 18, Sched. I, s. 8 (12); 2007, c. 10, Sched. G, s. 16 (1). 
 
62
 Ibid at s.23(4). 
63
 R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22&23 [hereinafter ―SPPA‖]. 
64
 Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 16 
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In addition, the SPPA, the MOHARBA, the HIA and its regulations do not give the 
Board the authority to consider compassionate reasons as evidence of the need to grant 
out of country coverage. The Board is also not authorized to grant monetary damages.
65
  
 
A final decision of the Board can be appealed to the Ontario Divisional Court along with 
a transcript of the proceeding.
66
 Divisional Court can review the Board‘s decision on 
questions of law or fact or both. The Court can also exercise all the powers of the Board 
including endorsing the Board‘s direction to OHIP, substituting its own opinion and 
requiring a rehearing by the Board.
67
 
 
The Board is comprised of at least 12 members appointed by Orders in Council and with 
the approval of the Minister of Health.
68
  No more than three members can be medical 
                                                 
65
 Except, under Rule 16 of its Rules of Practice and Procedures, where a party has acted unreasonable, 
frivolously, vexatious or in bad faith in the course of defending or prosecuting an action 
66
 Appeal to Divisional Court 
24. (1) Any party to the proceedings before the Appeal Board under this Act may appeal from its 
decision or order to the Divisional Court in accordance with the rules of court. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 24 
(1); 1998, c. 18, Sched. G, s. 54 (6). 
Record to be filed in court 
(2) Where any party appeals from a decision or order of the Appeal Board, the Appeal Board shall 
forthwith file in the Divisional Court the record of the proceedings before it in which the decision was 
made, which, together with the transcript of evidence if it is not part of the Appeal Board‘s record, shall 
constitute the record in the appeal. 
67
 Powers of court on appeal 
(4) An appeal under this section may be made on questions of law or fact or both and the court may 
affirm or may rescind the decision of the Appeal Board and may exercise all powers of the Appeal Board to 
direct the General Manager to take any action which the Appeal Board may direct the General Manager to 
take and as the court considers proper and for such purposes the court may substitute its opinion for that of 
the General Manager or of the Appeal Board, or the court may refer the matter back to the Appeal Board 
for rehearing, in whole or in part, in accordance with such directions as the court considers proper. R.S.O. 
1990, c. H.6, s. 24 (2-4). 
68
 MOHARBA Supra note 20 at s.7(1). 
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practitioners.
69
 A Hearing can take place in front of an odd number of Board members.
70
 
In this study, all Hearing decisions analysed took place before the typical panel 
composition of three members.  The Chair of the Board is responsible for the selection 
and assignment of Board members to any given Hearing.
71
  
 
ii) The Board‘s Procedures 
At the court level – as opposed to the tribunal level -- it has been argued that common 
law requirements for fair procedures in court may, ironically, interfere with the goal of a 
straightforward, understandable appeal process by imposing complex procedural 
requirements, and thus impede access to justice.
72Alternatively, ―speedy, informal and 
inexpensive dispute resolutions backed by specialized expertise‖73 may facilitate access 
to justice. Several factors are thought to facilitate access to justice at the tribunal level. 
Pitfield – who has researched the Board‘s activities -- states that, in addition to factors 
such as perceptions of bias and lack of transparency, the accessibility of procedures and 
cost can act as significant deterrents in accessing the Board.
74
 Pitfield defined 
‗accessibility of procedures‘ as the provision of information about the Hearing. This 
would include the application of legislation, the provision of assistance to applicants 
wishing to prepare an appeal, as well as the need for legal counsel for unrepresented 
parties. In terms of cost, Pitfield states that the ―costs‖ of the appeal process at the Board 
– which include the cost of hiring legal services, documentary and/or testimonial 
                                                 
69
 Ibid s.7(3). 
70
 Ibid s.13(3). 
71
 Ibid s.13(2). 
72
 Caroline Pitfield,  2003 LLM Thesis, University of Toronto―Critical Evaluation of HSARB: Giving 
Patients a Louder Voice in the Health Care System‖, 123-5 [hereinafter ―Pitfield‖] at 123-125. 
73
 Judith McCormack, ―Nimble Justice: Revitalizing Administrative Tribunals in a Climate of Rapid 
Change‖ (1995), 59 Sask. L. Re. 385, online QL (AMPA) [hereinafter ―McCormack‖] at 5 of QL version. 
74
 Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at 123. 
  36       
evidence, along with the cost of traveling to Toronto for oral hearings -- have more effect 
on the applicant than on the defendant OHIP.
75
  
 
This section of Chapter 2 examines the procedures of the Board from a legislative and 
operational perspective. The enabling legislation, MOHARBA, as well as the HIA and its 
Regulations do not specify any requirements regarding procedural protections for a 
Hearing before the Board.
76
 However, several procedures were identified by the author 
based on a review of decisions. These include: the date of the Hearing; the date of the 
decision; the format of the Hearing (oral/written/teleconference/combination of formats); 
whether the parties were self-represented or represented by legal counsel; if an interpreter 
was present; and whether the Hearing was de novo or a review of a previous Board 
decision. These procedures elements are listed in more detail below. 
 
Dates (file/hearing/decision);  
Pitfield identified the Board‘s ‗timeliness‘ as a major impediment to access to health care 
services in terms of the delays between the notice of an appeal and the hearing itself, and 
the delays in rendering a decision. She also identified that issues coming before the Board 
                                                 
75
 Ibid at134. 
76
 Section 23(4) of the HIA does reference the SPPA regarding the admissibility of evidence at a hearing 
(SPPA s.15) and the notice of facts and opinions (SPPA s16).  
 
Findings of fact 
23(4)  The findings of fact of the Appeal Board pursuant to a hearing shall be based exclusively on 
evidence admissible or matters that may be noticed under section 15 or 16 of the Statutory Powers 
Procedure Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 23 (4). 
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were of increasing complexity.
77
 This increasing complexity may or may not affect the 
―timeliness‖ of Board procedures. 
 
According to the SPPA, the Board is authorized to establish timelines for its procedure 
and to review all or part of its decision.
78
 
79
  
Format (oral/written/teleconference/combination);   
Hearings before the Board can take place in several formats. A Hearing can be held 
orally, in writing or by teleconference call. A Hearing can also use a combination of these 
formats such as a written submission by the patient/applicant and a teleconference or in 
person appearance by OHIP before the panel. At the Hearing, the applicant – typically the 
patient or the patient‘s advocate – under oath presents his/her evidence to the panel as to 
why he/she should be granted health care service funded by OHIP and why they are 
appealing OHIP‘s decision  denying the service -- based on the HIA and Regulation 552. 
Evidence may include testimony, an approval form provided by OHIP and completed by 
the applicant‘s physician and witness‘ statements supporting the applicant. OHIP‘s 
designate then presents OHIP‘s evidence to support its decision to deny funding for the 
service to the applicant based on the HIA and Regulation 552. Once OHIP has presented 
its case, the applicant may question the OHIP representative to clarify its presentation and 
to make final remarks. Once both sides have presented their evidence, the panel thanks 
                                                 
77
 Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at137-140. 
78
 SPPA, Supra Note 63 at s.16.2. 
Time frames 
16.2 A tribunal shall establish guidelines setting out the usual time frame for completing 
proceedings that come before the tribunal and for completing the procedural steps within those 
proceedings. 1999, c. 12, Sched. B, s. 16 (6). 
79
 A Reviewed decision cannot again be reviewed by the Board Rule 21.09(6) 
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the parties and ends the hearing. Further evidence or advocacy is not accepted by the 
panel once the hearing has ended. The appeal is ended once a written decision is released 
by the Board. 
   
Self-representation/Lawyer 
The MOHARBA, HIA and its Regulations do not require the applicant to have a lawyer 
nor does the Board or government provide a lawyer or legal assistance to the applicant. 
 
Interpreter 
There is no requirement under the MOHARBA or the HIA to provide interpretation 
services to the parties appearing before the Board. The Board does provide interpretation 
services free of charge to parties if requested prior to the Hearing. 
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Review of Its Own HSARB Decision 
The Board has the jurisdiction to review and reconsider a panel‘s decision.80 Once 
reconsidered by the Board, the decision cannot again be reviewed by the Board.
81
 The 
review of a panel‘s decision can be the result of a request by a party or by the Board 
itself.
82
 The Board will determine if it reviews a decision based on a number of factors 
such as a material error, public interest, new evidence, reliance on or effect of decision, 
consent of the opposing party to the review and the availability of additional appeal 
venues.  
 
iii) Substantive Arguments of the Parties 
If OHIP has denied out of country health care funding coverage, it tends to be based on 
one of two conditions under the HIA: whether the applicant qualifies as an ‗insured 
person‘ and/or if the health care service is an ‗insured service‘ under the HIA, Regulation 
552 and the Schedule of Benefits negotiated between the Ministry of Health and the 
Ontario Medical Association. For the purpose of this thesis, the assumption will be made 
that the applicant qualifies as an ‗insured person‘. The focus of this thesis will be on the 
determination by the Board of what constitutes an ‗insured service‘. 
 
 
Insured Services 
                                                 
80
 SPPA, Supra Note 63 at s.21.2(1) 
A tribunal may, if it considers it advisable and if its rules made under section 25.1 deal with the matter, 
review all or part of its own decision or order, and may confirm, vary, suspend or cancel the decision or 
order. 1997, c. 23, s. 13 (20). 
81
 Rule 21.09(6). 
82
 Rule 21.03.  
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Under the HIA, an insured person is entitled to receive insured services.
83
 Insured 
services include: prescribed services of hospitals and health facilities,
84
 medically 
necessary services provided by a physician,
85
 and health care services provided by 
prescribed practitioners
86
 – all under conditions and limitations that may be prescribed. 
―Prescribed is defined as ―prescribed by the Regulations‖.87  Cabinet can make 
regulations regarding what is and is not an insured service and the payment scheme for 
the insured services.
88
 Regulation 552 governs insured services and specifically the 
services provided by Ontario physicians if those physician services are specified in the 
schedule of benefits
89
 and hospital services. An OHIP determination that a service is not 
an ‗insured service‘ can be appealed to the Board. Typically, a service is not an insured 
service because it is an excluded service under the HIA Regulation 552 s.24(1) or, in the 
case of out of country services, it has not met the ―test‘ outlined in s.28. The details of 
‗excluded services‘ and out of country coverage are outlined below. 
 
Excluded Services 
Excluded services are listed in the HIA Regulation 552 s.24(1). For the purpose of this 
thesis, treatment that is generally accepted in Ontario as being ‗experimental‘ is one of 
the services excluded from coverage listed in s.24(1). This section is analysed in more 
detail later in this thesis. The experimental exclusion from coverage states: 
                                                 
83
 HIA Supra Note 4 at s.12(1). 
84
 Ibid at s.12(1)1. 
85
 Ibid at s.12(1)2. 
86
 Ibid at s.12(1)3. 
87
 Ibid at s.1. 
88
 Ibid at s.45(1)(e). 
89
 Regulation 552 Supra Note 3 at s.37.1(1). 
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EXCLUSIONS 
24 (1)  The following services rendered by physicians or practitioners are not 
insured services and are not part of insured services unless, in the case of 
services rendered by physicians, they are specifically listed as an insured 
service or as part of an insured service in the schedule of benefits or, in the case 
of services rendered by optometrists, they are specifically listed as an insured 
service or as part of an insured service in the schedule of optometry benefits: 
… 
17. Treatment for a medical condition that is generally accepted within Ontario as 
experimental. 
… 
Treatment that is considered to be ―experimental‘ is not funded by OHIP whether the 
treatment is available domestically or out of country. 
 
Out of Country Coverage – the criteria ‗test‘ under s.28.4(2) 
In Ontario
90
, an insured person may receive coverage for out-of-country health care 
services under two conditions. The first condition is if emergency treatment is required
91
 
                                                 
90
 The CHA s.11(1)(b) obliges all provinces to provide ―payment amounts for the cost of insured health 
services provided to insured persons while temporarily absent from the province.‖ 
91
 S.28.3 states in part 28.3  (1)  In-patient services rendered outside Canada in an eligible hospital or health 
facility are prescribed as insured services if, 
(a) the services are medically necessary; 
(b) it is medically necessary that the services be provided on an in-patient basis; 
(c) in Ontario, the insured person would ordinarily have been admitted as an in-patient of a public 
hospital to receive the services; and 
(d) the services are rendered in connection with an illness, disease, condition or injury that, 
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92
 as a result of an acute, unexpected event which arose while out of Canada and requires 
immediate treatment. The second condition is if the health care service was a non-
emergency situation but received prior approval from OHIP. Non-emergency health care 
can take place on an outpatient basis or an inpatient basis. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the focus will be on non-emergency inpatient out-of-country health care services 
(OCCNEIHS) under s.28.4(2) which during the period 2003/04-2007/08 stated: 
 
s.28.4(2) Services that are part of a treatment and that are rendered outside Canada 
at a hospital or health facility are prescribed as insured services if, 
(a) the treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the 
same medical circumstances as the insured person; and 
(b) either, 
(i) that kind of treatment that is not performed in Ontario by an identical or 
equivalent procedure, or 
                                                                                                                                                 
(i) is acute and unexpected, 
(ii) arose outside Canada, and 
(iii) requires immediate treatment. O. Reg. 31/92, s. 3; O. Reg. 596/93, s. 2. 
(2)  In subsection (1), 
―eligible hospital or health facility‖ means, 
(a) a hospital licensed or approved as a hospital by the government in whose jurisdiction the 
hospital is situated in which complex medical and complex surgical procedures are routinely 
performed, or 
(b) a health facility licensed by the government in whose jurisdiction the health facility is situated 
in which complex medical and complex surgical procedures are routinely performed. O. Reg. 
31/92, s. 3. 
92
 Regulation 552 s.28.2 deals with emergency outpatient hospital services; s.23.3 deals with emergency 
inpatient hospital services. Section 29 deals with physician services 
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(ii) that kind of treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured 
person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay that would result in death or medically 
significant irreversible tissue damage.
93
  
 
Under the s.28.4(2) ―test‖, the Board must determine if the out of country health care 
treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical 
circumstances as the insured person in question.
94
 In addition, the s.28.4(2) test requires 
either that the treatment is not performed in Ontario by an identical or equivalent 
procedure
95
 
96
 or if the treatment is performed in Ontario but travel outside the country to 
receive the treatment is required to avoid a delay that would result in the insured person‘s 
death or significantly irreversible tissue damage.
97
 
98
 The s.28.4(2) ‗test‘ does not provide 
the Board with jurisdiction to assess economic factors such as service cost estimates, cost 
effectiveness and/or cost benefit analysis on an individual or societal basis. The s.28.4(2) 
                                                 
93 Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(2)(a)(b)(i)(ii). 
94
 For the purpose of this thesis, ‗out of country health care treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as 
appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances as the insured person in question‘ is also 
referred to as ‗generally acceptable‘ or ‗GA‘. 
95
 For the purpose of this thesis, ‗identical or equivalent‘ is also referred to as ‗I/E‘. 
96
 ―OHIP is in a better position than individual physicians to know what treatments are available in the 
province. Before a patient is allowed to go out of the country for treatment, OHIP must be satisfied that the 
treatment is not, in fact, performed in Ontario. Consulting with OHIP is the only effective way to make that 
determination.‖ Sandra Blad v. General Manager OHIP, unreported decision, December 18, 1998  
97
 For the purpose of this thesis, ‗delay that would result in the insured person‘s death‘ is referred to as 
‗delay-death‘ and ‗delay that would result in the insured person‘s significantly irreversible tissue damage‘ 
is referred to as ‗delay-MSITD‘. 
98
 This author points out that Ontario‘s HIA Regulation 552 s.28.4(2) test does not require the health care 
service to be available from another Canadian province before it is considers out of country for compliance 
with s.28.4(2) – the criteria is only if the health care service is not available in Ontario. Thus, 
section.28.4(2) allows for the review of out of country health care services for potential public funding 
before a review of Canadian provincial health care service options.  As such, a non-domestic service is 
examined before a domestic service. This is of interest to the author as the CHA requires that all provinces 
– in order to receive ‗cash contributions‘ from the federal government - operate under the five principle 
discussed earlier – including the principal of ‗portability‘ of health care services across Canada. The federal 
CHA does not make reference to the portability of health insurance across Canadian borders. Thus, it is 
unclear to the author how s.28.4(2) meshes with the CHA ‗portability‘ requirement.  
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test also does not include any criteria regarding the compassionate circumstances of the 
patient requesting the out of country treatment. As discussed earlier, the Board does not 
have jurisdiction to assess whether a provision in legislation is or is not constitutional. 
Prior Approval Requirement for OCCNEIHS: Section 28.4(5) 
The request for the OCCNEIHS must be submitted by a practicing Ontario physician on 
behalf of the insured patient. The physician must confirm that the OCCNEIHS requested 
is generally acceptable for persons in the same medical circumstance as the patient. The 
submitting physician must confirm that an identical or equivalent procedure to the 
requested OCCNEIHS is not performed in Ontario or that a delay in receiving the 
identical or equivalent provided in Ontario would lead to the patient‘s death or MSITD.  
Based on the physician‘s submission, OHIP will approve or deny funding for the insured 
service. Under section 28.4(2), if the OCNEIHS is to be approved, the requested health 
care service must be approved by OHIP prior to its receipt.  
 Section 28.4(5) states: 
 
 Prior Approval  
The following are conditions of payment of amounts for services prescribed in 
this Section: 
1. An application for approval of payment must be submitted to the 
General Manager by a physician who practices medicine in 
Ontario on behalf of the insured person and the application must 
contain a written confirmation from that physician that, in the 
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opinion of the physician, one of the conditions set out in clause 
2(2)(b)
99
 is satisfied. 
2. The General Manager must give written approval of the 
payment of the amount under this section before the services for 
which approval has been sought are rendered. 
3. The services must be received within the time limit set out in the 
approval described in paragraph 2. 
4. If the services are covered by a preferred provider arrangement, 
they must be received from a preferred provider. 
 
It is important to recognize that the Board struggled with the issue of whether or not 
OHIP had the discretion to fund OCCNEIHS that had not been approved by the General 
Manager of OHIP prior to being received by the patient. In October of 2008, the Ontario 
Divisional Court heard an appeal from a Board decision which upheld OHIP‘s decision 
not to fund OCCNEIHS which had not received prior approval. In January of 2009, the 
Ontario Divisional Court released its decision -- C.C.W. v. Ontario Health Insurance 
Plan.
100
 The court ruled that the HIA Regulation 552 s.28.4(2) did not provide OHIP with 
the discretion to retroactively approve OCCNEIHS.
101
 It is also important to note that the 
court hearing (2008) and ruling (2009) came after the thesis study period (2003/04-
                                                 
99
 Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(2)(b) refers to ‗either‘ identical or equivalent procedures or a 
delay causing death or MSITD 
100
 2009 CanLII 712 (ON SCDC), [hereinafter ‗C.C.W.] <http://canlii.ca/t/224j3> retrieved on 2013-02-22 
101
 Ibid at para 57 ―Neither the Act nor the regulations expressly confer a discretion on the General 
Manager to give retroactive prior approval for out-of-country medical treatment or to waive the 
requirement for prior approval.‖ However, the Court did find that the Board should have considered the 
urgency of the situation, objective of s.28.4(2) and the implied power of OHIP to grant retroactive approval 
in certain cases = para 108 ―The Board reached an unreasonable decision in failing to find that the General 
Manager has the implied power to give retroactive approval in urgent situations in order to meet the 
objectives of s. 28.4 of Regulation 552.‖  
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2007/08). As will be seen in the analysis of Board decisions made during the study 
period, the interpretation of OHIP‘s discretion to grant retroactive approval and 
reimbursement was variable. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the existing Canadian health 
care legislative system within which HSARB is situated. It is within this system and legal 
constraints that Board decisions regarding the out of country coverage of health care 
services are made. The overview highlights the complexity and extensive interaction 
between various statutes. The overview also highlights the legislative definitions as well 
as the lack of HSARB‘s specific procedural protections required under the MOHARBA 
and the HIA. As well, the overview outlines the substantive test for OCCNEIHS outlined 
in regulations.  
 
Chapter 2 is also important because this thesis analyses the study‘s results relative to the 
A4R theory and found that consistency with the A4R theory largely depended on the 
legislative framework outlined here rather than on the study‘s quantitative data. In this 
respect, the legislation complied with the A4R theory rather than the legislation‘s actual 
operation. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review: Part I 
Need for Empirical Research 
 
This Chapter outlines the academic discussion regarding the lack of Canadian empirical 
research in the legal academic field and on tribunals specifically. Not only is 
administrative law an under researched area of law, the lack of empirical research 
regarding administrative law poses a significant risk to evaluating the work of the 
tribunal and to the reputation of this legal academic field. The lack of research may be the 
result of many factors including research capacity, complexity, difficulty, institutional 
support and lack of prestige. This Chapter also reviews the limited existing qualitative 
and quantitative tribunal research. 
 
Need For Empirical Quantitative Research  
Empirical Legal Studies is a growing field of legal study which emphasizes the use of 
empirical research approaches similar to other social science disciplines such as 
economics, political science, sociology, and psychology. ‗Empirical research‘ is defined 
as the use of statistical techniques and analysis – including the systematic coding of 
judicial opinions that facilitate descriptions of or inferences to a larger sample or 
population as well as replication by other scholars.
102
 
103
 Despite the availability of 
                                                 
102
 Michael Heise, ―The Importance of Being Empirical‖ 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 807 [hereinafter ―Heise‖] at 810 
– Heise states that this narrow definition of empirical research is clearly distinct from traditional theoretical 
and doctrinal counterparts – at 833 Heise argues that ‗[w]here empirical questions lurk, data warrant at least 
as much respect as that accorded opinions and words‘. 
103
 Peter H. Schuck ―Why Don‘t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?‖ 39 J. Legal Edu. 323 
[hereinafter ‗Schuck] at 323- -24. 
  49       
empirical research tools, the current legal scholarship remains dominated by theory and 
doctrine.
104
 Heise states:  
 
―Our legal literature would be enriched if more academics, particularly law 
professors, became more engaged in empirical legal research and produced more 
of it … Empirical work sheds important light on old legal issues and identifies 
and speaks to the issues that the more traditional theoretical and doctrinal genres 
cannot reach. …‖105 
 
The dearth of empirical research by legal academics may be the result of several factors 
including: the lack of research being conducted outside of law libraries; most law 
professors who generate much of the legal scholarship yet lack training in the area of 
empirical research; the lack of prestige; the lack of internal and external incentives to 
conduct empirical research; the risk of exposure to falsification through replication of 
results and the fact that anecdotal evidence is often easier to collect than empirical 
research.
106
 Lowery and Evans argue that legal research does not focus on basic research, 
and, in addition to a lack of institutional support, there is a failure to teach methods and 
paradigms and expand research arsenals for scholarly work. This lack of rigor in research 
methods creates a ‗crisis of confidence of sorts concerning research that clearly exists in 
the field‘.107 Doctoral work is particularly challenged. The doctoral contribution to 
                                                 
104
 Heise, Supra Note 102 at 834. 
105
 Ibid at 834. 
106
 Ibid at 809. 
107
 Daniel Lowery and Karen G. Evans, ―The Iron Cage of Methodology: The Vicious Circle of Means 
Limiting Ends Limiting Means‖ (2004) Vol 36 No 3Administration and Society 306 [hereinafter 
―Lowery‖] at 308. 
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knowledge and theory development has been minimal and doctoral research in the field
108
 
is ―distinguished by its poor quality‖.109 The authors challenge the field to explore ways 
of introducing rigorous empirical methods into curriculum and research.
110
 
111
 
 
The urging for legal academic empirical research is not new. The development of good 
theories is made even more difficult without the benefit of good data
112
 and the lack of an 
empirical footing poses a threat to legal theory‘s persuasiveness and influence.113  
In terms of quantitative research, a study by Arthurs et al,
114
 stated that developing and 
applying statistical data in legal research was undertaken frequently by only 3% of 
Canadian law professors, occasionally by 15% and not at all by 58%. Empirical research 
methodologies were employed in less than 10% of the law review articles published in 
each of five selected years of the study.
115Arthurs et al conclude ―… that lists of research 
projects undertaken by these institutions rarely indicate any empirical, interdisciplinary, 
comparative or historical aspects.‖116 The Nuffield Report of 2006 points out similarities 
to the Arthurs 1983 study. The Nuffield Report of 2006 found that, despite the 
achievements and potential of empirical legal research, UK universities had a current 
                                                 
108
 Lowery, Supra Note 107 is referring to scholarly research in Public Administration 
109
 Ibid at 308. 
110
 Ibid at 307. 
111
 Ibidat 307. 
112
 Derek C. Bok, ―A Flawed System of Law Practice‖ (1983) 33 J. Legal Educ. 570 [hereinafter ―Bok‖] at 
581. 
113
 Richard A. Posner, ―Against Constitutional Theory‖ (1998) 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 [hereinafter ―Posner‖] 
at 3. 
114
 H.W. Arthurs, Law and learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (Ottawa: Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, April 1983) [hereinafter ―Arthurs 1983‖] Table 1.  
115
 Arthurs 1983 Supra Table 4.   
116
 Ibid at 83.  
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capacity crisis to undertake empirical legal research and that this crisis would grow 
worse.
117
  
 
Need for Empirical Research of Tribunals 
In addition to the dearth of empirical research by legal academics generally, there is also 
a dearth of Canadian empirical research of tribunals. For example, there is a disturbing 
absence of debate in the academic literature regarding the actual administrative tribunal 
procedures experienced by litigants, the substantive legal arguments and the association 
with the outcome resource allocation decisions by tribunals. The lack of information and 
debate is important because more citizens have resource allocation decisions determined 
by tribunals than by courts.
118
 Administrative law – and a tribunal specifically -- is 
concerned with everyday practice of administrative justice, not just judicial review of 
administrative decision-making.
119
 Even more disturbing is the absence of thorough 
empirical research regarding the actual functioning of tribunals and the evaluation of this 
actual functioning related to its ideal functioning. Preliminary qualitative and quantitative 
empirical research, as cited below, offer insights into tribunal functions. More 
importantly, the cited tribunal research provides insights into study methodology 
challenges and the importance of sound methodology upon which conclusions should be 
based.  
 
                                                 
117
 The Nuffield Foundation, Nuffield Inquiry Law in the Real World: Improving Our Understanding of 
How Law Works, Final Report and Recommendations, The Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research, 
(London, 2006), online http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/empirical/docs/inquiry_report.pdf at 39. 
118
 Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 at 899-900.  
119
 Lorne Sossin, ―Access to Administrative Justice and Other Worries‖ in Colleen M. Flood et al, eds, 
Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008) 391-409 
[hereinafter ―Sossin‖].  
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According to Sossin and Hoffman, tribunals are key in allocating scarce resources yet 
their decision making process and content is under researched. Empirical research to 
evaluate the accountability of tribunals ‗is one of the least scrutinized areas of 
administrative law‘.120 The authors state that an assessment of health-related adjudicative 
tribunals has never before been comprehensively undertaken.
121
 
 
―The dearth of externally-focused empirical evaluation is not only a missed 
opportunity, in our view, but may also pose a significant risk. ... Without this data, 
the Boards may lack the baseline measurements needed to track changes over 
time, evaluate the performance of decision-makers and staff, and engage in longer 
term strategy planning. ... For academics, it is an under-scrutinized sphere of 
administrative law and health system functioning that is both ripe for research 
and, potentially, reform.‖122  
 
The authors recommend the need for evidence and data driven strategies in order to 
evaluate and achieve a tribunal‘s intended purpose.123 They argue that the current 
research focuses on theory, doctrine, and procedures - not substantive decision making 
that could be assessed through empirical research.  
 
                                                 
120
Lorne Sossin, and Stephen Hoffman, ―Empirically evaluating the impact of adjudicative tribunals in the 
health sector: context, challenges and opportunities‖ (2010) 28 Windsor Y.B. Access Justice 343-360 
[hereinafter ―Sossin and Hoffman‖]. 
121
 Ibid at 345. 
122
 Ibid at 353. 
123
 Ibid at 117. 
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―Once a system of empirical observation is in place, potential evaluators can 
establish benchmarks according to which they can track and assess performance. 
Such comparative points of measurement can be drawn from thoughtful 
consideration, aspiration goals of leaders, expert judgment on what is possible, 
data from similar tribunals in other jurisdictions (i.e. comparative analysis), or 
previous empirical observations from the same tribunal (i.e. interrupted time-
series analysis).‖124 
……… 
The two tribunal paradigms – process and substance – which present a unique 
challenge for empirical evaluation as simple evaluation cannot be effectively 
utilized. However, the fact that evaluation is not easy does not detract from its 
importance.
125
  
 
The authors make a final comment on the role of empirical research in legal academia. 
While empirical research is not new to the health sector, it is rare in the context of 
administrative justice.  The authors state that the lack of empirical research may be due to 
the complexity of the health system, methodological complications (simple research 
design cannot isolate cause-effect relationships, lack of clear criteria and goals, few past 
examples to emulate) and legal barriers. The lack of empirical research may also be due 
to a lack of competence, capacity and academic prestige in the legal field to conduct such 
empirical research. 
 
                                                 
124
 Ibid at 359. 
125
 Ibid. 
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―Finally, as recently highlighted by the Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal 
Research, the legal academy also suffers from a dearth of empirical competence 
and capacity to conduct such studies. ... Empirical legal methodologies are also 
not generally recognized to be as prestigious within the academic community as 
traditional doctrinal investigations. The pervasive culture of deference to experts 
and authority must further diminish the perceived value of objective empirical 
work and weaken any apparent need for more rigorous research that is higher on 
the hierarchy of evidence.  Again, the focus on elements of process (e.g. bias and 
independence) rather than impact (e.g. judicial decisions) as indicators of quality 
and performance must also deter legal scholars from conducting work in this area 
such that target outcomes are less likely to be assessed.‖126  
 
Existing Qualitative Research on Tribunals 
Two graduate theses undertook qualitative research on tribunals. The Jacobs 2009 
doctoral thesis qualitatively analysed three Canadian tribunals regarding the factors 
influencing daily independent tribunal decision making.
127
 Specifically, Jacobs examined 
the internal commission relationships and their link to external bodies within the daily 
workings of tribunal decision-making via 30 interviews, focus groups and nine months 
observing daily operations of three commission (the Office of the Information and 
Privacy Commission in Ontario, the Quebec Commission d‘acces a l‘information in 
Quebec City, federal Privacy Commissioner‘s office in Ottawa). The study did not 
                                                 
126
 Ibid at 357. 
127
 Laverne Jacobs 2009 PhD Thesis, York University ―Fashioning Administrative Independence at the 
―Tribunal‖ Level: An Ethnographic Study of Access to Information and Privacy Commissions in Canada‖. 
[hereinafter ―Jacobs‖]. 
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examine structural guarantees of independence (financial security, security of tenure, and 
the appointment and removal process) and did not reveal confidential information about 
actual individual cases. Jacobs concluded that
128
 ‖when it comes to empirical studies 
compiling and examining what it is that tribunals do, there is a dearth of Canadian 
administrative law theory and information available.‖129 However, Jacobs stated: ―the 
realities of tribunal existence are not that neatly packaged ―130 and factors affecting 
tribunal independence did not ‗jump out‘. Nevertheless, the tribunals‘ institutional culture 
was found to be an important factor.
131
  This thesis provided an interesting examination 
of the factors affecting the independence of tribunal decision making and the ‗dearth‘ of 
Canadian administrative law theory generally.  
Brenda Gamble‘s 2002 doctoral thesis ‗What‘s In, What‘s Out – Stakeholder views on 
the Boundaries of Medicare‘ for the University of Toronto‘s Institute of Medical Sciences 
Department
132
 did not examine tribunals but rather undertook a qualitative study of 
decision makers‘ views on what health care services should be publicly funded. The 
views of ―policy elites‖ from key stakeholder groups across Canada were solicited. The 
                                                 
128
 Ibid. The theses comments are based on the SCC decision of Ocean Port Ltd. V. British Columbia 
(General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch) [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 and her review of the 
academic literature as well as her doctoral thesis research. According to Jacobs, this was a landmark 
decision with respect to the judicial statement that the amount of independence a tribunal should have is 
determined by the will of the Legislature. Jacobs states that, based on a SCC decision, scholars have been 
invited to determine the factors that affect the independence of various decision making bodies.  However, 
according to Jacobs, this decision has not been taken up as not much has been said or done on the 
development of models of independence and impartiality that are true to the work of tribunals. 
129
 Ibid at 7.  
130
 Ibid at 343.    
131
 As a result of the dearth of theoretical application of models to the actual practice of tribunals, Jacobs 
develops three new theoretical model regarding  administrative independence; independence informed by 
judicial dictates; independence informed by cultural understandings; independence informed by 
fundamental values of fairness. 
132
 Hereinafter ―Gamble‖. 
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general public was not included in assessing the views.
133
 The study concluded that 
‗policy elites‘ wanted to continue ‗needs based‘ health care provided by hospitals and 
doctors. The policy choices that were made earlier influenced the ‗policy elites‘ on what 
should be funded by Medicare and any change would be based on the government‘s 
ability to mediate the scope of conflict within existing institutional frameworks. This 
qualitative study is interesting methodologically  because in determining what health care 
services should be insured, it excluded submissions from the general public and it did not 
include the criteria for determining who were ‗policy elites‘.  
 
Existing Quantitative Research on Tribunals 
In his doctoral thesis for the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto published in 
1999, Chipman
134
 undertook an empirical quantitative research analysis of 669
135
 
‗reported‘ decisions136 on multiple types of appeals over an eight year period of one 
tribunal - the Ontario Municipal Board. Chipman sought to determine whether the 
                                                 
133
 A self administered 12 page questionnaire was mailed out in January to April 2002 to 4,934 ―provider‖ 
groups of which 2,523 were returned completed. In March to April of 2002 a web based version on the 
questionnaire – which only included one question – was sent to 5,200 embers of the Canadian Federation of 
Independent Businesses. Of the 5,200 web based questionnaire, 1,240 were returned completed. 
134
 John Chipman 1999 SJD Thesis ,University of Toronto ―Policy-Making by Administrative Tribunals: A 
study of the manner in which the Ontario Municipal Board has applied provincial land use policies and has 
developed and applied its own planning policies‖[Hereinafter ―Chipman‖]. 
135
 Ibid. - 348 cases for the time period 1971-1978 and 321 cases for the time period 1987-1994 
136
 Ibid - Methodologically, there was considerable provincial policy change over time which affected the 
tribunal. It was not feasible to analyse all decisions. (Chipman at 340) Each year looked at 75-80 decisions 
regarding planning appeals, referrals, assessment appeals and ‗other matters‘. The 75-80 decisions was less 
than the total number handed down by the tribunal but were decisions where the tribunal made a specific 
statement about its views on the matter in question. (Chipman at 341) Chipman coded the data based on: 
identifiers, type of application, land use type, supporters and opponents, professional support or opposition, 
expressions of provincial policy, potential areas of policy development, importance of policy to Board‘s 
decision and the actual Board decision.   
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tribunal applied provincial planning policy and/or developed and applied its own 
planning policy in many areas where the provincial policy was silent.
137
 
138
 
 
According to Chipman, Ontario tribunals have been the subject of rich, but often 
generalized and theoretical literature. Yet despite their importance, there has been little 
published empirical scholarly analysis of the manner in which such agencies actually 
engage in their day-to-day activities.
139
  
 
―Court decisions, particularly those of the more senior courts, are closely studied, 
but the vast range of administrative decision-making, which probably touches 
more persons closely than do judicial decisions, remains largely anonymous and 
unaddressed.‖140  
… 
―Given their significant role, it is valuable to have a clear understanding of the 
considerations they (tribunals) bring to bear in making decisions on matters under 
their jurisdiction.‖141  
 
Chipman concluded, based on his empirical quantitative research, the tribunal in his study 
did not perform according to the theoretical models: 
                                                 
137
 Chipman was also examining the relationship between tribunals and government and the degree of 
tribunal independence in carrying out their mandate.  
138
 Chipman, Supra Note 134 at 338.  
139
 Ibid at 4. -―There is no lack of ―how to be successful before the Board‖ presentation materials, often of 
high quality, prepared by lawyers, planners and other professionals who appear before it, but this is of 
necessity of a limited and practically-focused nature, and is no substitute for analysis which attempts to 
place the Board‘s decision-making in a more analytical context, to get behind what it does to examine how 
and why it does it.‖  
140
 Ibid at 1.  
141
 Ibid at 3.  
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―The OMB has not behaved as the literature of regulatory theory might have led 
us to expect. … The reality of regulatory activity, as the commentators fully 
recognize, can be far more complex and ambiguous, and the analysis of the 
Board‘s decision-making certainly reveals a pattern far removed from the 
theoretical norm.‖142  
This quantitative research is of interest as it examines actual tribunal decisions and 
undertakes statistical assessment of the coded results. Based on this quantitative study, 
Chipman concludes that the tribunal did not perform according to theoretical models. 
This is the first quantitative study of tribunals that identified the discrepancy between 
administrative law theory and administrative law practice.  
 
Karen Fernadez‘s 2009 York University, Master of Arts thesis, entitled Democracy, 
Power and Decision-Making
143
 continues Chipman‘s study of the OMB. She examined 
31 OMB decisions in the downtown Toronto core for the 8 1/2 year period of 2000 to 
2008. Fernadez sought to determine who benefits from the process given the way the 
OMB operates and how OMB decisions come to reflect the consistent nature of the 
Board‘s own developed policies.144 Given the methodology for this study, the author 
                                                 
142
 Ibid at 319.  
143
 Hereinafter ―Fernadez‖. 
144
 Fernadez comments that while other studies had looked at the role of citizen participation, the role of 
expert testimony and the effects of the appeals on the built environment, she wanted to investigate the 
decisions of the OMB in an attempt to determine the role that it has come to play in approving 
developments that are to alter the look of the city significantly‖ in relation to the adoption of the New 
Official Plan and the planning for the downtown area. 
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interprets the study results with caution
145
 but acknowledges the important development 
of indicators such as approval rates, decision outcomes, number of decisions with 
sufficient reasons for analysis, position taken by the Board, and policies referred to in the 
final decision. 
 
Caroline Pitfield, in her 2003 LLM thesis at the University of Toronto entitled ‗Critical 
Evaluation of HSARB: Giving Patients a Louder Voice in the Health Care System‘146 
examined public participation at the policy making level and the legal mechanisms to 
challenge government decisions. Specifically, Pitfield sought to ‗evaluate‘ whether 
HSARB, as a specialized appeal mechanism, provided patients with an accessible and 
effective way to challenge government decisions about the availability of ‗insured‘ health 
care both within and outside of Canada.  She wanted to explore ―how good a job the 
Board is doing as an appeal mechanism for those with complaints about access to health 
care services‖ particularly as compared to the Courts and given the relative dearth of 
review as to whether the tribunal could provide an alternate decision making mechanism 
with the values of procedural fairness, reasonableness and Charter principles like dignity 
and equality.
147
 Pitfield examined HSARB‘s statute, regulation, rules, annual report and 
‗unreported‘ decisions available in hardcopy from the HSARB office.148  
                                                 
145
 Comment - For the eight and a half years of January 2000 to August 2008, approximately 4-5 cases 
appears to have been selected per year – but this is unclear. While 36 qualified for the study only 31 were 
used – it is unclear what the exclusion criteria were for the 5 cases. The study only looked at a small 
geographic area (downtown Toronto – Bloor to Queens Quay and Parliament to Bathhurst) to the results 
can only be generalized to that area. The study claims to look at ―trends in decision making regarding 
planning in the downtown area‖ (p66) but it is unclear if trends can be extrapolated from this sample size of 
31 decisions and 8 ½ years of coverage.  
146
 Pitfield, Supra Note 72. 
147
 Ibid at 61. 
148
 Ibid at 7 ―… information on the Board is relatively difficult to access … unreported decisions were only 
available in hardcopy at the Board‘s Toronto office.‖.  
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Pitfield concluded that HSARB had the potential to provide patients with an accessible 
and effective way to challenge government decisions about health care availability but 
had yet to fulfil its potential and needed to be more accessible and responsive. With 
respect to the presence or absence of legal assistance provided by MOHARBA and the 
HIA, Pitfield states: 
 
―Those with lawyers (or with legal knowledge themselves) are better equipped to 
formulate effective arguments, to do the proper research, and to use judicial 
procedures to their advantage – examine and cross-examine witnesses, to bring 
motions and to make objections, based on the Board‘s Rule of Practice, for 
instance. They are also more likely to introduce legal arguments, or use statutory 
interpretations, which can be effective ways of challenging OHIP‘s insistence that 
a claim does not fall within the statutory scheme. Such advantages are in addition 
to the obvious impact that legal knowledge, and familiarity with legal procedures 
and relevant legislation, will have on the potential success of the appeal in the 
first place. 
 
The need to hire a lawyer to defend one‘s interests successfully in civil, and 
particularly [sp] criminal proceedings, has been recognized by parties in such 
disputes for years. There is also a constitutional right to legal counsel when 
interests of sufficient importance – like liberty and security of the person – are in 
jeopardy …  
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Entitlements to health care services are not considered serious enough to warrant 
state-funded counsel for those involved in Board proceedings. Still, appellants 
may feel that they are significant enough to justify hiring a lawyer, particularly 
given the potential complexity of the Board‘s proceedings and in the absence of 
much information or assistance with respect to how they work.‖149  
   
With respect to the Board, Pitfield concluded ‗there is a problem‘ as the ‗accessibility of 
procedures‘ are complex, difficult to understand, and may require the assistance of a 
lawyer or some form of legal assistance. 
Pitfield also noted that there was a gap between the parties‘ expectations of HSARB and 
the Board‘s limited jurisdictional powers.150 Pitfield argues for increasing HSARB‘s 
discretion, allowing HSARB to be more compassionate and extending its powers, 
providing assistance to unrepresented litigants, reinstating Charter jurisdiction, and 
increasing the Board‘s expertise regarding medical necessity. Despite numerous 
methodological challenges,
151
 this thesis provides important insights into the distinction 
between procedural aspects of a hearing and the substantive legal arguments before the 
tribunal.  
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 Ibid at 129-130.  
150
 Ibid at 100. 
151
 It is unclear what time period was studied, how many cases were studied and what the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria was used. It is unclear what is the definition and indicators for ‗‘accessibility‘ and 
‗effectiveness‘ i.e. are defined relative to the patients‘ expectations or relative to the tribunal‘s mandate or 
the courts decree. There were no key informant or interview assessment with patients, OHIP or members of 
the tribunal to qualitatively assess ―accessibility‖ and ―effectiveness‖. It is unclear whether this is a 
comparison between the ‗Courts‘ and an administrative tribunal or just an analysis of the tribunal. It is 
unclear if a ‗specialized appeal mechanism‘ differed from an ‗appeal mechanism‘ and ‗administrative 
tribunals
151
 In the absence of qualitative data, a documentary review was undertaken by Pitfield of HSARB 
related statutes, regulations, rules, annual reports and unreported decisions.  
  62       
 
Pitfield and Flood evaluated HSARB‘s out-of-country appeal process in terms of the need 
for an accessible, equitable, quick and effective process for an appeal mechanism within 
a publicly funded health care system.
152
 The authors reviewed HSARB‘s mandate, 
composition, definitions, regulatory provisions, and decisions. The study raised very 
interesting insights – particularly regarding the low success rates of appeals. However, 
the study is methodologically unclear with respect to time frames and the definition of 
medical necessity.
153
 It is also unclear if the study is based on Pitfield‘s LLM thesis or if 
it is a new study. If the methodology is unclear, the insights from the study are to be 
considered cautiously. However, the study was interesting in its exploration of 
substantive legal arguments before the tribunal.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the academic discussion regarding the lack of 
empirical research in the legal field and specifically the lack of empirical research on 
Canadian tribunals. Adjudicative administrative tribunals are important because more 
citizens have resource allocation decisions determined by tribunals than by courts. 
However, our understanding of how tribunals make resource allocation decisions comes 
largely through the academic analysis of judicial reviews undertaken by the courts, where 
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 Caroline Pitfield and Colleen M. Flood, ―Section 7 ‗Safety Valve‘: Appealing Wait Times Within a 
One-Tier System‖ in Colleen Flood et al ed., Access to Care Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press 
Incorporated, 2005) 477 [hereinafter ―Pitfield and Flood]. 
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 The methodology of the study – particularly with respect to the time period covered by the decisions - is 
unclear. For example, the article states 121 cases heard in 2002. The authors cite a 1995 case with respect 
to s.28.4(2) dealing with delay. The authors also make reference to a 1999-2000 time period and then to a 
2001 case heard in 2003 with respect to the release of a decision.  The study also makes reference to 
Applicant‘s understanding of ‗medical necessity‘ but it is unclear how many Applicants have this 
understanding and if the understanding crosses all years. 
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the courts are emphasising fair procedures protections. Administrative law is an under 
researched area of law. This lack of administrative law research poses a significant risk to 
evaluating the work of the tribunal and to the reputation of this legal academic field. Of 
the empirical legal research on tribunals that does exist, there are several methodological 
flaws and shortcomings which limit the interpretation and generalizability of the findings.  
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Chapter 4 
Literature Review: Part II 
Judicial and Tribunal Decision Making Mechanisms 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the judicial and adjudicative 
tribunal decision making mechanisms within which HSARB is situated. This chapter 
outlines the debate about the increased or decreased role of the courts in health care 
decision making and their oversight role of adjudicative tribunals through the use of 
judicial review. The increased or decreased use of the courts as decision makers about 
health care resource allocation is considered within the context of another academic 
discussion regarding whether the court is deferring difficult resource allocations to 
tribunals.  
 
2. Courts as Decision Making Mechanism 
Why is a discussion of health care resource allocation decision making by the courts of 
importance to this thesis, which focuses on tribunal procedural factors, the substantive 
legal arguments of the parties and tribunal decision? The answer stems from the fact that 
the courts can provide, among other things, direction to tribunals with respect to the 
tribunal‘s jurisdiction, procedural fairness, the appropriate standard of review and the 
interpretation of legislation.  
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Our traditional understanding of the courts and their health care resource allocation 
decision making arises out of a review of the caselaw and the academic analysis of that 
caselaw. In academic analysis, the use of the courts to allocate resources is discussed and 
debated. The debate centres on whether there is an increased or decreased use of the 
courts, why courts are being used as resource allocation mechanisms, whether the courts 
are suitable resource allocators and how the judiciary sees its role relative to tribunals.
154
 
There is also academic discussion about the role of government, the courts and tribunals 
in consciously deferring health care resource allocation decisions to each other as a 
means of dealing with or avoiding difficult health care allocation decisions. 
 
Hadorn argues that there is a progressive attempt by litigants to use the court as a forum 
for health care resource allocation – even if in reality litigation is a rare event. This may 
be due to assumptions that the courts have the capacity to deal with complex resource 
allocation issues and/or deal with constitutional rights. Litigation on questions of resource 
allocation may be the result not only of issue complexity but of decision consistency, 
individual judicial consideration, decision making capacity of institutions and political 
aversion to sensitive resource allocations.
155
  
 
Syrett argues that courtroom litigation is still rare. Litigation may be an evolving social 
and political trend, coupled with the increasing public visibility of strategies of 
                                                 
154
 With respect to the latter point, the courts themselves may have different opinions about their role in 
health care resource allocation.  
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 D. Hadorn, ―Emerging parallels in the American health care and legal-judicial systems.‖ (1992) Am J. 
Law Med.18:79-95 [hereinafter ―Hadorn‖]. 
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rationing.
156
 According to Syrett, key factors in the UK in the use of the courts for health 
care resource allocation is the attitude of the judiciary towards health care resource 
allocation claims as well as institutional and constitutional competence of the courts to 
adjudicate upon issues arising from allocation decision-making in healthcare. The 
consequence of these assumptions is that judges have tended to adopt a restrained and 
deferential approach toward such matters when argued before them.
157
 This judicial 
position has dissuaded many would-be litigants, who are likely to perceive other channels 
(such as the political process) as offering greater prospects of success.
158
 Syrett states that 
courtroom litigation regarding resource allocation is not the best arena in which to engage 
in deliberations on the need for rationing and the principles which should underpin such 
choices.
159
  The deferential approach of the judiciary to the government for direction 
regarding health care resource allocation may be problematic. Syrett argues that the 
government is unlikely to lead because ―of the propensity of politicians to engage in 
strategies of ‗blame avoidance‘ on questions of healthcare rationing. There is scope for 
other institutions within civil society to seize the initiative in generating wider 
deliberations on such issues. ... the courts regard their role as primarily reactive to the 
                                                 
156
 K. Syrett, ―Rationing in the Courts: England‖ in Law, Legitimacy and the Rationing of Health Care: A 
Contextual and Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)  [hereinafter 
―Syrett‖] at 159-178. 
157
 For example, Syrett examined the extent the U.K. courts to engage in questions of health care resource 
allocation in order to reach some conclusions about the openness of courts to employ public health law 
principles and values in decision-making regarding healthcare rationing. He concluded that English courts 
– the judges themselves - are generally more reluctant to prospects of evolution of a judicial role re 
decision on allocation of healthcare.  
158
 Syrett, Supra Note 156 at 161. 
159
 Ibid at 159. 
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wider health policy context.‖160 However, despite the problems, judicial involvement in 
health care resource allocation cannot be casually dismissed. Syrett states: 
 
―... courts may make a telling and useful contribution to the process of 
decision-making on the allocation of resource, although their capacity to 
do so will, of course, be contingent upon their readiness to adjust their 
restrained, deferential approach in the interest of fulfilling the sort of 
instrumental, facilitative role … ‖161  
Alternately, Mariner argues that in the USA there is an increased use of the courts as 
health care resource allocation forums. This increase, it is argued, is a result of proposals 
to reduce national expenditures for health care under Medicare and other programs.
162
 
These cost containment concerns have raised questions about the limits on legislative 
power to distribute health care benefits. Mariner argues that the American legislative 
power to distribute health care via the constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
analysis has been a weak, rigid and imprecise source of protection for the sick. As a 
result, there is a role for the courts to ensure a heightened scrutiny and flexible approach 
to reviewing claims. Mariner concludes that American judges may be seeking a greater 
role in health care resource allocation – a role she supports. However, when courts do 
                                                 
160
 Ibid at 178.  
161
 Ibid at 161.  
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 WK Mariner ―Access to health care and equal protection of the law: the need for a new heightened 
scrutiny‖ (1986) Am J Law Med. 12(3-4):345-80. Review. PubMed PMID: 3330409 [hereinafter 
―Mariner‖]. 
  69       
adopt the role of resource allocators, it is unclear if the courts offer an explicit or implicit 
recognition of the financial impact of resource allocation decisions.
163
  
 
Use of the Charter as a Decision Making Mechanism 
Whereas the Canadian Constitution outlines the jurisdiction of the federal and provincial 
governments, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms outlines the rights of individuals 
relative to governmental actions.  
 
There is a debate whether the Charter is being used as a resource allocator of health care 
and if this use is appropriate. Sheldrick argues that the Canadian courts have increasingly 
been used to allocate health care resources under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and under the court‘s authority to judicially review administrative law 
decisions.
164
 Charter challenges are resorted to because of the absence of effective 
alternatives to challenge decisions regarding access to government funded health care.
165
  
Alternatively, Greschner argued that there are few Charter challenges because of the 
relative comprehensiveness of the publicly funded system in Canada. She argues that the 
basic principles articulated in the Canada Health Act mirror values of equality and 
protection of human dignity under the Charter.
166
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 Mariner, Supra Note 159.  
164
 Byron Sheldrick, ―Judicial Review and the Allocation of Health Care Resources in Canada and the 
United Kingdom‖ (2003) 5 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 149 [hereinafter 
―Sheldrick‖] at 163. 
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 Martha Jackman, ―Charter Review as a Health Care Accountability Mechanism in Canada‖ (2010) 
Health Law Journal, Vol 18:1-29 [hereinafter ―Jackman‖].  
166
 D. Greschner, ―How Will the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Evolving Jurisprudence Affect Health 
Care Cost?‖ Discussion Paper No. 20 (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002) 
at 19. 
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Both Flood et al.
167
 and Sheldrick argue that Charter challenges as a mechanism for 
resource allocation decision making are costly and time consuming and may produce 
policy outcomes that are undesirable from the perspective of both the state and the user 
groups,
168
 and litigants have not necessarily seen judicial decisions as an effective form 
of decision making.
169
  
 
Sheldrick‘s position counters Flood‘s argument that the courts may be the best means to 
protect welfare entitlements and rights.
170
 However, there is a distinction between the 
recognition of a health right and the enforcement of that right. Flood and May argue that 
where patient health care rights exist, the issue of enforcing those rights needs to be 
examined.
171
 Jackman, alternatively, argues that there is no judicial recognition of a 
constitutional right to publicly funded health care based on need in Canada.
172
  Flood and 
May argue that patients need accessible, inexpensive means to deal with their rights in 
health care.
173
 The ability to bring forth patient concerns about resource constraints to a 
review body may also help shed light on inappropriate resource allocation decisions and 
spur change.
174
  
 
                                                 
167 Colleen M. Flood, Mark  Stabile & Carolyn Tuohy, ―What is In and Out of Medicare? Who Decides? In 
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―The evidentiary burden, costs and delays associated with ordinary litigation 
make it an impractical means of enforcing patients‘ rights. Moreover, patients 
cannot readily bring litigation against the system actors such as governments for 
resource allocation decisions. If a patient charter of rights is to be meaningful it 
must provide patients with an inexpensive, readily accessible, independent means 
through which to file a complaint and have it quickly resolved.‖175  
 
In terms of resource allocation, Jackman argues that the Charter has enormous potential 
as a health care accountability mechanism.
176
 Jackman argues that there is a judicial 
reluctance to use the Charter in rationing public funds for health care services.  
 
Canadian residents have utilized the Charter as a mechanism to question the 
government‘s decision whether to fund or not fund a health care service. In Auton,177 178 
a Charter argument regarding the violation of the equality provision – s.15 – was brought 
against the British Columbia government for its decision not to fund behavioural therapy 
for children with autism. The SCC ruled, in a deferential opinion, that there was no 
violation as the scope of Medicare was a matter for the legislature and not the courts as 
long as the government maintained equality of constitutionally protected access. As there 
was not a s.15 violation, the SCC did not consider cost arguments as s.1 justification. 
                                                 
175
 Ibid. 
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 Jackman, Supra Note 165 at 26. 
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 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 71. 
178
 Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) also used s.15 to 
challenge resource allocation re. the provision of deaf interpreters as an insured benefit – the SCC agreed 
with the claimants that the government had violated s.15.   
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According to Lahey, the decision by the SCC left the responsibility for allocating 
resource to the governments and legislatures.
179
  
 
Alternatively, in Chaoulli,
180
 resource allocation decisions were not left to the 
governments and legislatures. In Chaoulli, the Supreme Court ruled that Quebec‘s 
legislated prohibition on private medical insurance in the face of long wait times violated 
the Quebec Charter. However, only a minority of the judges found that the Quebec law 
violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter.
181
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saw him in January 10
th
 of 1995. On January 11, 1995, Dr. F. gave his recommendation to the patient but 
the patient wanted a second opinion. At a February 28, 1995 appointment, Dr. F. told the patient he was not 
an ideal candidate for hip surgery. On March 27, 1995 the patient went to the emergency room. On April 
11, 1995, Dr. F. saw the patient. On May 18, 1995, the patient received an operation on his left hip. From 
July 1995 to December 1995, the patient consulted a ‗number of people‘. In January of 1996, the patient 
fell on his shoulder. In April of 1996, the patient was operated on for a hernia. In February the patient met 
with Dr. F. who determined the patient‘s right hip required an operation. On September 4, 1996, the patient 
received an operation on his right hip. In the author‘s opinion, this is a significant number of health care 
services provided to the patient some of which the patient does not appear to experience a delay accessing 
care. In addition, the issue before the court with respect to the delay receiving hip surgery through the 
public health care system appears to be resolved within approximately two years. 
 
The trial court also appears to question the validity that the patient‘s complaint results from the public 
health service. The trail court stated: 
 
Mr Zeliotis initiated a media campaign denouncing the delays in the health system. The truth is 
that, bearing in mind his personal medical obstacles, the fact that he was already suffering from 
depression, his indecision and his complaints which in many respects were unwarranted, it is hard 
to conclude that the delays that occurred resulted from lack of access to public health services, and 
in fact even the complaints made about the delays by Mr. Zeliotis may be questioned … 
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Lahey states that:  
 
‗… the right of Canadians to health care is in the process of transitioning from a 
right that is defined by governments through their legislative and administrative 
processes to a right that Canadians will be able, to some still uncertain extent, 
demand from governments through the adjudicative process. Whatever else this 
may mean, it certainly means a new kind of accountability that requires 
governments to explain the rationale for their legislative and policy choices to the 
overseeing courts.
182
 
Lahey goes on to state that use of the judiciary to make resource allocation decisions may 
unavoidably focus on the rights of an individual rather than the interests of the collective. 
However, this individual focus ‗cannot be altogether bad‘ given the lack of participation 
of affected individuals and ‗black-box‘ decisions of bureaucrats.183 
 
The Charter raises two questions with respect to this thesis – 1) are tribunals themselves 
subject to the Charter and 2) are tribunals able to review Charter questions submitted by 
the parties. For example, are parties before a tribunal able to clarify whether they have a 
                                                                                                                                                 
It is possible to sympathize with Mr. Zeliotis, to understand the pain and anguish he felt, but one 
cannot conclude that the problems and delays he speaks of were solely caused by problems of 
access to Quebec health services. At the same time, the Court acknowledges that despite the fact 
that his medical file is not entirely conclusive he has an ‗interest‘ in the broad sense in bringing 
the instant proceedings. So far as he was concerned, he had real problems getting an operation and 
this caused him suffering. He felt he would have had better access if there were a private system. 
We cannot say this is true, but it is his opinion and he is entitled to it.‖ 
 
In this author‘s opinion, the Chaoulli case highlights the importance of understanding the patient‘s original 
submission at trial and the trial court‘s decision based on this submission.  
182
 Lahey, Supra Note 28 at 57. 
183
 Ibid at 58. 
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Charter right to a given health care service when the government denies provision of that 
service.  
 
With respect to whether tribunals are subject to the Charter, the 2001 Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor 
Control and Licensing Board)
184
, held that administrative tribunals as agencies are within 
the operations of the executive branch of the government and are thus – like the 
government itself – subject to the Charter. The question whether tribunals are able to 
review Charter questions was resolved in the 2010 Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
R. v. Conway
185
 which held that administrative tribunals are courts of competent 
jurisdiction to hear Charter issues and grant general remedies - if Charter jurisdiction has 
not been excluded by statute.
186
  
 
3. Judicial Review 
A quasi-judicial / tribunal decision can be judicially reviewed by the courts based on 1) 
an alleged breach of procedural fairness or bias and/or 2) the tribunal‘s inappropriate 
utilization of its specific standard of review. If a tribunal‘s decision does not comply with 
                                                 
184
 [2001], 2 S.C.R. 781, online QL (SCJ) [hereinafter ―Ocean Port‖] at para 32. 
185
 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 76 [hereinafter ―Conway‖]. 
186 Ibid - Conway at para 22 states: ―[t]he result of this question will flow from whether the tribunal has the 
power to decide questions of law.  If it does, and if Charter jurisdiction has not been excluded by statute, 
the tribunal will have the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies in relation to Charter issues arising in the 
course of carrying out its statutory mandate (Cuddy Chicks trilogy; Martin).  A tribunal which has the 
jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies is a court of competent jurisdiction.‖  
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procedures or substantive review relative to the standard of review, the court can quash, 
set aside or remit the matter back to the tribunal.  
 
Procedural Review of Tribunal Decisions 
Administrative tribunals, such as the Board, are required to follow procedures that are 
fair, particularly when Board discretion is involved.
187
 The court judicially reviews a 
tribunal‘s decision primarily in terms of the procedures the tribunal followed in arriving 
at the decision - as opposed to a judicial review of the tribunal‘s substantive outcome of 
the decision itself. As such, tribunals will endeavour to follow procedures that are 
endorsed by the courts in an effort to create a fair environment for both parties in which 
the tribunal will come to an outcome decision. The tribunal will also endeavour to follow 
procedures to avoid its outcome decision being overturned by the courts for failure to 
follow fair procedures.  
 
Decisions that are policy decisions, such as those made by the legislature or minister as 
opposed to outcomes affecting an individual, do not typically require following the 
procedural protections.
188
  The government has maintained that it is entitled to make 
health policy decisions and has refused to extend the duty of fairness.
189
  
 
The duty of fairness and the factors to be considered are established in caselaw. In Baker, 
the duty of fairness was held to require full and fair consideration of the issues and 
                                                 
187
 Baker v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration)  [1999] 2 S.C.R. No. 39, online QL 
[hereinafter ‗Baker‘] 
188
 Ibid at para 60  
189
 Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at 29.  
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‗meaningful opportunity to present various types of evidence relevant to their case and 
have it fully and fairly considered.‘190 The Supreme Court in Baker also stated that the 
right to participate, as an element of the duty of procedural fairness, ensured that: 
 
―..administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, 
appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional and 
social context, with an opportunity for those affected to put forth their 
views and evidence fully and to have them considered by the decision-
maker.‖191 
Baker also established factors which must be considered in the duty of fairness. These 
include five factors for general procedural fairness - the nature of the decision and the 
process involved in making it, the nature of the statutory scheme, the importance of the 
decision to the individual affected, the legitimate expectations of the parties, and the 
procedure chosen by the tribunal. Specific procedural fairness factors include - notice that 
the decision will be made, disclosure of the info on which the tribunal will base its 
decision, the opportunity to participate or make views known, full hearings similar to that 
which occurs in courts, opportunity to give evidence and cross examine, right to counsel, 
and oral or written reasons for its decisions.
192
  
 
                                                 
190
 Baker, Supra Note 187 at para 32. 
191
 Ibid at para 22. 
192
 Ibid . 
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According to Huscroft, the duty of fairness requires two things – (1) the right to be heard 
and (2) the right to an independent and impartial hearing.
193
 ―Hearings‖ do not 
necessarily have to be oral hearings as the modern state could not function if oral 
hearings were required for every administrative decision.
194
 It has also been argued that 
additional factors may influence an applicant‘s access to fair hearings. For example, 
access to justice factors may include such things as the access to adequate legal 
representation
195
 and physical access to administrative justice.
196
 
 
Pitfield argues that any shortcomings with respect to determinations of fact are not 
surprising as they are the natural result of administrative law‘s focus on procedure. 
Pitfield argues that ‗[w]hat matters are how the process looks and not necessarily how 
well it works.‖ In her view, tribunals have chosen the fairness of process over the 
accuracy of factual determinations and questions whether judicial procedures are actually 
fair and effective. 
197
  
 
It is expected by this author that procedures are neutral and allow the substantive legal 
argument with respect to the legislation to be the only determining factor(s) for the 
tribunal decision. But what if the due procedural protections, so strongly entrenched in 
administrative law, influence the outcome decision as much or more than the substantive 
legal argument(s)? This is a core question for this thesis - whether these procedures are 
                                                 
193
 Grant Huscroft, ―The Duty of Fairness: From Nicholson to Baker and Beyond‖ in Colleen M. Flood et 
al, eds. Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008) 117. 
[hereinafter ―Huscroft‖]. 
194
 Ibid at 118. 
195
 Sossin, Supra Note 119 at 402. 
196
 Ibid at 396. 
197
 Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at 98.  
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neutral or whether they – in addition to substantive legal arguments - influence the 
outcome tribunal decision. Subsequent chapters in this thesis analyse, for example, 
whether the procedures of the Hearing format and legal representation at the Hearing 
affect the decision regarding resource allocation.  
 
Substantive Review of Tribunal Decisions 
A ‗substantive review‘ of tribunal decisions by the courts is not a review of the 
procedures used by the tribunal but an actual review of the tribunal‘s decision relative to 
the tribunals‘ jurisdictional mandate, the standard of review and evidence. In essence, 
administrative law principles ensure decision-makers act within the bounds of their legal 
authority.
198
 While it is argued that the courts appear to have a deferential approach to 
decision-makers, including the decisions of tribunals,
199
 if the tribunal‘s decision is not 
legally appropriate relative to its statutory authority, the courts can overturn the tribunal 
decision.  
 
For example, in Stein v. Quebec (Regie de l‘Assurance-Maladie),200 the Quebec Superior 
Court overturned the Tribunal‘s decision to uphold the government‘s denial of out of 
country colon cancer surgery reimbursement. In that case, Stein was told by his physician 
that the liver metastases should be removed as soon as possible. Stein, after being 
rescheduled for surgery several times, sought surgery out of country via a procedure that 
was considered by the tribunal to be ‗experimental‘ in Canada. The Quebec Superior 
                                                 
198
 Nola Reis, Charter Challenges‖ in Jocelyn Downie et al ed., Canadian Health Law and Policy 3rd 
edition (Canada, Lexis Nexis, 2007) at 538 at 556. 
199
 Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at 29. 
200
 [1999] Q.J. No. 2724, [1999] R.J.Q. 2416 (Que. S.C.). [hereinafter ―Stein‖]. 
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Court found the Tribunal‘s decision irrational, unreasonable and contrary to the purpose 
of the Quebec Health Act and ordered reimbursement.
201
 According to Lahey, ―Stein 
indicates an emerging willingness in the courts to demand that health care policy-makers 
more tightly connect their decisions to an understanding (and a justification) of the 
consequences of those decisions for real flesh and blood citizens.‖202  
 
When a court substantively reviews a tribunal decision, it is reviewed according to a 
standard. Until 2008, the standard of review varied for tribunals from correctness, 
reasonable simpliciter to patent unreasonableness. The court provided guidance to 
tribunals regarding the standard of review in the 2008 SCC decision of Dunsmuir v. New 
Brunswick
203
 which established correctness and reasonableness as the two standards of 
review. In the case of Flora v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan,
204
 the Ontario Court of 
Appeal held HSARB‘s Standard of Review as one of reasonableness. In C.C.W. v. 
Ontario Health Insurance Plan, the court confirmed that the Standard of Review for 
HSARB out of country cases was that of reasonableness
205
 and deference was owed to 
HSARB in the interpretation of its own statute.
206
 
  
                                                 
201
 Ibid at para 32. 
202 Lahey, Supra Note 31 at 52. 
203
 2008 SCC 9 (CanLII) [hereinafter ‗Dunsmuir‘].. 
204
 2008 ONCA 538 (CanLII) [hereinafter ―Floira‖] at para 92 ―I end my analysis of the reasonableness of 
the Board‘s decision where I began.  Under the formulation of the reasonableness standard articulated in 
Dunsmuir, deference is owed to the Board‘s decision if it falls within a range of acceptable outcomes that 
are defensible on the facts and the law and if the justification for the decision is sound, transparent and 
intelligible.  I have no hesitation in concluding that the Board‘s decision satisfies these requirements.  I turn 
next to Mr. Flora‘s Charter s. 7 claim.―  
205
 C.C.W., Supra Note 100 at para 46. 
206
 However, no deference was given to the Tribunal regarding the government‘s/OHIP‘s to retroactively 
give prior approval to out of country applications. The court also confirmed the Tribunal had no jurisdiction 
of deal with constitutional issues. 
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The courts have been helpful in establishing the standard of review for tribunals and 
HSARB specifically. However, the judicially reviewed tribunal decisions only reflect a 
small percentage of all tribunal decisions. The small percentage of cases on appeal to the 
courts may not represent the cases that come before a tribunal. Of the tribunal cases not 
appealed to the courts, little research has been done to analyze the procedures and the 
substantive legal arguments presented by the parties and the resulting tribunal decision.  
 
 
4. Tribunals as Decision Making Mechanisms 
 
Charter challenges before the courts review government decision making relative to legal 
rights and norms. Administrative Law is about ensuring that governmental power is used 
in an accountable, fair way relative to ordinary citizens.
207
 To different extents, both 
constitutional law and administrative law deal with the legality of government powers.
208
  
 
Administrative tribunals are important because more citizens have resource allocation 
decisions determined by tribunals than by courts.
209
 Tribunals are concerned with 
everyday practice of administrative justice not just the judicial review of administrative 
decision-making.
210
 
 
                                                 
207
 Colleen M. Flood, ―An Introduction to (the Effervescence of) Administrative Law in Colleen M. Flood 
et al, eds. Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008) 9. 
[Hereinafter ―Flood‖]. 
208
 Ibid at 9. 
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 Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 at 899-900.  
210
 Sossin, Supra Note 119. 
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Tribunals have evolved over the last quarter century from the old approach to governing 
which was one of ―command and control‖ whereby administrative bodies imposed the 
regulation and sanctioned any non-conforming behaviour to ‗new‘ governance.211 Under 
the new governance model, the ideal is that the government uses a mixture of tools to 
accomplish the government‘s goals including the concept of a ‗regulatory pyramid‘ of 
escalating strategies as a means of flexibility in enforcing regulatory regimes.
212
 
213
  
 
Our theoretical understanding of how tribunals make resource allocation decisions comes 
largely from the judicial review by courts of individual tribunal decisions.  The 
understanding of tribunal procedures and substantive legal arguments through the eyes of 
the court in judicial review is not the only way to understand how tribunals operate: 
 
―...for many years excessive emphasis has been placed on judicial review of 
administrative tribunals. Indeed, in the beginning years of the subject, and for too 
long, there was, in my view, far too much attention paid to legal controls of 
administrative action, as reflected, for example, in the views of A.V. Dicey and 
Lord Hewart of Bury, and not enough attention to what might be called a realistic 
approach to the subject ... .―214 
 
                                                 
211
 W.A. Bogart, ―The Tools of the Administrative State and the Regulatory Mix‖ in Colleen M. Flood et 
al, eds. Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008)  26  
212
 I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992).  
213
 J. Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
214
 Frank Iacobucci, ―Preface‖ in Colleen M. Flood et al, eds. Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008) xxiii. 
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5. Judicial and Political Deference to Tribunals 
In the academic discussion regarding the use of the courts as a mechanism to allocate 
resources, the issue of judicial deferral to the legislature and administrative tribunals 
arises again and again. Ham states that political leaders are reluctant to allocate health 
care resources at the macro level as they will have to accept responsibility for unpopular 
choices. The retreat from explicit resource allocation decision making can be interpreted 
as a political blame avoidance strategy to avoid unpopular decisions and shift these to 
tribunals, health authorities and physicians.
215
 Ham states: 
 
―In these circumstances, there is a tendency for policy makers to avoid blame 
either by ducking tough choices or by devolving responsibility to others. 
Rationing by guidelines rather than exclusions is one manifestation of this, in that 
it leaves ultimate responsibility for deciding who should be given access to health 
care resources to agencies such as sickness funds and health authorities at the 
meso level and to physicians at the micro level.‖216  
 
According to Flood, the larger debate around tribunal decision making regarding resource 
allocation has to do with whether the government defers politically sensitive issues to the 
courts and/or administrative tribunals as a way of avoiding unpopular decisions.
217
 
218
The 
courts are deferential to the government and both the government and the courts avoid 
                                                 
215
 Chris Ham, Glenn Robert, Reasonable Rationing: International Experience of Priority Setting in Health 
Care, (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003). [hereinafter ―Ham 2003‖] at 14. 
216
 Ibid at 8. 
217
 Flood, Supra Note 208 at 9.  
218 R. Abella, ―Canadian Administrative Tribunals: Towards Judicialization or Dejudicialization‖ (1988) 2 
Can. J. Admin. L & Prac. 1 at 2. 
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substantive resource allocation decisions by engaging administrative tribunals. According 
to Flood, the legislature makes a conscious decision to devolve difficult decisions 
regarding resource allocation away from the legislature and the courts and into the hands 
of administrative tribunals.
219
 Flood states:                                                                         
 
―Through statutes, legislatures give these tribunals and boards power over others. Their 
reasons for doing so are as varied as the types of delegated decision-makers in existence. 
Sometimes there is a desire to employ particular expertise that is not available within a 
government department; sometimes there is a need for an independent and impartial 
decision maker so that decisions are not seen to be dictated by political processes; and 
sometimes, which is of greater concern, governments may try to bury or deflect attention 
from inadequate funding for programs or tough resource allocation decisions by 
devolving decision making to administrative agencies with court-like powers. 
Judicialization can be appealing to governments, who ―clothe what are essentially 
economic or social decisions with a sort of protective colouring that may bolster the 
tribunal‘s credibility, or at least make it a little less vulnerable to criticism.‖220 
   …Whatever the reason for establishment of a board or tribunal, it is very important to 
realize that the legislature – almost always at the behest of the government – makes a 
conscious choice to devolve decision-making away from the legislature and not to the 
courts but to an administrative body.
221
  
 
                                                 
219
 Flood, Supra Note 208 at 8. 
220
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221
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the debates regarding the judicial 
and adjudicative tribunal decision making mechanisms within which HSARB is situated. 
It is debated whether tribunals provide an accessible, inexpensive mechanism for 
resource allocation decisions or whether they are just a mechanism for government and 
the courts to defer or shift difficult and/or unpopular decisions.  
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Chapter 5 
Literature Review 
Part III: Process and Substantive Theories 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the major health care resource allocation decision 
making scholarship and to identify the current debates in the academic discussions. This 
review will be used as the basis to develop a context within which to analyse tirbunal 
decision making factors – specifically the study of HSARB resource allocation decisions.  
This thesis does not review the scholarship on decision making capacity, appointment 
process of decision makers, the independence of decision makers or governance and 
regulation theory. These are valid ways to study resource allocation decision making. 
However, this thesis quantitatively focuses on actual procedural factors faced by the 
litigants and the effect these factors have on the decision outcome. The thesis also 
critically examines the substantive regulatory ‗test‘ in order to determine which factors 
actually influence resource allocation decisions. Thus, the literature review not only seeks 
to outline the various procedural and substantive decision making theories but to also 
establish, based on the existing empirical research, if the theories and the practical 
application of resource allocation decision making are aligned. If the theory and practice 
are not aligned, it is anticipated that the literature review will establish where the 
disconnect is taking place.  
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The literature, while providing an outline of the procedural and substantive theories, did 
not summarize common themes. This needed to be derived by the author from a review 
of numerous theories. An exhaustive review of the literature did not provide a 
quantitative analysis or examination of whether the theory and the practical application of 
resource allocation decision making were aligned. In essence, the lack of quantitative 
research literature regarding the alignment of theories to practice made the congruity of 
tribunal resource allocation decisions and any applicable theory difficult to understand. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: Part A examines access/procedural theories. Part B 
reviews substantive theories regarding who makes resource allocation decisions - 
technical review panels, physicians, multiple stakeholders and corporations. Part C 
examines ‗other factors‘ which may contribute to resource allocation decision making – 
such as economic theory and the ‗levels‘ of decision making. 
 
The next chapter will analyse, based on a study of HSARB decisions, what is actually 
taking place regarding resource allocation decision making. Subsequent chapters will 
analyse the theories relative to the actual procedural and substantive factors affecting the 
tribunal resource allocation decisions. 
 
2. Part A - Access / Procedural Theories 
The interest in health care resource allocation decision making arose because of difficulty 
obtaining agreement on the principles / substantive approaches that should guide decision 
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making.
222
 
223
  There was a need to ensure the decisions themselves were reached in a 
legitimate and fair way rather than focusing solely on substantive elements because 
procedural theory in health care resource allocation has been influenced by a number of 
theorists including the writings of Daniels and Sabin on the A4R, Nelson,
224
 Calabresi 
and Bobbitt
225
 and Orentlicher‘s226  and Chris Ham‘s 227 concern about transparent 
decision making. In essence, there is a theoretical debate regarding the transparency of 
procedures and whether procedural transparency is critical for the acceptance of a 
resource allocation outcome. There is limited academic qualitative research on the 
application of health care resource allocation decisions and there does not appear to be 
any quantitative research on the application of procedural resource allocation decision 
making theory to health tribunals. 
 
One prominent procedural theory, developed in the late 1990s by Daniels and Sabin, is 
entitled the theory of Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R).  In essence, the theory 
states that due to a lack of consensus over substantive distributive justice principles for 
health care, society must rely on fair deliberative procedures that yield a range of 
acceptable answers. In other words, Daniels and Sabin state that decision makers can 
only legitimately allocate health care resources for consumption by individuals and 
                                                 
222
 Daniels, N. Sabin, J.E. (1997). Limits to health care: fair procedures, democratic deliberation, and the 
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 David Orentlicher, ―Rationing Health Care: It‘s a Matter of the Health Care System‘s Structure‖ 19 
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society if the allocation process itself is accepted by society. In this respect, the outcome 
decision regarding the health care resource allocation may not be agreed upon, but the 
process for achieving the outcome is considered acceptable to individuals and society and 
thus the outcome decision is accepted. A key aspect of this procedural theory is the need 
to have a transparent decision making process. The ‗A4R‘ theory requires four conditions 
of transparency: publicity, relevance, appeals and enforcement. Under the publicity 
condition, decisions by decision makers must be publicly accessible. Under the relevance 
condition, the rationale for decisions must rest on the evidence that fair-minded parties 
agree is relevant. Under the appeals condition, a mechanism for challenging a decision 
and/or a dispute resolution mechanism must be made available. Under the enforcement 
condition, regulation of the process must be in effect to ensure the conditions of publicity, 
relevance and appeals.  
 
In 2008, Daniels and Sabin released a book entitled Setting Limits Fairly which asks the 
question ‗how can a society or health plan meet population health care needs fairly under 
resource limitations?‘ The authors recast their 1998 question regarding how to decide 
about resource allocation decision making. The authors asked under what conditions 
society should grant authority to individuals or institutions to set limits to health care? 
The authors concluded – as they did in 1998 - that limits can only be acceptable as 
legitimate and fair if they are established through a fair limit-setting process – according 
to the theory of A4R – such that stakeholders accept the outcome as fair and legitimate. 
Given the lack of consensus about approaches to rationing, society must rely on fair 
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deliberative procedures that yield a range of acceptable answers.
228
 Procedural fairness 
must, according to the authors, enable public deliberation and democratic oversight for 
health care limits. The authors state that legitimacy to decide is a fundamental problem of 
ethics and health policy regardless of financing, delivery systems or different countries 
and that no democratic society has achieved consensus on distributive justice principles 
for health care.
229
 
230
  
 
The necessity for transparency in resource allocation decision making as outlined by 
Daniels and Sabin is challenged by a number of academics. For example, in order to 
discuss procedural fairness accurately, transparency itself must be further broken down – 
something which is not done in the A4R theory. Nelson examined two types of 
transparent resource allocation decision making - explicit resource allocation and implicit 
resource allocation.
231
  Explicit resource allocation involves transparent decision making 
that acknowledges cost related concerns as the justification for limiting access to 
particular treatment. Implicit rationing involves decisions to limit access to care where 
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the legal principals of procedural fairness. Their A4R theory looks very much like the long standing 
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 Ibid at 4. 
One view is the sickest patients should receive health care resources. Another view is that society should 
maximize the total benefits its health care expenditures provide regardless of who benefits.   
 
―In the absence of a broadly accepted consensus on principles for fair distribution, the problem of fair 
allocation becomes one of procedural fairness. … When we lack consensus on principles that tell us what is 
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they apply, we may nevertheless find a process or procedure that most can accept as fair to those who are 
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231
 Nelson, Supra Note 224. 
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cost considerations are not articulated in a transparent process but are nonetheless a 
factor. In essence, both types of transparent resource allocation – explicit and implicit – 
acknowledge factors – such as cost – differently in terms of transparency and its effect on 
the outcome decision. 
  
The American academics, Calabresi and Bobbitt state that explicit public, transparent 
resource allocation decisions - that resulted in suffering and/or death -could exacerbate 
social tensions.
232
 As a result, society tries to conceal any conflict of values in order to 
avoid this social tension and appearing to make a ‗tragic choice‘.233 In other words, 
transparent resource allocation decisions may have a negative effect on society rather 
than allowing for acceptance by society.
234
 Interestingly in 2001, the UK academic Chris 
Ham,
235
 advocates for the development of resource allocation guidelines in a fair and 
open procedure so that decisions based on these guidelines are defensible. In other words, 
the transparency of resource allocation decision making does not appear to be sufficient 
without accompanying guidelines.  
 
In 2003 Chris Ham, stated the challenge of rationing health care services needed a 
systematic approach:  
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 and A Coulter, ―Explicit and Implicit Rationing taking responsibility and avoiding blame 
for health choices‖ (2001). J Health Serv Res Policy 6 163-9 [hereinafter ―Ham 2001‖].  
  92       
―In an era of ever-increasing medical possibilities, publicly financed health care 
systems face the challenge of determining what services should be covered for the 
insured population. This challenge, usually referred to as health care rationing or 
priority setting, words we shall use interchangeably, has led governments in a 
number of countries to take a more systematic approach to the determination of 
service coverage than has usually been the case in the past.‖236 
 
Ham advocated for resource allocation guidelines along side of exclusions and the 
responsibility for rationing takes place at many different points in the system - as opposed 
to one decision making point.
237
  
 
Need for Quantitative Research 
There appears to be little empirical research regarding the application of resource 
allocation decision making procedural theory to actual decision making. Two qualitative 
research initiatives looking at theory‘s application to practice have been done by Ham 
and Giacomini.  
 
In his book, Reasonable Rationing: International Experience of Priority Setting in Health 
Care,
238
 Ham investigated – based on case studies of five countries - the extent which 
actual resource allocation decisions met Daniels and Sabin‘s four conditions (publicity, 
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relevance, appeals and enforcement) in the A4R theory.
239
 Researchers for the Canadian 
component of the case study stated that the rationale for priority setting is seldom 
available to anyone other than decision makers. As a result, patients and the media are 
not aware of the difficulties faced by decision makers and are not able to engage in 
discussions around priorities. The researchers were also not aware of an appeal process 
for a second opinion. 
240
 
 
In the detailed reports of all five country studies, it was established that in decision 
making about priorities at the macro level, there are gaps in cost and benefit information: 
 
―Those responsible for priority setting therefore have to confront the need to make 
decisions in conditions of incomplete information and likely conflicts between 
objectives.‖241  
 
Even if more accurate information was available it would still have to be interpreted by 
policy makers in the process of determining priorities. Ham states: 
 
                                                 
239
 The five countries included: New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands 
regarding health technologies.  The following seven questions were asked of each country: 
 
1. What procedures are used to determine whether health technologies should be funded? 
2. What is the role of different institutions in these procedures? 
3. What kind of evidence do these institutions expect/require/consider in making funding decisions? 
4. What standard of proof do they expect to be demonstrated in agreeing funding? 
5. What appeal mechanisms are available for reviewing decisions? 
6. What does experience in your country say about the debate between those who argue for stronger 
institutions and those who argue for better information to support priority setting? 
7. To what extent does experience in your country meet the tests of accountability for reasonableness? 
240
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―One clear conclusion from experiences so far is the sheer messiness of health 
care decision making and the inherently political nature of priority setting. The 
allocation of scarce resources between competing demands is at once an 
economic challenge and a political puzzle. ..‖242  
 
From the work undertaken by Ham, it appears that there is evidence of a partial retreat 
from explicit rationing at the macro level. Instead of explicit rationing at the macro level, 
the focus on the meso level of health authorities and micro level of physicians of 
rationing could be interpreted as a political blame avoidance strategy in order to avoid 
unpopular decisions and shift these unpopular decisions to tribunals, health authorities 
and physicians.  
 
―In these circumstances, there is a tendency for policy makers to seek to avoid 
blame either by ducking tough choices or by devolving responsibility to others. 
Rationing by guidelines rather than exclusions is one manifestation of this, in that 
it leaves ultimate responsibility for deciding who should be given access to health 
care resources to agencies such as sickness funds and health authorities at the 
meso level and to physicians at the micro level.‖243 
 
In their study of twenty four Canadian health policy documents from January 1998 to 
January 2005, the authors – Giacomini, Kenny and DeJean - express concern about how 
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process theories, which assist with procedural fairness, are reflected in policy
244
  The 
authors found that the reviewed health policy documents cite health care frameworks but 
the frameworks are not well defined, described, or evaluated, vary substantially and 
provide little consistency. For example, the variability articulated in the terms ―equity‖ 
and ―accountability‖ suggested to the authors that policy makers currently develop ethical 
principles for their frameworks based on their own understandings and not based upon 
standard definitions. As such, the authors state that the development or reliance on an 
ethics framework as a feature of health policy should proceed with caution.  
 
In summary, the focus on procedures is the result of difficulty obtaining agreement on the 
theoretical underpinning that should guide substantive resource allocation decisions. The 
scholarship in the area of procedural theories focuses on pros and cons of legitimate, 
transparent resource allocation decisions in order to yield a range of acceptable answers. 
However, there is very limited qualitative research available and limited academic 
commentary regarding application of procedural theory of health care resource allocation 
decisions. There also does not appear to be any quantitative research on the application of 
procedural resource allocation decision making theory at the tribunal level. 
 
3. Part B - Substantive Theories 
a. Review Panels 
There is limited empirical research on the application of resource allocation decision 
making theory by tribunals in Canada. The limited Canadian empirical research that does 
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exist is not referred to by American academic discussion about health care resource 
allocation decisions. Instead, the American academic discussion is based on theory not 
empirical research. The academic theory discusses the creation of independent reviews by 
specialized technical panels
245
 and independent and impartial governing boards.
246
 These 
specialized technical panels would determine resource allocation. The debate is regarding 
the scope of jurisdiction of these theoretical bodies. 
 
Ruger argues that consumers alone, physicians or health experts, strict algorithms or cost-
benefit calculations, shared decision making within an informed consent model, fair 
procedures or third parties such as insurers should not make health care decisions.  Health 
care decisions must involve an integrated mix of stakeholders:
247
 
 
―Shared health governance extends beyond the individual patient-doctor 
relationship to the institutions that oversee the health sector. For example, 
patients must be protected from physicians who have financial incentives 
to provide inappropriate and costly care, of who unfairly deny, or fail to 
recommend, appropriate medical care; or who practice bedside rationing. 
In the former case, peer review should motivate physicians to conform to 
established standards. In the latter, appeals procedures should protect 
individuals from unfair denial of care. An independent and impartial 
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governing board should periodically review coverage and quality 
decisions, hear and rule on patient and physician appeals, and require 
guidelines to be adjusted. The board should also oversee and critically 
review quality of care and other information, including physician 
credentials and abilities. Many states currently have consumer grievance 
and appeal procedures, while Medicare has a federal external review 
system.‖248 
  
In terms of economic theory, Peacock states that resource allocation panels are important 
to the process of resource allocation decision making. Peacock states that resource 
allocation decisions must consider the outcomes and trade-offs of their decisions and that 
doctors must accept the key concepts that underpin programme budgeting and marginal 
analysis and other economic approaches to priority setting.
249
 
Sage argues for expert, independent review of disputes in order to screen and control 
ineffective, costly litigation regarding health care resource allocation decision.
250
 Such an 
‗administrative adjudication mechanism‘ would allow the use courts only to be used for 
unsettled issues. In this respect, independent review panels represent an extension of 
health care regulation rather than litigation management.
251
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The independent review panels, according to Sage, offer a standard process for resolving 
socially contentious entitlement issues that builds public values, strengthens therapeutic 
relationships by reducing adversarial tensions, building patients‘ trust in their health plans 
and providers, and rewarding compassionate behavior.
252
 Among other things, Sage 
suggests that independent review procedures should be different for insured individuals 
who are severely or chronically ill than for those who are only occasional users of health 
care services.    
 
The academic discussion reviewed above points to the need for specialized technical 
review panels populated by a mix of stakeholders. The debate regarding specialized 
technical review panels is regarding the scope of their jurisdiction. The jurisdictional 
scope may include patient protection from: inappropriate and costly care, the denial of 
care, the failure to recommend care. The jurisdiction may also require compliance with 
guidelines, oversee the quality of care provided, and periodic review coverage. The 
panels might also consider health outcomes and trade-offs and control for ineffective and 
costly litigation as well as following different procedures for chronically ill patients 
versus occasional patients.  
 
b. Physicians  
Resource allocation decisions by physicians based on medical necessity is debated in 
the literature. The debate is about whether physicians, as a decision making 
mechanism, determine ‗medical necessity‘ in the interest of the individual patient, the 
society at large or a combination of the individual and society – or – if physicians 
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should even be involved in these decisions. There is also discussion regarding the 
determination of medical necessity as a clinical, contract or corporate function and 
whether the term ‗medical necessity‘ is a term of art rather than a clinical term.253 
This debate considers whether or not utilitarian values – as represented by economic 
analysis, collective societal decisions versus individual physician decisions, and 
physician models of service delivery should be considered. Why is the role of 
physicians in decision making important to this thesis on tribunal resource allocation 
decision making? In the substantive argument before the HSARB/tribunal, physicians 
are required to determine if a procedure is medically necessary for a given patient and 
if a delay receiving that treatment would result in harm to the patient. In this respect, 
an understanding of the theory behind physician resource allocation decision making 
is important. 
 
Physicians Decide 
Ubel
254
 
255
argues that physicians should determine medical necessity and thus resource 
allocation for patients. Physicians, it is argued, are often asked to be "gatekeepers," 
determining their patients' access to medical therapies and technologies. At the same 
time, most physicians have been taught that they should act as patient advocates, 
pursuing patients' best interests regardless of cost. Ubel argues that healthcare rationing is 
appropriate in order to help control healthcare costs, and that rationing decisions made at 
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the bedside by physicians must be part of the rationing system. A system that attempts to 
control costs by mandating an elaborate set of rules would be burdensome to physicians. 
 
Physicians not to Decide 
Barrett
256
, on the other hand, argues that Ubel's main conclusion that physician 
participation in bedside rationing is essential to controlling healthcare costs ―is out of step 
with the current focus of thinking and policy debate within Canada and other countries 
with universal public healthcare systems.‖ Barrett states that in the Canadian context, we 
collectively need to better understand the limits and choices in defining the "medicare 
commons," which occurs at the intersection of the overall level of funding, the range of 
comprehensiveness of services provided and the level of access that we are able to 
provide. In order to facilitate this understanding and collective responsibility, a 
deliberative, transparent process that engages patients and the public must be undertaken. 
Ultimately, Barrett argues, physicians must accept responsibility to use scarce resources 
prudently. 
 
Veatch, like Barrett, opposes physicians allocating resources. He states that physicians 
who are bound by the Hippocratic Oath make poor allocators of health care resources 
because are they are working for the benefit of their patient at the expense of all others:
257
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―There are serious problems, however, with permitting allocations to be made on 
the basis of a clinician‘s interpretation of these traditional medical professional 
values…. Clinicians will differ amongst themselves over how these conflicts 
should be resolved. Even if they could agree completely, it would not follow that 
lay people – the ones whose lives are at stake and the ones who created the pool 
of resources to be allocated – would concur with the ranking. .. Because these 
choices have nothing to do with medical knowledge, there is no reason why 
clinicians should be the ones making them? It is the general lay public that creates 
the money pool to support dialysis and creates the pool of cadaver organs to be 
allocated. They should be the ones making the moral choices relating to medical 
and non-medical goods and relating the pursuit of maximum benefit to maximum 
justice or fairness in allocation. Clinicians should remain free to give undivided 
loyalty to their patients. That is incompatible with asking them to be resource 
allocators.‖258 
 
Aaron argued against the determination of medical necessity and medical resource 
allocation by physicians. A key factor that Aaron identifies is the link between 
economic analysis of health care and the generally acceptable medical norms of 
providing health care:  
 
―… In general, medical norms currently call for providing all care that 
promises net medical benefits. Under efficient health care rationing, some 
care will not be provided even if it is beneficial when benefits per dollar of 
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cost fall below some threshold. By definition, therefore, care that provides 
positive benefits below that threshold will not be offered. Because community 
tastes differ, some services that are deemed to generate sufficient benefits to 
justify provision in one community may be found not to provide sufficient 
benefits in another. Furthermore, judgments about medical benefits are often 
imprecise and probabilistic. Ethical challenges will arise from attempts to 
justify denial of care in one community that is available in others, or denial of 
care with a probability of success (or cost-effectiveness) only marginally 
lowers than that of another service that is available.‖259 
 
c. Multiple Stakeholders 
Lauridsen
260
 presents a third argument. He acknowledges the inevitable need for 
rationing of healthcare has apparently presented the medical profession with the dilemma 
of choosing the lesser of two evils. He states that physicians appear to be obliged to adopt 
either an implausible version of traditional professional ethics or an equally problematic 
ethics of bedside rationing. The former requires unrestricted advocacy for patients but 
prompts distrust, moral hazard and unfairness. The latter commits physicians to rationing 
at the bedside; but it is bound to introduce unfair inequalities among patients and lack of 
political accountability towards citizens. However, Lauridsen argues that this dilemma is 
false, since a third intermediate alternative exists. This alternative makes it possible for 
physicians to be involved in rationing while at the same time being genuine advocates of 
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their patients. According to this ideal, physicians are required to follow fair rules of 
rationing adopted at higher organizational levels within healthcare systems. At the same 
time, however, they are prohibited from including considerations of cost in their clinical 
decisions.  
 
According to Hunter,
261
 whether a physician should operate for the good of society, the 
good of their patient or somewhere in between - this is a ―wicked issue‖. Clinicians 
themselves are ambivalent on these matters. Many would prefer governments and 
politicians to make these decisions openly in publicly funded healthcare systems, since 
they determine how much of the overall budget is to be spent on healthcare. Others 
believe it to be the responsibility of clinicians to decide how health care resources should 
best be used in individual cases.  
 
It is also argued that the physician‘s role itself is unclear and as such makes the allocation 
of resources by physicians extremely unclear. According to Eike-Henner W. Kluge, until 
the role of the physician in resource allocation is more thoroughly assessed, there will be 
ongoing challenges in the formal decision making process.
262
 Physicians act as 
gatekeepers – and conflict results.  A physician has a fiduciary duty to their patient, a 
gatekeeper‘s duty to government funded health care resources while being self employed 
business operators.
263
 
264
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Kluge argues that simply picking one model – either the Hippocratic, Social Service or 
Business Model - will not solve the problem. Rather, a reconceptualizating of the three 
mutually incompatible models for a ―service-provider monopoly‖ is required. 
 
d. Corporations  
The debate over the role of physicians in health care resource allocation may represent 
the larger battleground of the clinical versus corporate control of health care.  The battle 
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may come to a head over the definition of the word ―medical necessity‘.  Sage265 argues 
that current allocation theories oversimplify the economic and clinical effects and focus 
primarily on the determination of ―medical necessity.‖ According to Sage, medical 
necessity is a term of art in health insurance contracts used to distinguish, at the margin, 
covered from non-covered services.
266
 
 
―To many physicians, the phrase ―not medically necessary‖ means ―not clinically 
indicated‖, which makes them question why a seemingly nonprofessional party 
such as a health plan has the right to challenge their professional opinion. To 
many health plans, it means ―not covered even though not expressly excluded 
from coverage,‖ which gives them a degree of comfort issuing denials based on 
established insurance practice even though such decisions outrage physicians. 
Consequently, decisions involving medical necessity are frequently characterized 
by inconsistent administration, poor communication, distrust and, if disputes 
arise, relatively unprincipled, results-oriented judicial resolution.
267
 
Sage argues that disputes about health care resource allocation portray the struggle 
between corporate interests and clinical judgment over health care decisions – and by 
extension, the legitimacy of allowing cost considerations to override clinical judgment. 
The concept of medical necessity (MN) is at the heart of insurance contracts. Sage argues 
that MN has a multitude of meanings and operates at a symbolic and substantive level, 
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sometimes referring to entitled medical benefits and sometimes referring to ideology of 
political positioning.  
 
According to Sage, a serious problem is that, because of its symbolic importance, health 
professionals and policymakers often regard ―medical necessity‖ as a coverage standard 
unto itself, rather than entwined with a historically determined, legally stylized insurance 
document that itself operates within an increasingly complicated set of relationships 
among purchasers, health plans, and providers.
268
 Sage argues that not only is there a lack 
of empirical research in this area, the court‘s involvement is questionable given their 
focus on the individual as opposed to the society at large: 
 
―Absent empirical research, one must employ less precise tools to 
explain medical necessity. Reading judicial opinions in medical 
necessity disputes conveys several distinct impressions. First, there is 
relatively little law in these cases. This is true even though, unlike 
medical malpractice cases, their rationales are fully stated in 
published text instead of being hidden in a jury‘s unexplained verdict 
regarding liability. Second, the facts of principal interest to courts 
concern clinical benefit to the specific patient bringing suit, not 
―population health,‖ ―cost-effectiveness,‖ or the prudent use of 
pooled social resources—in other words, identified rather than 
statistical lives. Third, the time pressures created by disputes over 
preauthorization and the potential conflicts of interest that beset both 
                                                 
268
 Ibid at 605. 
  107       
insurers and providers in managed care seem to make courts 
apprehensive that the facts before them are incomplete or 
untrustworthy. Fourth, hallmarks of procedural fairness 
at early stages of the dispute—such as clear explanations regarding 
denials, timely access to internal appeal mechanisms with competent 
systems of gathering evidence, and unbiased external review—tend to 
reassure courts that coverage cases can be viewed as contractual 
matters and make courts less likely to reverse the health 
plan‘s determination.‖269  
 
Sage ultimately concludes, despite the lack of empirical research, that the oversight for 
the allocation of resources should be based on a therapeutic (clinical judgment) rather 
than contract relationship (corporate interests).  
 
4. Part C: Other Theories – Factors Contributing to Resource Allocation Decisions 
a. Economic Theory 
Economic theory is the study of decision making regarding the allocation of resources – 
particularly under conditions of scarcity.
270
 Costs are integral to priority setting and 
economic theory – but are highly controversial.271 According to Ruger, economic 
analysis is part of utilitarian theory – which requires the allocation of resources in order 
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to maximize the social utility.
272
 
273
 The economic analysis, as part of the decision 
process, typically looks at the cost of treatment relative to the society at large rather than 
the cost of treatment to the individual. As such, resource allocation favoring the good of 
society may be in conflict with resource allocation favoring the good of the individual.  
 
It is important to note that not all academics agree that fiscal/cost issues should be 
incorporated into health care resource allocation decision making. Of the academics that 
advocate for the use of economic theory to be incorporated into decision making, there is 
not consensus on the extent of its use. For example, Robinson
274
 argues that the 
economists' approaches to priority setting (opportunity cost, marginal analysis and choice 
under scarcity) are based on the premise that it is possible to design a rational priority 
setting system that will produce legitimate changes in resource allocation. However, he 
argues that the economic models need to balance pragmatic and ethical considerations 
with economic rationality when making resource allocation decisions. Clinical autonomy 
must be balanced with financial responsibility:  
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―The results of priority setting will be implemented only if a decision making 
culture that considers costs, outcomes, and trade-offs between alternative uses of 
scarce resources has been established. Managers and doctors must accept the key 
concepts that underpin programme budgeting and marginal analysis and other 
economic approaches to priority setting. Successful application of priority setting 
methods requires a degree of integration between funding and priority setting 
mechanisms. If priority setting mechanisms conflict with funding mechanisms at 
local or regional levels, or with budget setting mechanisms within provider 
organizations, priority setting is unlikely to lead to changes in the allocation of 
resources.‖275 
While some academics argue that the use of economic analysis is key to the decision 
making process, the extent of its use and the value placed on financial considerations 
varies. For example, Callahan originally stated that for the greater good of society, 
government resources – such as Medicare in the USA – should focus on age-based 
rationing. The government should not pay for life-extending health care for persons who 
have lived out their ‗natural lifespan‘. Rather, payment by the government for life-
extending health care would be limited to those of an age not considered to be beyond a 
natural lifespan.
276
 This concept of rationing health care for the elderly was highly 
controversial. 
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Callahan subsequently modified his position approximately two decades later in 2008.
277
 
Callahan stated that under the best of circumstances, age should be irrelevant in the 
provision of health care. However, society‘s dilemma is how to ration health care in an 
era of growing Medicare cost, public pressure and expectations for more health care. 
Callahan argues that a society must reflect on whether there is an obligation to keep the 
elderly alive as long as possible, regardless of the cost of doing so? Callahan argues that 
there is a duty to help young people to become old people, but not to help the old become 
still older indefinitely. Callahan argues that a more reasonable goal is maintaining a high 
quality of life within a finite lifespan.
278
 
One may well ask what counts as ―old‖ and what is a decently long lifespan? We 
can generally agree that the present Medicare and Social Security eligibility 
criteria of 65 years is quickly becoming outdated. My own answer is that someone 
is old when it can be said that he or she has had a ―full life,‖ by which I mean 
enough time to do most (though not necessarily all) of the things that a life makes 
possible: education, family, work, and so on. As I have listened to people speak of 
a ―full life,‖ often heard at funerals, I would say that by 75-80 most people have 
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lived a full life, and most of us do not feel it a tragedy that someone in that age 
group has died (as we do with the death of a child).
279
 
280
 
Similarly to Callahan‘s position, Emanuel281 argues for a ‗complete lives‘ approach, 
which priorizes younger people who have not yet lived a complete life and will likely not 
do so without aid. Emanuel states that as an individual gets older in age, the probability 
of receiving a medical intervention should significantly decrease.  
 
Several academics debate the issue of cost and state that other non-cost information 
must be considered. For example, Aaron argues that in resource allocation of health 
care, a variety of analytical, political, legal, and ethical challenges emerge, including 
the need to develop information on the expected medical benefit of various treatments 
for particular conditions and to place values on those benefits and methods of 
enforcing limits that can be enacted and sustained politically.
282
 However, Trebilcock 
is of the view that imperfect information in the process of economic analysis is 
pervasive
283
 - almost no exchange is entered into with absolute perfect information by 
both parties.
284
 So, if the economic analysis information is imperfect, who makes 
decisions based on this imperfect information? Politicians, judges, medical experts? 
Trebilcock states that the incentive of elected officials is their political accountability 
                                                 
279 Callahan
, Supra Note 276.
. 
280
 It is interesting to note that at the time of this 2008 article, Callahan was 77 years old - ― There are some, 
like me at age 77, who continue to work, but the numbers drop off rapidly by 80 …‖ 
281
 G.P. Emanuel et al, ―Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions‖ (2009), 373 Lancet 423, 
at 428.  
 
282 Aaron, Supra Note 259.  
283
 Trebilcock, Supra note 270. 
284
 Ibid. 
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to constituencies and election, judges may be just as likely as politicians to adopt 
‗efficiency-determined conceptions of the social welfare‘ as notions of distributive 
justice,
285
 and medical experts have no advantage making social and procedural 
valuations.
286
  
 
―Hence, the common law courts are viewed as maximizing a broad social welfare 
function, while politicians and their delegates (for example, bureaucrats and 
regulators) are viewed as captives of factional politics involving competition and 
conflict among distributional coalitions. On this view, the common law will tend 
to be concerned with efficiency, the political process with often cynically 
motivated redistributional or rent-seeking objectives.‖287   
Mehlman argues that the cost based resource allocation is to be compared not only to 
other cost options but to the cost of denying treatment.
288
 Mehlman states that central 
to cost saving is the concept of ‗statistical‘ lives saved versus ‗identifiable‘ lives 
saved at any cost. Saving ‗identifiable‘ lives produces an emotional reaction and can 
be very compelling. 
 
                                                 
285
 Trebilcock finds the Efficiency of the Common Law Thesis – that common law exhibits a general 
tendency towards the evolution of economically efficient rules - uncompelling. 
286
 Rather Trebilcock asks: Who should be on the committee that decides the resource allocation? Who 
should appoint them? What kinds of information or submissions should be solicited? What criteria would 
be used to evaluate the information? How would the veracity of the information be tested? Would a 
reasoned set what criteria? Or should we adopt a completely non-rationalistic (‗black box‘) rather than 
rationalistic decision making process?‖  
 
287
 Trebilcock, Supra Note 270. 
288
 M.J. Mehlman, ―Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments‖ (1985) Wisc. L. Rev. 239 
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Ruger argues that both clinical and economic analyses are required for evidence-based 
decision making. In terms of economics, Ruger does include cost analysis, comparative 
pricing within a category of medical procedures and the importance of clinical case-by-
case judgments by physicians while ensuring that the physician has the medical capacity 
and is not financially influenced outside medical criteria. 
According to Williams, concern has increasingly been expressed at the low level of 
impact that economic evaluations have on the priority setting decisions they are designed 
to inform.
289
 While clinical evidence on the benefit and the costs being the main criterion 
used, Vuorenkoski et al argue that the criteria used for priority setting varied between 
studies, and also between decisions. The decisions seemed inevitably to be partly value-
based in their nature, as the scientific or other exact evidence did not give a firm 
foundation on which the decisions could be solely based.
290
 
 
On a global scale, there are different institutional perspectives on the use of economics in 
health care resource allocation decisions. The World Bank has done extensive work 
reviewing the literature on economic approaches to allocating health care.
291
 The World 
Bank report on the economics of health care priority setting concludes that because of 
limitations in evaluation methodology, equity principles and practical constraints, the use 
                                                 
289
 I. Williams and S. Bryan, ―Understanding the limited impact of economic evaluation in health care 
resource allocation: a conceptual framework‖ (2007) Health Policy 80(1):135-43. Epub 2006 Apr 18. 
PubMed PMID: 16621124. 
 
290
 L. Vuorenkoski, H. Toiviainen and E.Hemminki, ―Decision-making in priority setting for medicines--a 
review of empirical studies‖ (2008) Health Policy, Apr; 86(1):1-9 PubMed PMID: 17950484.  
 
291 K. Hauck, P. Smith, and M. Goddard, ―The Economics of Priority Setting for Health Care: A Literature 
Review‖ World Bank, Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper, September 2004. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/Healthnutritionandpopulation/Resources/281627-1095698140167 / 
Chapter3Final.pdf [hereinafter ―World Bank Report‖]. 
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of cost-effectiveness analysis in health care priority setting needs to be fundamentally 
rethought.
292
 On the other hand, the World Health Organization-CHOICE program has 
developed complex cost effectiveness tools for countries to analyse the cost effectiveness 
of health care interventions to assist in decisions around allocating scarce health care 
resources.
293
  
 
 b. ‗Levels‘ of Resource Allocation Decision Making 
The literature also discusses the theory that there may also be ‗levels‘ of resource 
allocation decision making. In other words, how a resource allocation decision is 
made depends on the level where the decision is made. Four key authors discuss 
‗levels‘ of decision making regarding resource allocation.  
 
According to Sunstein,
294
 there are three levels of resource allocation decision making – 
general, mid level and low levels regarding resource allocation decision making. The 
level may affect the theory utilized for analysis. It is also often difficult to distinguish 
between general, mid and lower level principles. Sunstein states that academics often try 
to analyze the general principle of resource allocation relative to legal doctrines such as 
contract law and constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and equality.  
 
                                                 
292
 Ibid. 
293
 http://www.who.int/choice/toolkit/pop_mod/en/index.html 
294 Cass Sunstein, ―Incompletely Theorized Agreements‖ (1995) 108 Harvard. L. Rev. 1733, at 1739-40 
[hereinafter ―Sustein‖]. 
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Sunstein
295
 goes on to discuss the concept of ―Incompletely Theorized Agreements‖ 
(ITA) which further provides a model for understanding collective resource allocation 
decisions. The concept behind ITA is that people can take different paths to common, 
often partial agreement. Sunstein states that it is rare for anyone to theorize any subject 
completely. There appears to be three levels of ITA – agreement on general principles, 
agreement on mid level principles and agreement on lower level principles – the latter is 
often seen in individual cases.  Most often, people agree on a general principle but not on 
a particular case. ITA may also involve collective agreement on mid level principles but 
disagreement on both general theory and specific cases.  There may also be agreement on 
mid level and lower level principles but not higher level principles. This sort of 
agreement is incompletely theorized in the sense that it is incompletely specified. 
Incompletely specified agreements permit acceptance of general goals when people are 
unclear about what the goals mean. This incompletely specified agreement hides social 
disagreement while allowing for both stability and flexibility.   
Emanuel identifies three levels of resource allocation regarding government decisions – 
macro, intermediate and micro allocations. Macro-allocations to determine gross national 
product expenditures on the resource; intermediate determinations about basic health care 
packages for all; and micro allocations regarding a particular patient and a particular 
service. Emanuel states that all intermediate determinations, as opposed to macro and 
micro decisions, should be transparent.
296
 In terms of micro allocations, he states that the 
problem with overutilization of health care resources has been in part driven by a medical 
                                                 
295
 Ibid. 
296
 Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Victor F. Fuchs, ―The Perfect Storm of Utilization‖ (2008) 299 J. AM. Med. 
ASSOC. 2789, at 2789-90. 
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culture and training that encourages physicians to ignore costs in recommending 
treatments – particularly high volumes of office visits, hospitalizations, tests, procedures, 
prescriptions. 
  
Instead of three ‗levels‘ Orentlicher argues that allocation of resources is done either 
through a centralized or decentralized model. In a centralized model, a commission is 
established to develop guidelines for widespread use. The advantages of this model are 
the increased legitimization of a transparent process involving broad participation, the 
preservation of the physician-patient relationship and duty of loyalty, and the promotion 
of consistency and fairness among patients.
297
 In a decentralized model, resource 
allocation decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. The decentralized model was 
considered advantageous because of the unfeasibility of centralized decision making for 
most medical decisions. Orentlicher argues that a successful resource allocation model 
would combine both the centralized and decentralized models. Orentlicher concludes that 
centralized rationing alone is not feasible and physicians should make rationing decisions 
in a treatment context while government should make cost-effective decisions, thus 
limiting the resources available to physicians and eliminating any personal incentive 
physicians may have for high cost care.
298
 
 
Like Sunstein, Ruger states that parties can agree at one level but not at another such that 
partial agreement and workable solutions are possible without requiring complete 
                                                 
297
 Orentlicher cites examples of a centralized model which include the Oregon model for expanding the 
number of residents on Medicaid by reducing the scope of health service coverage. Other centralized 
models include the UK NICE model and the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) which is a non-
profit organization that distributes organs for transplant. 
298
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agreement. Ruger also argues, again like Sunstein, that there are three levels of resource 
allocation decision making. The three levels include: the Conceptual Level concerning 
values for human flourishing; the Policy Level concerning policies and laws such as the 
division of the total sectors budget belongs within the context of the political unit and 
should be evidence based.; and the Intervention Level which concerns specific patient 
cases
299
 in which physicians should have the authority to make evidence based resource 
allocation decisions.
300
However, Ruger
301
 argues that there is persistent disagreement and 
little guidance about the principles governing resource allocation. There also is a lack of 
guidance regarding the definition of what health care benefits
302
 or the evaluation of 
outcomes.
303
 
 
As a result, Ruger offers an alternative theoretical framework for health, ethics, policy and law 
that integrates both substantive criteria and procedural mechanisms. She states we are at a 
crossroads of 
 
―…two dichotomous paradigmatic positions: consequentialism and proceduralism 
- which adherents often present as mutually exclusive. Consequentialists argue 
that we should assess health policy and laws by their consequences; proceduralists 
believe that fair processes will yield fair decisions. Thus far, neither end of the 
philosophical spectrum has promised or delivered a plausible solution, and 
                                                 
299
 Ruger, Supra Note 246. 
300
 Ruger does not link the three levels of ITA (conceptual, policy, interventional) with the levels of 
budgeting (macro budget decisions and health policy budget decisions) 
301
 Ruger, Supra Note 246 
302
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attempts to incorporate both positions have been unsatisfactory. As a result, the 
field is at a standstill. Any movement forward involved elements of both the 
consequentialist and proceduralist frameworks.  …‖304 305  
 
Ruger states that ―[i]f we are to develop a new paradigm of health ethics, policy and law, 
we must construct a framework that permits us to prioritize health goods and services 
amidst widespread disagreement.‖306 Ruger outlines a new model to address these 
problems. The model includes the following key principles:  
 
1. Humans flourish and health is required to flourish –  a person‘s  ‗health 
capacity‘ constitutes a person‘s ability to be healthy and thus flourish 
2. Value is placed on ‗basic‘ or ‗central‘ health capabilities such as the 
avoidance of premature death 
3. A joint scientific and deliberative approach is needed to judge health care 
interventions – based on evidence based medicine, expert opinion of 
physicians and health experts, and input from individuals – physicians and 
                                                 
304
 Ibid at 136. 
305
 According to Ruger, the current models fail to ensure just rationing for several reasons including:  
1. Focus on health care not health 
2. Focus on procedural fairness instead of substantive principles– democratic procedures for 
distributing health care are unclear with no moral theory for allocation 
3. Economic models need further development  
4. Role of preferences, both individual and societal, unclear in models 
5. Need more focus on ‗accountability for reasonableness‘  depending on different groups and 
values 
6. The current models are ‗indeterminate‘ – outcomes, needs, individuality, lack thresholds, all 
benefits are not equal, determining ‗whose‘ preference i.e. citizens, medical experts, patients, 
payers, regulators, etc 
 
306
 Ruger, Supra Note 246 at 141. 
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experts should have authority for substantive decisions about allocation 
decisions 
4. Decisions are based on a shared concept of capacity for health functioning – 
when disagreements occur, ‗practical models of agreement or consensus 
facilitate workable solutions.‖  
5. Moral obligation to provide high quality care not just  ―equal access‖ to 
‗decent minimums‘ or ‗adequate care‘  
6. Evaluation of health care must consider costs ‗because we live in a world of 
scarce resources‘ – cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) needs to be used to 
compare interventions within a single population - economic considerations 
need to follow and complement clinical considerations, not vice versa.  
 
Ruger argues that both clinical and economic analyses are required for evidence-based 
decision making. In terms of economics, Ruger‘s model does include cost analysis, 
comparative pricing within a category of medical procedures and the importance of 
clinical case-by-case judgments by physician while ensuring that the physician has the 
medical capacity and is not financial influenced outside of medical criteria.  
5. Conclusion  
The purpose of this literature review was not only to outline the various procedural and 
substantive decision making theories discussed in the literature but to also establish, 
based on the existing empirical research, if the theories and the practical application of 
resource allocation decision making were aligned. If the theory and practice are not 
aligned, it was anticipated that the literature review would establish where and why the 
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disconnect was taking place. The literature could then inform the quantitative research 
design of this thesis. Unfortunately, while there were numerous procedural and 
substantive theories in the literature, the empirical research regarding the application of 
these theories to actual tribunal decision making was minimal to non-existent. 
The review of the literature did, however, raise several themes. First, health care resource 
allocation decisions are difficult but inevitable and decisions have to be made. Second, 
resource allocation decisions are often made on the basis of incomplete information by a 
variety of decision makers at various levels. Third, resource allocation decisions are made 
in a context of a number of transparent and non-transparent factors such as economic 
factors. Fourth, an accessible mechanism is needed to address resource allocation 
disputes. A fifth theme involves disagreement about how resource allocation decisions 
should be made – either based on agreed upon procedures and/or substantive legal 
guidelines / ―test‖ requirements. Sixth, there is also disagreement regarding the objective 
for resource allocation decisions i.e. should the decision be based on what is best for 
society or what is best for the individual. Seventh, there is disagreement regarding the 
mechanism to make resource allocation decisions – the courts, administrative tribunals,307 
technical review panels, physicians or corporations. Eighth, there appears to be confusion 
over the ‗right‘ of individuals to a health care resource. Ninth – and most important for 
this thesis – there is a lack of quantitative empirical research regarding resource 
allocation decisions – particularly at the tribunal level and specifically by the Health 
Services Appeal and Review Board. Without existing quantitative empirical research, 
                                                 
307
 The literature on the resource allocation decision making by tribunals, courts and the legislature is 
confusing. Academics appear to agree that the courts defer to the legislature. However, the legislature 
defers unpopular and/or difficult decisions to tribunals and courts oversee the tribunals. The courts 
judicially review decisions of tribunals. In essence, it appears to the author that the courts and the 
legislature are deferring to tribunals.  
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research questions and methodology needed to be developed in order  to understand the 
reality of tribunal resource allocation decisions and what theories do and/should apply.  
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Chapter 6 
Research Methodology 
Introduction 
Administrative tribunals speak through their decisions. HSARB is no exception. In its 
written reasons, HSARB outlines the case‘s context, the procedure that the Board 
followed, the substantive submissions of the parties and its decision whether or not a 
patient‘s request met legislated criteria.  
 
In an effort to analyse factors which may affect the Board‘s health care resource 
allocation decision making, the author examined Board decisions regarding 28.4(2) 
Regulation 552 of the HIA for the fiscal 2003-2008 period relative to contextual, 
procedural and substantive resource allocation theories. By analyzing statistical 
associations within the Board decisions, certain trends evolved, some questions were 
answered and many others arose.  
 
The challenge methodologically was to identify a significantly large caselaw data set 
(Appendix A), develop an objective research matrix (Appendix B), assess each individual 
case relative to the research matrix (Appendix C and Appendix D) and statistically 
analyze the results. As further discussed, certain trends emerged. However, as with many 
exploratory research protocols such as this, several unexpected trends were also 
identified. The following elements of the research methodology – case selection, sample 
size, timeframe, research matrix and limitations – are outlined in more detail below. 
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Case Selection 
The case selection of Board decisions took place before the Board decisions were 
uploaded in August of 2010 to the CanLII website. Board Hearing decisions available 
from the Board‘s website that deal with Section 28.4(2) of Regulation 552 were analyzed 
for the fiscal five year period from 2003 to 2008. The search engine on the Board‘s 
website was used to identify all cases directly or indirectly dealing with s.28.4(2). 
―Directly dealing with s.28.4(2)‖ refers to all cases where the review of non-emergency 
inpatient health care service outside of Canada was the main issue. ―Indirectly‖ refers to 
those cases where s.28.4(2) was not the main issue under review or where reference was 
made to s.28.4(2) but it was determined that s.28.4(2) was not applicable. For instance, in 
a case where an Ontario man requested health care in Quebec under s.28.4(2), the Board 
determined that s.28.4(2) was not relevant as Quebec is not outside of Canada.  
 
Sample Size of Case Selection 
It was initially difficult to determine the sample size of Section 28.4(2) cases to be 
reviewed. In the end approximately 400 HSARB decisions were analyzed. However, the 
HSARB decision database presents several research challenges:  
 
First, the electronic database of HSARB decisions, which was accessible only through the 
HSARB website and not through standard electronic databases such as CanLII or 
Quicklaw,
308
 was still in basic form.
309
 The HSARB website database could not be 
                                                 
308
 At the time, the Consent and Capacity Board Decisions were linked to legal research databases. Thus, 
the technology and administrative process existed to allow tribunal decisions to merge with existing legal 
research databases. It was anticipated at the time that this thesis would recommend further exploration of 
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searched by statute or regulation, section or successfully by key word. There is no 
headnote or annotation of the cases on the database. 
 
Second, HSARB case decisions could only be searched by an exact citing of the initials 
in the style of cause. The HSARB initials may not correspond to the Court system style 
of cause. For example, in the recent case of Flora, the Court citation for the Flora case is 
Flora v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2008 ONCA 538 (CanLII). The HSARB citation 
is A.F. v. The General Manager, the Ontario Health Insurance Plan, File # 6681 [decision 
released 11/21/2002]. The Flora case could not be located on the HSARB database if the 
word ―Flora‖ or the initial ―F‘ is searched. Of the HSARB database cases, four cases had 
the initials A.F. but only one of these four cases was the Flora case which was appealed 
to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
 
Third, appealed HSARB decisions were not listed as such on the HSARB case decision 
database. In this way, it is difficult to determine which cases were under review by 
HSARB, under appeal to the courts, had new decisions resulting from court appeals or 
stand as reported.  
 
Fourth, searches through the HSARB case decision database were incomplete and 
produced only a fraction of the actual cases. For example, a search under the HIA for ‗out 
of country‘ cases only produced 4 cases. A search under HIA for ‗Regulation 552 section 
                                                                                                                                                 
linking HSARB decisions to existing legal research databases. The addition of HSARB decisions to CanLII 
in August 2010 made this recommendation moot. 
309
 http://www.hsarb.on.ca/scripts/MOHSearchFile_Public.asp - this website is no longer active since the 
addition of HSARB decisions to CanLII in August 2010. 
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28.4‘ only produced 2 cases. Both searches did not identify the well known Flora case 
which deals with ‗out of country‘ under ‗Regulation 552 section 28.4‘.   
 
As a result, the HSARB case decision database was searched using the term ―s.28.4(2)‘. 
Three hundred and eighty seven cases were identified for the fiscal period 2003-2008. All 
these 387 cases were read and analyzed. Of the 387 cases, only 314 were directly on 
point. The residual cases were either duplicates of a s.28.4(2) case, dealt with motions or 
orders for existing s.28.4(2) cases or were not applicable.  
 
In summary, the limited search function, the incomplete retrieval of all relevant case 
decisions, the initialized HSARB citations, the difference between HSARB and Court 
citations, and the lack of noting up of HSARB decisions made it difficult to find HSARB 
section 28.4(2) cases and to follow cases appealed from HSARB to the Courts. As a 
result, a very broad net was cast to capture all s.28.4(2) cases. From this initial analysis of 
almost 400 cases, trends emerged and were further examined.  
 
At the beginning of this thesis, one foreseeable recommendation was to revamp the 
HSARB case decision website to address the problems listed above and to integrate the 
HSARB case decisions to existing legal search engine e.g. CanLII
310
 links to decisions of 
the Consent and Capacity Board along with other Tribunal decision databases. This in 
fact was done by the HSARB administrative office in August 2
nd
 of 2010. This is a 
positive step. Also, given that the majority of Applicants before the Board are 
unrepresented, non-legally trained individuals, it will be recommended by this author that 
                                                 
310
 <http://www.canlii.org/en/on/>. 
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a non-legal research database which is user friendly for the general public be further 
explored. 
  
Timeframe for Case Selection 
The five year time period was selected for the case review of HSARB for several reasons. 
First, the legislation and decision making bodies – HSARB and the Court – were 
relatively stable in structure during this period. This relative stability allows for the thesis 
to focus on the theory, interpretation and application of the legislation rather than on 
changes to the legislation or structural changes to the decision making bodies. Second, 
the timeframe spans a period of one Ontario elected government (Ontario Liberals 2003 
to the present). This also represents a time period of relative political stability. Third, it 
was assumed – perhaps incorrectly given the previous section‘s review of the HSARB 
database – that the legal research technology would allow for accessing case decisions for 
the period of 2002 and later. It should be noted that several important Hearings took place 
before the Board before 2003 and subsequent Court decisions were issued after 2008. In 
specific cases, the timeframe will be expanded to include such cases. Fourth, in the spring 
of 2009 and again in the spring of 2011, the government amended s.28.4(2) of Regulation 
552. The amended s.28.4(2), which is further discussed in the Epilogue section of this 
thesis, presented a natural endpoint to critically assess the section. Fifth, this author was 
appointed to HSARB in 2008 and began hearing cases from April 2008 to February 2009. 
It was important for the research and the potential for the perception of bias that none of 
the author‘s decisions were part of the research period. 
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Research Matrix 
A coding system, reflecting contextual, procedural and substantive issues, was developed 
in order to perform quantitative statistical analysis associations between research factors 
seen in the case data. The coding system was tested on 30 cases, refined and the initial 30 
cases were subsequently recoded. The coding system was then used on all cases including 
the initial 30 cases. An independent researcher randomly reviewed the accuracy of ten of 
the three hundred and eighty seven coded cases. The random review confirmed that the 
research matrix and coding system provided a level of accuracy. The coded data was then 
inputted into a statistical package and analyzed. From this statistical analysis of 
frequencies and cross tabulations, associations, trends and further questions emerged.  
 
The research matrix sought to analyse the contextual, procedural and substantive theory 
in resource allocation decision making relative to the actual decision making. Contextual, 
procedural and substantive theory indicators were utilized. For example, contextual 
indicators included medical diagnosis, patient demographics, and the geographic 
distribution of requests for out of country health care. Procedural theory indicators 
included timeframe for hearing, type of hearing, self-representation at hearing, language 
interpretation, type of appeal and appeal requests. Substantive theory indicators included 
the regulatory criteria of medically necessity and the delay accessing domestic care. 
 
Limitations of this Thesis 
This thesis will focus on the resource allocation decision making regarding health care 
out-of-country criteria found in s.28.4(2) of HIA Regulation 552. There are also several 
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administrative requirements under section 28 of Regulation 552. It was understood by the 
author at the outset of this study that these administrative requirements for out-of-country 
insured health care under section 28 of Regulation 552 are activated once a health care 
service had been determined under section 28.4(2) to be an insured health care service 
under OHIP. These administrative requirements include: approval for insured services 
prior to the treatment,
311
 the production of written documentation,
312
 the submission of 
accounts within given time limits
313
 or the General Manager of OHIP discretion to pay 
accounts in extenuating circumstances despite non-compliance with prescribed 
requirements.
314
 This thesis was to focus on section 28.4(2) rather than focusing on the 
administrative requirements, cited above, following the determination whether a health 
care service is an insured service under OHIP. However, the administrative requirements 
– particularly the s.28.4(5) requirement for OHIP‘s prior approval before obtaining an out 
of country health service – became increasingly dominant in the five year case review. As 
such, it became necessary to include the s.28.4(5) for OHIP‘s prior approval of an out of 
country request in the case analysis as time progressed in the study period. 
 
It is important to note that the statistical relationships between procedural and substantive 
factors and the decisions of the Board are correlations not causation relationships. As 
                                                 
311
 Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4.(5) – Conditions of Payment  
Recent relevant Case law - C.C.W. v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2009 CanLII 712 (ON S.C.D.C.) – is 
actually three cases – that of C.C.-W., J.F.-T. and the Estate of Linda Mailloux. All three cases were heard 
and decided upon at the same time. The cases deal with the s.28.4(5) requirement for prior written approval 
for payment of medical expenses when services cannot be obtained in Ontario. The court held that OHIP 
does not have the discretion to waive this legislative prior approval requirement. 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2009/2009canlii712/2009canlii712.html 
312
 Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(5)2 – Conditions of Payment requirement of Written 
Documentation 
313
 Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(5)3 – Time limits for submitting accounts 
314
 HIA, Supra Note 4 at s.18(4) – General Manager payment discretion despite non-compliance with 
prescribed requirements 
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correlations, the factors must be more closely examined. It is highly recommended that 
further qualitative research be undertaken to further explore the correlations in order to 
determine the meaning behind the results. . 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Patient Profiles: Results  
 
Introduction  
Patient Age 
 Patient Sex 
Patient Residence 
Patient Diagnosis 
Patient‘s Requested Treatment 
Requested Location of Treatment 
- Country 
- USA State 
- Northern USA State 
- Northern USA State – Requested Health Facility 
- Northern USA State – Requested Treatment 
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- Northern USA State – Requested State and Requested Treatment 
- Northern USA State – Requested Health Facility and Requested Treatment 
Conclusion 
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Chapter 7 
Patient Profiles 
RESULTS 
 
Introduction 
The Board operates in response to appeals brought by patients seeking OCCNEIHS. As 
such, it is the patient who activates the Board‘s jurisdiction and process. While extensive 
information is available about the Board and OHIP, little is known about patients 
appearing before the Board. For example, it is not known who is coming before the 
Board (their age, sex, place of residence), for what medical reason (diagnosis) and where 
they wish to go for medical assistance (the requested country, facility) or what procedure 
they are requesting. This is a gap in our understanding of the Board and tribunals in 
general. 
 
To address the gap, each Board decision during the study period was analyzed in terms of 
the contextual factors of patients‘ age, sex, place of domestic residence (Appendix F), 
patients‘ diagnosis (Appendix G), treatment requested, requested out of country 
treatment, and requested location of treatment (Appendix H and Appendix I). The 
purpose of collecting and analyzing this information was to – in an investigational 
manner – produce a ‗patient profile‘ and to determine if any trends might emerge which 
might affect Board decisions. 
 
Patient Age 
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Only about 40% of the cases documented the age of the patient – as such, the results 
should be interpreted with caution. Approximately 60% of the cases did not provide the 
age of the patient. The majority of the patients (21.9%) appear to be in the age range of 
25-64 – 11.7% of the cases were in the 45-64 year old range and 10.2% of the cases were 
in the 25-44 year old range. Approximately 7.3% were minors in the 0-17 year old range, 
2.5% were in the 18-24 year old range, 7.3% were in the 65-79 year old range and 2.2% 
were in the 80+ year old range. As will be discussed later, 100% of patients stated some 
form of diagnosis yet 60% of cases did not provide the age of the patient. Thus, it is 
difficult to link patient diagnosis to the patient‘s age.  
 
Patient Sex 
The patient sex or deduced sex
315
 found in the Decisions indicated that the patients 
appearing before the Board are approximately split evenly between males (47.9%) and 
females (52.1%). There does not appear to be a significant difference between the 
number of males and females accessing the Board.  
 
Patient Residence 
The residence of the patient or their deduced residence was mapped to their associated 
LHIN designation which was further mapped to four areas of the province: North, South, 
East, and West Ontario. The Patients‘ Residence data indicated a high percentage 
(51.7%) of the cases were ‗Unknown‘ as they did not stipulate the geographic residence 
of the patient. Of those that did, patients from the Southern part of Ontario (15.2%) and 
                                                 
315
 ‗Deduced sex‘ refers to those cases where the sex of the patient was no stated but may have used the 
pronoun. For example, the pronoun ―her‖, ―she‖ or ―the patient‘s husband ― deduced sex of the patient as 
female. 
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the Western part of Ontario (14.6%) most often appealed to the Board. This number was 
closely followed by the Northern part of Ontario (11.1%).  
 
Patient‘s Diagnosis 
The highest percentage of patients appealing to the Board have a collection of ‗Other‘ 
conditions (21.6%). ‗Cancer‘ (15.6%) was the second highest diagnosis followed by 
‗Back Pain‘ (11.4%), ‗Head‘ (11.1%), ‗Joints‘ (10.8%), ‗Addictions/Mental 
Health/Anorexia‘ (9.2%), ‗Obesity‘ (7%), ‗General Pain‘ (7%), ‗Heart 
Disease/Circulation‘ issues (5.4%) and ‗Unknown‘ diagnosis at (1%).  
 
Patient‘s Requested Treatment316 
The patients requested surgery 49.2% of the time – almost half of all cases. This was 
followed by medical assessments (14%), treatment (13.3%) and diagnostic procedures 
such as an MRI, CTscan etc. (12.4%). The combination of categories dealing with 
counseling, drug treatment, follow up to an existing out of country health care service and 
unknown requests for treatment amounted to 9.2% of cases. Only 1.9% dealt with 
transplants. 
 
Table 1: Patients’ Requested Procedure 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
VSurgery 155 49.2 49.2 49.2 
                                                 
316
 The patient‘s requested treatment as outlined in the Decision was coded. Based on the large variations in 
frequency for each code, the treatment requested was recoded based on the following six codes: surgery, 
treatment (chemo, radiation, angioplasty, angiogram, scleroderma, the drug Herceptin), transplant, 
diagnostics (MRI, XRay, CT scan, PET), assessment (medical opinion), and counseling, drug treatment 
only, follow up, and ‗unknown‘.  
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a
l
i
d 
Treatment 42 13.3 13.3 62.5 
Transplant 6 1.9 1.9 64.4 
Diagnostics 39 12.4 12.4 76.8 
Assessment 44 14.0 14.0 90.8 
Counseling/Drug TMT 
only/Follow up/Unknown  
29 9.2 9.2 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Requested Location for Treatment 
a) Country: 
The patient‘s requested location for treatment was coded by country, state/province and 
facility location. Based on the large variations in frequency for each country code, the 
requested location treatment by country was re-coded globally into 7 categories – the 
USA, Europe (including the UK), India, China, Israel, ‗Other‘, and ‗Unknown‘.317 
  
                                                 
317
 All global locations were known/stated in the Decisions. There were no cases of a category of 
‗Unknown‘ location for treatment. As a result, the ‗Unknown‘ location for treatment category was not used.  
  136       
Table 2: Global Location of Patients‘ Requested Treatment  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
USA 263 83.5 83.5 83.5 
Europe + UK 27 8.6 8.6 92.1 
India 9 2.9 2.9 94.9 
China 4 1.3 1.3 96.2 
Israel 2 .6 .6 96.8 
Other 10 3.2 3.2 100.0 
Total (*) 315 100.0 100.0  
 
The clear majority of requests are for health care services in the USA (83.5%). The next 
closest requested treatment location is Europe and the UK (8.6%) followed by India 
(2.9%), ‗Other‘ (3.2%), China (1.3%) and Israel (0.6%).  
 
 
b) USA State: 
Within the USA, there was a large variation of frequency for each American State. As a 
result, the USA States listed in the Decisions were further coded as North, East, South 
and West. 
318
Approximately 44.1% - the majority of Ontario patients before the Board - 
sought treatment in the Northern USA.
319
 From the data, Ontario patients are seeking 
                                                 
318
 The North included Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Montana, Idaho and Illinois. 
The East included New York, Maryland, Massachusetts and Connecticut. The South included Florida, New 
Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina and Virginia. The 
West included California and Oregon. 
319
 Northern States:  
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treatment in the Northern States of the USA (44.1%) is almost double the rate of those 
seeking treatment in Southern States (20.3%). Patients also appear to infrequently access 
the Eastern States for treatment (16.5%) and rarely appear to be accessing Western USA 
States (1.9%).  
 
Northern States – Requested Health Facilities: 
If one looks at the facilities in the Northern States requested by the Ontario patients 
appearing before the Board, 34.6% of patient requests are for the Mayo Clinic 
(Minnesota), 10.2% are for the Cleveland Clinic (Ohio), 11.0% are for Detroit area 
facilities (Michigan), 3.9% are for Royal Oaks (also Michigan), 34.6% are for ―Other 
Facilities‖ and 5.5% are ‗Not Stated‘ in the case Decision. Note that Detroit facilities 
(11.0%) and Royal Oaks (3.9%) combine to total 14.9% of cases for the State of 
Michigan – or the second most requested State after Minnesota. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Of the Northern States, Minnesota was the State most often requested (40.9%) followed by Michigan 
(38.6%) and Ohio (14.2%). The States of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana, Wisconsin and ‗Not Stated‘ 
totaled 6.4%.  Thus, from this data, approximately 80% of Northern States accessed for out of country 
health care services were in Minnesota and Michigan. 
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Table 3: Patients‘ Requested Facility  
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
1 Mayo Clinic 44 34.6 34.6 34.6 
2 Cleveland Clinic 13 10.2 10.2 44.9 
3 Detroit 14 11.0 11.0 55.9 
4 Royal Oaks 5 3.9 3.9 59.8 
8 Other 44 34.6 34.6 94.5 
9 Not stated 7 5.5 5.5 100.0 
Total 127 100.0 100.0  
 
Northern States – Requested Treatment: 
Of patients requesting out of country health care services in Northern States, almost 50% 
- the clear majority of cases - are requesting Surgery (49.6%), followed by almost a 
quarter (24.4%) requesting Assessments. Treatment was requested 13.4% of the time 
followed by Diagnostics at 11.0%. Only small percentage – 1.6% - requested an out of 
country health care service that was not surgery, treatment, diagnostics or assessment. 
Thus, from this data, one can see that three quarters of the out of country requests were 
for surgery and assessment.  
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Table 4: Patients‘ Requested Procedure 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
1 Surgery 63 49.6 49.6 49.6 
2 Treatment 17 13.4 13.4 63.0 
4 Diagnostics 14 11.0 11.0 74.0 
5 Assessment 31 24.4 24.4 98.4 
6 Other 2 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Total 127 100.0 100.0  
 
Northern States – Requested State and Requested Treatment: 
In order to understand what Northern States Ontario patients requested to perform a given 
health care service, the Northern States were cross tabulated with the health care services 
(surgery, treatment, diagnostics, assessment and other).  
 
Minnesota had 28.8% of its cases requesting Surgery and 44.2% of its cases requesting 
Assessment. Michigan had 65.3% of its cases requesting Surgery and 12.2% of their 
cases requesting Assessment. Ohio has 66.7% of its cases requesting Surgery and 5.6% of 
its cases requesting Assessment.  
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Northern States – Requested Health Facility and Requested Treatment: 
Ontario patients are not going to a particular State but to a health care facility within the 
State. This raises the question what facilities and procedures within a given State are 
being requested by Ontario patients?  
 
A cross tabulation of the patients‘ requested health care facility by the type of health care 
service produced the following results: of the requests for the Mayo Clinic (Minnesota) 
half of the requests were for Assessments (50%) and Surgery 30% (29.5%). The 
Cleveland Clinic (Ohio) requests were primarily for Surgery (84.6%) with no requests for 
Assessment. The Detroit and Royal Oaks requests (both Michigan) has 71.5% and 2.5% 
requests for Surgery respectively and 7.1% and 1.2% requests for Assessment 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Patients‘ Requested Health Care Facility 
 
Clearly, from this Northern State data, patients are requesting different States for 
different health care services – Mayo Clinic (Michigan) for assessments, the Cleveland 
Clinic (Ohio) for surgery, followed by the Detroit and Royal Oaks also for surgery. Of 
note is the highest request for surgery (‗Other‘ category) where the facility was not stated 
in the Board‘s decision.  
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Conclusion 
From the results, we can see that the age of the patient was only given 40% of the time. 
Of this 40%, approximately 7% were minors (0-17 years old), 2.5% were 18-24 years 
old, 10% were 25-44 years, 12% 45-64, 7% were 65-79 year age range and 2% were over 
80 years of age. Approximately 48% of females and 52% of males came before the 
Board. While over 50% did not report their geographic location in Ontario, those that did 
report were from the North (11%), the East, the West (15%) and the South (15%). 
 
Patients indicated variable diagnosis including: ‗Other‘ conditions (21.6%). ‗Cancer‘ 
(15.6%) Back Pain (11.4%), Head (11.1%), Joints (10.8%), Addictions/Mental 
Health/Anorexia (9.2%), Obesity (7%), General Pain (7%), Heart Disease/Circulation 
issues (5.4%) and ‗Unknown‘ diagnosis at (1%).  
 
The treatment requested was surgery (49%), medical assessments (14%), treatment (13%) 
and diagnostic procedures (12%). The combination of categories dealing with counseling, 
drug treatment, follow-up to an existing out of country health care service and unknown 
requests for treatment amounted to 9.2% of cases. Only 1.9% dealt with transplants. 
 
The majority of requests were for the USA (84%) followed by Europe and the UK (9%), 
India (3%), ‗Other‘ (3%), China (1%) and Israel (0.6%). Of the USA treatment requests, 
the majority of requests (44%) were for the northern USA compared to 2% of requests 
for the western USA. Approximately 80% of northern State requests were for Minnesota 
and Michigan. Patients before the Board requested different States for different 
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procedures For example, Minnesota was for assessments (44%) and surgery (29%) while 
Michigan was requested for assessments (12%) and surgery (65%) and Ohio was 
requested for assessment (6%) and surgery (67%). Patients before the Board also 
requested particular facilities to undertake particular treatment. For example, the Mayo 
Clinic in Minnesota was requested for assessment (50%) and surgery (30%) compared 
with the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio was requested primarily for surgery (85%) and not for 
assessments (0%).  
 
Based on this data, it is clear that the patients‘ context (age, sex, place of residence, 
diagnosis) as well as their request for out of country coverage (requested treatment, 
geographic treatment location and specific treatment facility) were factors before the 
Board and outlined in the Board‘s decision. Of particular interest is the number of ‗pain‘ 
cases and the fact that patients were requesting particular facilities for specific treatment. 
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Chapter 8  
Procedures: Results  
Introduction 
 Duration Appeal is at the Board 
Hearing Date to Decision Date 
Type of Hearing – Oral, Written, Teleconference, Split 
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Chapter 8  
Research Question #1: 
Do procedures statistically affect resource allocation decisions of the Board?  
If so, what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect?
 
 
 
Procedures:  
 
RESULTS 
 
Introduction: 
Tribunals, such as the Board, attempt to ensure procedural fairness and natural justice for 
the parties. Ideally, a tribunal‘s procedures facilitate rather than hinder the parties‘ 
arguments on substantive issues. The purpose of analyzing the Board‘s procedural data 
was to explore whether there is a correlation between the procedural aspects of the 
Board‘s procedures and the Board‘s decision to grant or deny the patient‘s request for out 
of country coverage. As such, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: 
 
Research Question #1: 
Do procedures statistically affect resource allocation decisions?  
If so, what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect?
 
 
 
These procedural factors included: the time a case proceeds through the Board‘s system – 
from the date of the appeal request to the hearing date through to the decision date 
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(Appendix J); whether the hearing is oral, written or by teleconference call, or some 
combination of oral/teleconference/written (Appendix K); whether a review was 
requested of the Board‘s decision; the presence of an interpreter at the hearing; whether 
parties were  represented by a lawyer or were self-represented at the hearing; and whether 
the hearing request was based on OHIP‘s denial of a prior approval application, a 
reimbursement application or a combined prior approval-reimbursement application.   
 
Duration the Appeal is at the Board:  
Why are File Date, Hearing Date and Decision Date important in terms of number of 
days a case is within the Board‘s system? These procedural elements – time within the 
system - may influence the ability of the parties to present substantive arguments i.e. the 
procedures‘ appropriateness relative to the patient‘s changing health status, whether 
equivalent procedures exist in Ontario, and if there is a delay accessing a hearing or a 
delay receiving a Board decision.  
 
The analysis of dates sought to assess the total time a case took to be processed within the 
Board. The timeframe in which cases came to the Board office (the File Number), the 
time from the case arriving at the Board office to the time a Hearing was scheduled (the 
Hearing Date) and the time from Hearing to the release of the Decision (the Decision 
Date) were analyzed in terms of total time and total time by year.  
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The data only permitted date assessments between the Hearing Date and the Decision 
Date because of comparable day, month and codes. The File Number only provided the 
year code and thus are not comparable.  
 
Based on data analysis of the time from Hearing Date to Decision Date, a wide variation 
was seen. Over the study‘s five year period, cases took between 3 days to 1,220 days 
from the date of the Hearing to the date the Decision was released. The average over the 
five years from Hearing Date to Decision Date was 160 days – or about 22.8 weeks 
(160/7days) – or about 5.7 months (22.8/4weeks). 
 
This range – 3 days to 1,220 days – is very skewed in comparison to a normal 
distribution. This is a distribution which is very skewed to the lower values of Decision 
days. The degree of skewness is indicated by a few extreme cases. In other words, the 
majority of days between the Hearing Date and the Decision Date were in the lower 
range of days – 0 to 200 days with a few outliers.  
 
Hearing Date to Decision Date: 
It is important to restate that the database selection of the cases over five years was based 
on the Decision Date. As such, it is possible that a File Date and Hearing Date came 
before the study period while the Decision Date would have fallen within the study 
period.  
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The overall average number of days in the system was approximately 160 days, but this 
varied enormously between 2004 and 2006 years. In 2006, the average number of days 
from Hearing Date to Decision Date was 137 days. In 2006, the average number of days 
from Hearing Date to Decision Date was 289 days. Is this ‗Decision Date Year‘ 
significant? The year 2008 is very significant in terms of accounting for why a case takes 
time between the Hearing Date year and the Decision. The graph below depicts the 
average number of days between Hearing Date and Decision Date data: 
Table 6: Average Number of Days between Hearing Date and Decision Date 
 
From this graph, we can see how the fifth year rises beyond the other years of the study 
in terms of mean number of days between the Hearing Date and the Decision Date. It 
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raises the question what was taking place in the fifth year that caused this significant 
finding. The cases in the fifth year may shine some light on this issue. 
 
Further analysis identified that there were 17 cases in fifth year with respect to this 
study‘s timeframe. The majority of these cases had a Hearing Date of 2007 and a 
Decision Date of 2008. These 17 cases were then cross tabulated to see if the Board had 
Granted or Denied the application. Only one of the 17 cases was Granted. 
 
Type of Hearing – Oral, Written, Teleconference or Split 
The Board can conduct three types of Hearings - where the parties appear in person, 
referred to as Oral Hearings, by Teleconference or by Written submissions. Each party – 
the Applicant and Respondent - determines which method of Hearing they wish for 
themselves. While the majority of cases involves one type of Hearing, it is possible to 
have a ‗split‘ Hearing where one party elects one type of Hearing while the other party 
elects a different type of Hearing. For example, one party may elect an Oral Hearing 
while the other party elects to join the Hearing by Teleconference. In such a case, the 
Panel would appear in person, one party would appear ‗orally‘ and be in the room with 
the Panel while the second party would join the group by teleconference call. In all cases, 
the Board and the parties have the parties‘ written submissions before them.  
 
Of all 315 Hearings, 192 cases - 61% - were Oral Hearings, 52 cases - 17.8% - were 
Teleconference Hearings and 85 cases - 27% - were Written Hearings. These cases did 
not add up to 100% because some of the cases were split cases. For example, the patient 
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may have presented before the Board by teleconference call while OHIP attended in 
person or vise versa. 
 
Analysis was done on ‗split‘ Hearings to determine the type and number of split Hearings 
that took place during the five year study period. Of the total cases for the five year 
period, Oral-Teleconference Hearings took place 11 times, Oral-Written Hearings took 
place four times and Teleconference-Written Hearing took place three times.  
 
Type of Hearing relative to Disposition: 
Of interest was whether the type of Hearing – oral, written, teleconference or ‗split‘ - 
gave a party an advantage over the other party in terms of whether the appeal was 
Granted or Denied by the Board. As will be discussed later, the Board has an overall 
Grant rate of approximately 20% and a Deny rate of approximately 80% for the five year 
study period. Based on this, further analysis was done on the majority of 192 Oral 
Hearings. The table below indicates that an Oral Hearing was significant in a Board 
Granting an appeal. 
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Table 7: Oral Hearing vs. Board Grant of Appeal  
Cross tabulation 
 
Oral 
Total No Yes 
Board -Grant No Count 109 143 252 
Expected Count 98.7 153.3 252.0 
% within Board-Grant  43.3% 56.7% 100.0% 
Yes Count 14 48 62 
Expected Count 24.3 37.7 62.0 
% within Board- Grant  22.6% 77.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 123 191 314 
Expected Count 123.0 191.0 314.0 
% within Board-Grant  39.2% 60.8% 100.0% 
 
 
The analysis indicates that there was a very significant association between an Oral 
Hearing and the Granting of the appeal. This significant association was based on 48 
granted cases. The 48 cases represented 77.4% of the oral cases granted where the 
statistical average number of oral cases granted was only estimated to be 60.8%. In other 
words, if the Hearing was Oral, the application was granted significantly more times 
(77.4%) than expected (60.8%).   
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The 48 oral cases were individually identified and subsequently analyzed. Of the 48 oral 
cases granted by the Board for the study period, the majority of Grants by the Board 
appear to be because the requested health care service is not ‗Identical or Equivalent‘ to 
health care service in Ontario or there is a Delay accessing an Identical or Equivalent 
health care service in Ontario that would result in the patient‘s death or medically 
significant irreversible tissue damage to the patient.   
 
This significant association between the type of Hearing – in this case an Oral Hearing – 
and the Granting by the Board of the patient‘s appeal – was further analyzed by Year. In 
the interest of time, only Decisions in the year 2004 and year 2006 were explored. No 
significance was found for Year 2001. However, significance was found for Year 2006. 
In other words, an Oral Hearing did not result in a significant number of Grants by the 
Board for Year 2004 but it did result in a significant number of Grants by the Board for 
Year 2006. 
 
Parties: Represented by Lawyer or Self-Represented  
The prevalent thought is that parties may be in a better position to present their facts and 
argue the law if they are represented by a lawyer who knows the applicable law. Parties 
who are self represented may not argue as effectively as a lawyer who knows the law in 
question. In all court and tribunal hearings, there is significant concern that if a Hearing 
takes place between a self represented party and a lawyer, the self represented party may 
be at a disadvantage in arguing his or her case and the Hearing does not represent a ‗level 
playing field‘. Is this true?  
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To determine if this is the case at the Board, within the study period, the number of times 
the patient was self represented versus represented by a lawyer and how many times 
OHIP was represented by a non-lawyer versus an OHIP lawyer was analyzed. Then the 
number of times both the patient and OHIP were represented by a lawyer was analyzed 
relative to the Board‘s Decision to grant or deny the patient‘s appeal (See Appendix L for 
details). 
 
We know overall that the Board denied cases 80% of the time and granted cases 20% of 
the time during this study period. Of interest was whether having a lawyer significantly 
increased the percentage of granted application above the overall 20% rate on behalf of 
the patient. It is understood that this is a crude measure as the nature of the case may have 
influenced the Board‘s Decision within the study‘s timeframe. However, this measure 
was examining Procedural aspects of the Board‘s Hearing – in terms of representation at 
the Hearing - not the Substantive elements of that representation. 
 
The data indicates that a very small percentage of patients were represented by lawyers. 
In only 32 cases out of 315 total cases – 10.2% - did a lawyer represent the patient at a 
Hearing.  Approximately 282 cases out of 315 – 89.5% - did not have representation by a 
lawyer. 
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In 42 cases of 315 total cases – 13.3% - a lawyer represented OHIP at a Hearing.  
Approximately 273 cases out of 315 – 86.7% - OHIP did not have representation by a 
lawyer. 
 
In 28 cases out of a total of 315 cases – 8.9% - both the patient and OHIP were 
represented by lawyers. In 4 cases, the patient had a lawyer and OHIP did not. In 14 
cases, OHIP had a lawyer and the patient did not.  
 
Of the 28 cases with legal representation for both parties, how many of the cases resulted 
in a grant or denial of the patient‘s appeal? Of the 28 cases where both parties had legal 
representation, 9 cases – or about 32% of the cases – resulted in the Board granting the 
Application on behalf of the patient. This grant rate of 32% is higher than the overall 
grant rate of 20%.  
 
Interpreter 
This study sought to analyze the number of times an Interpreter was used and the 
language of the Interpretation. The study found that Interpreters were seldom used in 
Hearings. Only 3 cases - 1% of the time - used Interpreters. 
 
Type of Appeal: Definitions 
As of the timeframe for this study, there were at least three types of patient appeals to the 
Board from OHIP Decisions not to fund an out of country coverage health care service. 
These included:  
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i) Prior Approval 
- a request for approval of an out of country coverage health care service before the 
patient accessed the out of country coverage health care service (termed ‗Prior Approval‘ 
or ‗Prior‘ requests);  
 
ii) Reimbursement 
- a request for approval of an out of country coverage health care service after the patient 
accessed the out of country coverage health care service (termed ‗Reimbursement‘ 
requests) where Prior Approval not ever requested by the Patient;  
 
iii)  Both – Prior Approval and Reimbursement 
- a request for an out of country coverage health care service both before and after the 
patient accessed the out of country coverage health care service where, the Patient had 
requested the out of country coverage health care service but had been denied by OHIP 
but the Patient went ahead with the out of country coverage health care service anyway – 
or - the Patient had requested the out of country coverage health care service but had not 
yet heard back from OHIP on its acceptance or denial at the time of the out of country 
coverage health care service delivered, but subsequent to the out of country coverage 
health care service delivery, the Patient learned that OHIP denied its coverage (termed 
Prior Approval and Reimbursement).  
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The challenge in the reading of the Decisions for this study was the cases‘ reference to 
the Prior Approval Form. The Prior Approval Form was intended to be submitted to 
OHIP prior to receiving the out of country coverage health care service, in order for 
OHIP to determine if the health care service qualified for OHIP funding. However, in 
practice, the Prior Approval Form was often submitted after the out of country coverage 
health care service was delivered. Thus, the Prior Approval Form was used for Prior 
Approvals but also for Reimbursement requests as well as for combined Prior Approval 
and Reimbursement requests. For this study it was important, therefore, to determine how 
the Prior Approval Form had been used, not just that it had been used. This determination 
was made after carefully reading each case.  
 
Results:  
i) Prior Approval  
Approximately 28.5% of the time the Board overruled OHIP‘s denial of coverage if the 
patient had sought prior approval from OHIP for the out of country treatment. Thus, the 
patient who had sought prior approval from OHIP was significantly more likely to have 
their request granted by the Board - 28.5% compared to an overall granting rate of 
approximately 20%. It is important to note that approximately 72% of those with Prior 
Approval still were not granted. 
 
ii) Reimbursement  
The Board overruled OHIP‘s denial and granted the out of country reimbursement to the 
patient/Applicant 16.3% of the time - which is less than the overall grant rate of 20%. 
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iii) Both - Prior Approval and Reimbursement  
However, the picture appears to change if both Prior Approval and Reimbursement were 
requested by the patient. The numbers of Prior Approval cases and Reimbursement cases 
overlap such that 54 cases – or 25.8% - requested both Prior Approval and 
Reimbursement for out of country health care service from OHIP.  
 
A cross tabulation of the 54 cases was undertaken to determine if the Board granted the 
appeal of those patients requesting both Prior Approval and Reimbursement for an out of 
country health care service proved ‗extremely‘ significant. Of the 54 cases requesting 
both prior approval and reimbursement, 17 cases were granted out of country coverage by 
the Board. It appears that the chances of a Board grant were improved significantly if the 
patient requested both a Prior Approval and a Reimbursement. Approximately 32% of the 
time the Board overruled OHIP‘s denial and granted the Prior Approval-Reimbursement 
request.  
 
Review Requests 
Under a ‗Review Request‘, one or both parties to a Hearing before the Board may, upon 
receiving the Decision of the Board, request that another Panel of the Board review the 
evidence and render its own Decision. The 315 case were reviewed to see the frequency 
of Review Requests during the study period. There were extremely few Review Requests. 
Only one case or 0.3 – less than 1% - requested another panel of the Board to Review of 
the Board‘s Decision.  
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Conclusion 
The purpose of analyzing the Board‘s Procedural data was to explore whether there is a 
correlation between the procedural aspects of the Board‘s procedures and the final 
decision by the Board to grant or deny the patient‘s request for out of country coverage. 
These procedural factors included: the time a case proceeds through the Board‘s system – 
from the date of the appeal request to the hearing date through to the decision date; 
whether the hearing is oral, written or by teleconference call, or some combination of 
oral/teleconference/written; whether a review was requested of the Board‘s decision; the 
presence of an interpreter at the hearing, whether parties were  represented by a lawyer or 
were self-represented at the hearing; and whether the hearing request was based on 
OHIP‘s denial of a prior approval application, a reimbursement application or a 
combined prior approval-reimbursement application.   
 
It was found that the data only permitted an analysis of duration of the time a case took 
from hearing date to decision date and not the total time from appeal application to 
decision date. The duration of time from the hearing date to the decision date was 
variable and was skewed by a few cases. In terms of hearing formats, oral hearings were 
more likely to be correlated with a decision to grant of out of country coverage than other 
formats – for a particular time period. It was also found that patients were unrepresented 
90% of the time but when they did have representation they were more likely to be 
correlated with the decision to grant coverage. The data revealed that interpreter and 
decision reviews were seldom used. The data indicated that patients who had requested 
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prior approval of out of country coverage from OHIP were more likely to be granted 
coverage by the Board. However, patients who had requested prior approval and 
reimbursement from OHIP received more coverage grants than prior approval requests 
alone.  
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Chapter 9  
Substantive Arguments: Results  
 
Introduction 
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Screening Test – s.24(1)17 ‗Experimental Treatment‘ 
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Chapter 9  
Research Question #2: 
What substantive arguments affect resource allocation decisions? 
 Substantive Arguments:  
 
RESULTS 
 
Introduction: 
The Board‘s Decision in a given case is based on its agreement or disagreement with 
argument put forth by the parties – OHIP and the patient – relative to the Board‘s 
jurisdiction, statute and regulations. According to the data, the Board denies the patient 
out of country coverage approximately 80% of the time. The Board overrules OHIP‘s 
denial of coverage 20% of the time resulting in a grant of coverage for the patient. 
However, prior to this study, there was no empirical research to establish which 
element(s) of the s.28.4(2) regulation were being argued and accepted by the Board 
regarding the granting or denial of out of country coverage. Even though Board decisions 
typically gave reasons for the decision, the reasons – particularly in the first years of the 
study – often did not specifically comment on the acceptance or denial of s.28.4(2) test 
elements. Thus, in order to clarify the acceptance or denial of s.28.4(2) elements, this 
thesis asks the following question: 
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Research Question #2: 
What substantive arguments affect resource allocation decisions?
 
 
 
In order to analyse this question in more detail, this ‗Substantive Argument‘ section is 
divided into two parts: Phase I
320
 and Phase II.  
 
Phase I is an overview of the patient‘s argument, OHIP‘s argument and the Tribunal‘s 
Decision on each of the three main elements of the s.28.4(2) test (see Appendix M) as 
well as the screening test of ‗experimental‘ treatment. The details regarding the s.28.4(2) 
test definitions, standard of proof, burden of proof and the evidence required is outline in 
Appendix E. In hindsight, requests for prior approval and/or reimbursement should have 
been included in the ‗substantive argument‘ analysis rather than ‗procedural‘ analysis in 
order to determine the significance of s.28.4(2) relative to the prior approval requirement 
of s.28.4(5). The prior approval requirement of s.28.4(5), as will be further discussed, 
represents administrative non-medical criteria which can supersede the medical necessity 
determination of physicians. In this respect, the importance of this development for the 
substantive argument of the parties is better categorized under the substantive argument 
analysis than the procedures analysis.  
 
Phase II of this study examined the discrepancies between the patient and the patient‘s 
physician(s) prior to a request being submitted to OHIP. This discrepancy between the 
                                                 
320
 Phase I further analyzed the s.28.4(2) cases to determine the: definition of test elements, the onus/burden 
of proof for each element, the required standard of proof, on overview of the evidence presented to the 
Board and  any Board reasons/insights. The results and analysis can be found in the Appendix. 
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patient and the patient‘s physician(s) is termed – for the purpose of this study - the 
‗discrepancy within team patient‘ (see Appendix N). Phase II only examine discrepancies 
within team patient that occurred in year 5 cases. Almost half of the year 5 cases coming 
before the Board indicated there was a discrepancy within team patient regarding one or 
more of the elements of the s.28.4(2) test. In hindsight, all years in the study period 
should have been assessed for discrepancies in team patient. The reason year 1-4 were 
not analyzed was the unanticipated nature of the ‗discrepancy within team patient‘. The 
author had – incorrectly – assumed that only if the OCCNEIHS was approved by the 
patient‘s physician would the patient come before the Board. This was not the case in 
actuality. Patients who requested an OCCNEIHS but did not receive approval from their 
own physician did come before the tribunal. In essence, the patient‘s physician and OHIP 
were of the same opinion that the OCCNEIHS requested by the patient was not approved.  
 
 
PHASE I – OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENTS 
 
Screening Test – s.24(1)17‗Experimental Treatment‘ 
According to the legislation, if a treatment is determined by the Board to be experimental 
it is automatically not funded by OHIP. The vast majority of patients - 81.9% - did not 
argue that the out of country treatment was either experimental or non-experimental 
while 13.3% argued the treatment was not experimental and about 4.8% argued the 
treatment was experimental. OHIP argued the treatment was experimental in 13% of 
cases and not experimental 4.8%.  As with the patient data, OHIP did not argue for or 
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against experimental in 82.2% of cases. From the data, the Board determined that a 
procedure was experimental 7.6% of the time and not experimental 6.7% of the time.  
 
Table 8: Summary of Arguments – whether procedure is ―Experimental‖ 
 Experimental Not Experimental No Argument 
Patient 4.8% 13.3% 81.9% 
OHIP 13.0% 4.8% 82.2% 
Board Decision 7.6% 6.7% 85.7% 
 
 
Section 28.4(2) Test  
Section 28.4(2) was amended in April of 2009. However, given that the study period 
preceded the amendment, the following earlier version of s.28.4(2) that was in force 
during the study period was used:  
 
section28.4(2)  
Services that are part of a treatment and that are rendered outside Canada at a hospital 
or health facility are prescribed as insured services if, 
(a) the treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the 
same medical circumstances as the insured person; and 
(b) either, 
(i) that kind of treatment that is not performed in Ontario by an identical or 
equivalent procedure, or 
  165       
(ii) that kind of treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured 
person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay that would result in death or medically 
significant irreversible tissue damage.
321
  
 
The results are as follows:  
 
Test Element #1 - s.28.4(2)(a) 
‗Generally Accepted in Ontario as Appropriate for a Person in the Same Medical 
Circumstances as the Insured Person‘ 
 
According to the data, 81% (80.6%) patients argue that the treatment they requested is 
generally accepted for a person in the same medical circumstances as they were in. 
Approximately 4.8% of patients argued that the treatment is not generally accepted as 
appropriate for them. In 14.6% the patient did not argue that the treatment was or was not 
generally accepted as appropriate for patients in their condition. In almost 50% of the 
cases – approximately 30% less frequently than the patient - OHIP agreed that the out of 
country treatment is generally accepted as appropriate for the patient. Approximately 
26% of the time OHIP argued the treatment was not generally accepted as appropriate for 
the patient. In 25% of the cases, OHIP did not argue that the treatment was or was not 
generally accepted for the patient. The Board determined that in 68% of the cases the 
treatment was generally accepted for the patient and in 21% of the cases it was not 
generally accepted for the patient. The Board did not make a determination regarding 
general acceptability in 12% of cases. 
                                                 
321
 Regulation 552 Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(2)(a)(b)(i)(ii) 
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Table 9: Summary of Arguments – whether procedure is ―Generally Accepted‖ 
 Generally Accepted NOT Generally Accepted No Argument 
Patient 81% 5% 15% 
OHIP 49% 26% 25% 
Board Decision 68% 21% 12% 
 
 
Test Element #2 – s.28.4(2)(b)(i)  
‗Treatment That Is Not Performed In Ontario by an Identical or Equivalent Procedure‘ 
 
In approximately 48% of cases, the patient argued that there was identical / equivalent 
treatment performed in Ontario and 30% there was not identical / equivalent treatment in 
Ontario. In 23% of cases, the factor of identical/equivalent was not argued. OHIP argued 
in 5% of the cases that there was no identical/equivalent and in 66% of the cases that 
there was identical/equivalent. OHIP did not present an argument on this point in 29% of 
cases. The Board determined that there was not identical/equivalent treatment in Ontario 
14% of the time and 58.4% there was identical/equivalent treatment. In 28% of cases, the 
Board did not address the issue in the Decision. At least half the time, the parties and the 
Board agreed that there was identical/equivalent in Ontario (48% patients, 66% OHIP, 
and 58% Board).  
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Table 10: Summary of Arguments – whether procedure is ―Identical/Equivalent‖ 
 I/E in Ontario NO I/E in Ontario No Argument 
Patient 48% 30% 23% 
OHIP 66% 5% 29% 
Board Decision 58% 14% 28% 
 
Test Element #3 – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)  
‗Treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured person travel out of 
Canada to avoid a delay
322
 that would result in death or medically significant irreversible 
tissue damage‘ 
 
Over 59.7% and 44.8% of cases delay causing death or MSITD respectively was not 
argued by the patient.  
 
OHIP argued that delay would cause death (0.3% - or 1 case) or MSITD (1%). OHIP 
argued that the delay the patient experienced would not cause the patient‘s death (36%) 
or MSITD (42%). OHIP did not argue delay causing death 63.8% and MSITD 57.5% of 
the time. 
 
The Board determined that the delay would cause the patient‘s death 5% and MSITD 
11% of the time. The Board determined that the delay would not cause the patient‘s death 
                                                 
322
 Delay itself was not enough reason for OHIP to fund out of country treatment. The delay, once 
established, had to likely cause the patient‘s death or MSITD. The patient need only establish that the delay 
is likely to cause their death or MSITD rather than both death and MSITD. The author assumes that if there 
is patient death there is also MSITD. 
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(46%) or MSITD (51%) – versus patients and OHIP who argue delay causing death – 
26% and 0.3% respectively and delay causing MSITD – 45% and 1%. The Board did not 
determine delay causing death 49% or MSITD 38% of the time. Clearly, there is a 
significant patient-OHIP-Board difference of opinion regarding ‗delay‘.  
 
Further analysis attempted to ascertain where the patient was experiencing a delay. This 
was done by estimating potential points of medical assessment experienced by the patient 
- delay accessing the patient‘s Ontario general practitioner, delay accessing an Ontario 
specialist and delay accessing Ontario surgery. In terms of delay accessing their Ontario 
general practitioner, 90% did not discuss this type of delay. Approximately 9% said there 
was a delay accessing the general practitioner and 1% stated there was no delay accessing 
the general practitioner. Approximately 79% did not discuss access to Ontario specialists 
as a cause of the delay. Of those patients discussing delay causing death and/or MSITD, 
delay to access an Ontario specialist was reported in 14% of cases. No delay accessing an 
Ontario specialist was reported in 7% of cases. Approximately 83% did not discuss 
access to Ontario surgery as a cause of the delay. Of those patients discussing delay 
causing death and/or MSITD, delay to access Ontario surgery was reported in 15% of 
cases. No delay accessing Ontario Surgery was reported in 2% of cases. 
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Table 11: Summary of Arguments – whether procedure requested is due to Delay, Delay 
causing Death, Delay causing MSITD 
 Delay  
Death 
No Delay 
Death 
N/A 
Death 
Delay 
MSITD 
No Delay 
MSITD 
N/A 
MSITD 
Patient 25.7% 14.6% 59.7% 45.1% 10.2% 44.8% 
OHIP 0.3% 35.9% 63.8% 1.0% 41.4% 57.5% 
Board 
Decision 
4.8% 46% 49.2% 11.4%% 50.5% 38.1% 
 
PHASE II: DISCREPANCIES WITHIN TEAM PATIENT  
Phase II was an unexpected research finding that emerged during case analysis. The 
patients‘ argument for s.28.4(2) was not always cohesive. In Year 5, approximately 50 of 
the 106 cases showed discrepancy within the patient‘s s.28.4(2) arguments. These 
discrepancies within Team Patient were found in every area of the s.28.4(2) test.
323
 While 
there may also have been discrepancies within the OHIP argument and dissent in the 
Board‘s deliberations, these were not recorded in the written Decision.  
 
Types of Discrepancies within Team Patient 
There were a variety of types of discrepancies within Team Patient which reflected a 
number of differences of opinion including:  
- disagreement between the patient and the general practitioner,  
                                                 
323
 Discrepancies within the ‗Experimental‘ screening element were not analyzed for the purpose of this 
paper but are available for future analysis 
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- disagreement between the patient and the general practitioner and specialist (the 
latter who agree with each other),  
- the patient and the general practitioner agree but the specialist disagrees,  
- the patient and general practitioner disagreeing but the patient and specialist 
agree,  
- the patient only reports the specialist disagreeing but does not report the general 
practitioner‘s position and 
- discrepancies between the patient‘s Ontario based medical team and an out of 
country medical opinion typically a specialist.  
In one case, the patient reported that he did not have a physician and thus could not 
present a medical opinion of his need for a particular out of country treatment. On the 
other extreme, one patient reported seeing fourteen specialists who did not agree that she 
should receive the out of country treatment.   
 
All s.28.4(2) Test Elements of Patients‘ Argument Assessed for Year 5 
While initially the first element of the s.28.4(2) test – GA - was assessed, this only 
represented 17 of the 50 cases. As a result, all 50 GA, I/E, and Delay cases were analyzed 
in order to increase the sample size and determine if any patterns could be seen. In 
hindsight, Year 1 to 5 cases should have been included in the analysis of possible 
discrepancies within Team Patient. Of the 50 cases, there were only 4 grants of out of 
country coverage.
324
 The remaining 46 cases that had discrepancies within Team Patient 
were denied coverage by the Board.  
                                                 
324
 Cases #292 (06-HIA-0047 L.S.), Case #322 (06-HIA-0265 D.A.M.), Case #329 (06-HIA-0293 D.K.), 
Case #362 (07-HIA-0018 S.F.) 
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Out-of-Country ―Grants‖ by the Board 
A cross tabulation analysis of GA versus Board decisions and I/E versus the Board 
decisions found a pattern when there was a discrepancy in the argument of Team Patient - 
the Board did not grant the patient‘s out of country request. The pattern is not significant 
given the sample size of 4 grants. A larger sample size should be included to assess if this 
pattern is significant.  
 
The pattern changes when analyzing Delay (s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)). Delay causing death and 
Delay causing MSITD both show the same pattern to each other which differed from the 
pattern shown in GA (s.28.4(2)(a)) and I/E (s.28.4(2)(b)(i)). When there was a 
discrepancy within team patient over delay, the Board granted out of country coverage 
50% of the time.   
 
Granted Cases Year 5 
Four (4) cases in year 5 were granted by the Board when there were discrepancies within 
Team Patient. Each case was reviewed in more detail in an effort to determine where the 
discrepancy within Team Patient relative to the required elements of s.28.4(2). In 
all four cases, the Ontario specialist was acting as a ‗gatekeeper‘. In three of the four 
cases there was a discrepancy between the patient and the specialist regarding Delay 
causing MSITD – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii). The remaining case dealt with the experimental nature 
of a procedure. It is also interesting to note that physicians were not present at the 
Hearing to answer questions from the parties or the Board.  
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Chapter 10 
 
ANALYSIS  
of Quantitative Research Relative to Theory and Empirical Research 
 
Introduction 
This research sought to examine the influence of a tribunal‘s procedures as well as the 
influence of substantive arguments of the parties on a tribunal‘s resource allocation 
decision making. The challenge was to find a theory that addressed this research. Of the 
multitude of theories, academic debate, academic discussion and review of existing 
limited – and often flawed -- empirical research, this author found an absence of theories 
which examined the correlation between a tribunal‘s procedures as well as the influence 
of substantive arguments of the parties on a tribunal‘s resource allocation decision 
making. In addition, none of the theories or academic discussion analyzed who was 
coming before the tribunal, for what reason and how this might impact on the tribunal‘s 
decision.  
 
Given the overall lack of applicable theory relative to this thesis‘ research, this author 
chose to review an academic discussion and a theory for the purpose of this analysis. 
First, the academic discussion regarding the lack of empirical research in legal analysis – 
specifically in terms of tribunal decisions - was reviewed. Second, this author reviewed 
the A4R theory regarding the process of making resource allocation decisions. The A4R 
theory was chosen because of the theory‘s potential for analysis relative to objective data 
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on the Board‘s procedures. For example, the premise of the A4R theory is that, in the 
absence of consensus of substantive distribution principles, a fair, transparent resource 
allocation process should lead to the acceptance of a resource allocation decision. As 
such, the focus of the A4R theory is on procedures rather than technically difficult 
substantive medical and administrative substantive arguments. These substantive 
arguments are difficult to quantify based on the empirical data source of Board decisions. 
The study‘s data source - Board‘s decisions – consistently and in a standardized manner 
recorded the Board‘s procedures. The Board‘s decisions did not consistently and in a 
standardized manner record the submissions of the parties or information regarding the 
patients‘ profiles. In this respect, patient profiles and the substantive arguments of the 
parties allowed room for subjective interpretation while the Board‘s procedures did not. 
Given the importance of objectively analyzing data in this quantitative study, the author 
chose to statistically analyse the Board‘s process and subsequently compare it to the A4R 
theory.  
 
The A4R theory requires four conditions of transparency – publicity, appeals, 
enforcement and relevance of evidence. This author analyzed each of the four conditions 
relative to the study data. The A4R theory, as will be discussed in more detail, did not 
represent the complexity of the tribunal resource allocation decision making in terms of 
the influence of a tribunal‘s procedures as well as the influence of substantive arguments 
of the parties on a tribunal‘s resource allocation decision making. 
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The empirical results were then analyzed – not according to the A4R – but relative to 
their original categories: patient profiles, procedures and substantive arguments by the 
parties before the Board.  Each element was analyzed in detail to determine if any trends 
existed as they related to the research questions. The empirical results found numerous 
trends. These trends are discussed later in this chapter. 
   
Need For Empirical Research 
This author‘s extensive literature review and attempt to analyse the research results 
identified that the majority of legal scholarship exhibited a dearth of empirical research 
and an abundance of theory and doctrine. According to Heise, current legal scholarship is 
dominated by theory and doctrine.
325
 While the traditional approaches of theory and 
doctrine are important, they cannot identify issues and shed light on key issues which are 
more amenable to empirical research.
326
 According to Schuck, the call for legal academic 
empirical research is not new.
327
 The use of empirical research is necessary to support 
theory and doctrine. For example, Bok states that the development of good theories is 
difficult without the benefit of good data.
328
 Posner states that the lack of an empirical 
footing poses a threat to legal theory‘s persuasiveness and influence.329  
 
There are a number of reasons why empirical legal research is not prevalent or the focus 
of legal scholarship. Lowery and Evans argue that scholarly research lacks institutional 
                                                 
325
 Heise, Supra Note 102 at 834. 
326
 Ibid at 834. 
327
 Schuck, Supra Note 100 at 329 observes that the two main forms of legal scholarship – theoretical and 
doctrinal – account for ―almost the entire corpus of legal scholarship.  
328
 Bok, Supra 112 at 581. 
329
 Posner, Supra Note 113 at 3. 
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support, and there is a failure to teach research methods and paradigms regarding 
empirical research. This lack of rigor in research methods creates a crisis of confidence 
concerning research that does exist.
330
  
 
Need for Empirical Research on Tribunals 
This author‘s theory research identified that there was a lack of empirical research on 
tribunals. The author found extensive academic debate regarding judicial review of 
administrative action. The literature by Hadorn, Syrett, Mariner, Flood, Sheldrick, 
Greschner, Jackman, Lahey, Pitfield, and Heise - provides a rich legal academic 
discussion – but focuses on the judicial discussion of administrative tribunals. Thus, in 
addition to the dearth of empirical research by legal academics generally, there is a lack 
of empirical research by legal academics on administrative law.  
 
One of the few academic sources discussing the lack of empirical research on tribunals 
can be found in the writings of Sossin and Hoffman. In a 2010 article, the authors state 
that tribunals are key decision makers in allocating scarce resources but that the current 
research on tribunals focuses on theory, doctrine, and procedures.
331
 The use of empirical 
research to evaluate the accountability of tribunals ‗is one of the least scrutinized areas of 
administrative law.
332
 Jacobs also stated that there was a ‗dearth‘ of Canadian 
administrative law theory and information, that the realities of tribunal existence are not 
that neatly packaged 
333and factors affecting tribunal independence did not ‗jump out‘.334 
                                                 
330
 Lowery, Supra Note 104 at 308. 
331
 Sossin and Hoffman, Supra Note 120. 
332
 Sossin and Hoffman, Supra Note 120. 
333
 Jacobs, Supra Note 127 at 343.  
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Chipman‘s empirical research also found that there was little published empirical 
scholarly analysis regarding tribunal day-to-day activities.
335
 The tribunal did not perform 
according to the theoretical models or regulatory theory. It was far more complex and 
ambiguous and reviewed patterns far removed from theoretical norms.
336
 
 
Sossin and Hoffman state that the lack of empirical research may be due to system and 
research method complexity, a lack of empirical skills and academic prestige as well as 
the pervasive culture within academia of deference to experts and authority. These factors 
further diminish the perceived value of objective empirical work. For example, one 
empirical study sought to ‗evaluate‘ HSARB as compared to the courts in providing 
patients with an accessible and effective way to challenge government decisions.
337
 
However, the ‗evaluation‘ indicators of tribunal versus court elements were not described 
or analyzed according to research design protocols. Sossin and Hoffman recommend the 
need for evidence and data driven strategies in order to evaluate and achieve a tribunal‘s 
intended purpose.
338
 According to Sossin and Hoffman, the fact that evaluation is not 
easy does not detract from its importance. Sossin and Hoffman also believe that the lack 
                                                                                                                                                 
334
 As a result of the dearth of theoretical application of models to the actual practice of tribunals, Jacobs 
develops three new theoretical model regarding  administrative independence; independence informed by 
judicial dictates; independence informed by cultural understandings; independence informed by 
fundamental values of fairness. 
335
 Chipman, Supra Note 134 at 4 ―There is no lack of ―how to be successful before the Board‖ presentation 
materials, often of high quality, prepared by lawyers, planners and other professionals who appear before it, 
but this is of necessity of a limited and practically-focused nature, and is no substitute for analysis which 
attempts to place the Board‘s decision-making in a more analytical context, to get behind what it does to 
examine how and why it does it.‖.  
336
 Ibid at 319. 
337
 Pitfield, Supra Note 72. 
338
 Sossin and Hoffman, Supra Note 120. 
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of empirical research is not only a missed opportunity but may also pose a significant risk 
by not studying changes over time or evaluating decision-makers.  
 
These two authors state ―that an assessment of health-related adjudicative tribunals has 
never before been comprehensively undertaken and is ripe for research and, potentially, 
reform.‖ However, there has been preliminary research regarding HSARB undertaken 
which forms the basis for further exploration. For example, Flood and Pitfield identified 
the low success rate of appeals at HSARB and Pitfield identified a gap between the 
parties‘ expectations of HSARB and the Board‘s limited jurisdiction.  
 
In order to address the gap of a lack of empirical research -- identified by Heise, Schuck, 
Bok, Posner, Lowery and Sossin and Hoffman, Jacobs and Chipman -- and to address the 
methodological challenges, this author undertook a literature review of existing tribunal 
empirical research. The author reviewed the existing empirical research of Jacobs, 
Gamble, Chipman, Fernadez, Pitfield and Pitfield and Flood in order to identify possible 
research design strategies, statistical indicators and to learn from the limitations of the 
empirical research on tribunals. After an extensive review, no research design, statistical 
indicators or analysis could be identified regarding interplay between the influence of 
tribunal procedures and substantive arguments by the parties on the tribunal‘s decisions. 
However, the literature identified several statistical indicators that were incorporated into 
the author‘s methodology. These statistical indicators included: unforeseen factors 
influencing Board‘s decision (Jacobs); the exclusion of the general public and lack of 
information on subject inclusion (Gamble); the coding and statistical analysis of actual 
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tribunal decisions (Chipman);
339
 approval rates, decision outcomes, and the position 
taken by the Board (Fernandez); insights into significant role of lawyers in formulating 
effective arguments (Pitfield); the gap between the parties expectations of HSARB and 
the Board‘s limited jurisdictional powers (Pitfield)340 and the low success rates of appeals 
(Pitfield and Flood).  
 
From these empirical studies, this author saw the need to further explore who were the 
parties appealing a government decision (patient profiles), why the party was appealing 
the government decision (substantive argument) and what part of the party‘s substantive 
appeal was accepted by the tribunal, if any. It was also assumed that the process 
(procedures) by which parties appealed a government decision before the tribunal was a 
neutral process and did not affect the tribunal‘s decision. This latter aspect – the Board‘s 
procedures – was analyzed relative to the A4R theory. The details of this analysis are 
listed below. 
.  
                                                 
339
 Chipman, Supra Note 134.  
340
 Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at 100. 
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Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) Theory: 
The A4R theory states that societies lack consensus on substantive distributive justice 
principles. Because of this lack of consensus, society will only accept resource allocation 
decisions if the process used to determine the resource allocation is considered by those 
affected to be fair. Fair processes are those processes which are transparent. Transparent 
processes are characterized as having four conditions: publicity, relevance, appeals and 
enforcement. In essence, if the four conditions of transparency are fulfilled – publicity, 
relevance, appeals and enforcement – the resource allocation decision is considered to be 
fair and transparent and thus more likely to be acceptable even if there is no consensus 
regarding the resource allocation decision. 
 
Why is the A4R theory important? The A4R theory is important because – if society 
continues to have a lack of consensus on substantive distribution principles, and the 
process used to determine the resource allocation is not considered fair by those generally 
affected, would the society still accept the resource allocation decision?  What if the 
process itself influences the resource allocation decision irrespective of the submissions 
of the parties before the decision maker? What is a revised resource allocation decision 
making mechanism? According to the A4R, the four conditions of transparency are 
required for a process to be considered ‗fair‘ and thus important to the acceptability of a 
resource allocation decision. If the four conditions of transparency are not met, is a 
resource allocation decision still acceptable?  
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This study will analyse the Board process relative to the A4R theory with the assumption 
that there is a lack of consensus on substantive distribution principles – as seen in the 
substantive arguments of the parties before the Board.  
 
Overall, elements of the theory of A4R were found in the analysis of the cases. However, 
the theory‘s transparency conditions of publicity, relevance, appeals and enforcement are 
not ‗fine grain‘ enough to capture procedural elements that may affect decision making. 
Second, the A4R theory strays away from it purpose of focusing on the process of 
decision making and into the area of substantive arguments via its relevancy of evidence 
condition.
341
 The A4R provides an important starting point for a critical analysis of the 
procedures involved in resource allocation decision making. An analysis of the A4R‘s 
transparency conditions of appeals, publicity, enforcement and relevance is outlined 
below. However, the A4R needs to be supplemented with quantitative research in order 
to provide a more ―fine grain‖ analysis of the impact of the general procedure and 
individual procedural factors on Board decisions. 
 
Appeal Condition 
Under the A4R‘s ‗appeals‘ condition, a mechanism for challenging a resource allocation 
decision must be made available. While the Board has jurisdiction to hear appeals from 
OHIP decisions, a decision of the Board can review its own decision or its decision can 
be appealed to the courts.  
 
                                                 
341
  Paul Brest, ―The Substance of Process‖ (1981) 42 Ohio St. L.J. 131.[hereinafter ―Brest‖]. – Brest 
argues that the role of the courts in terms of representational-reinforcing review and the fundamental values 
cannot be separated.  
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The mechanism for challenging a resource allocation decision of the Board is based on 
the legislative scheme outlined in Chapter 2. The province, according to s.92(7) of the 
Constitution, deals with the delivery of health care. The provincial HIA outlines the 
jurisdiction of the Board to hear appeals from ‗insured persons‘ who have been refused 
health care coverage and or the reimbursement of claims by the General Manager of 
OHIP. The Board also has the jurisdiction to review and reconsider a decision made by a 
previous panel of the Board.
342
 This appeal option for the Board to review and reconsider 
its own decision was only used once in this five year case study. Whether or not the 
Board‘s decision to review and reconsider its own decision, a decision of the Board may 
be further appealed to the Ontario Divisional Court by ‗any party‘.343 During the study 
time period and based on the data source of Board decisions, it was unknown how many 
Board decisions were appealed to the Divisional Court.  
 
While the condition of ‗appeals‘ requires a ‗mechanism‘ for challenging a resource 
allocation decision, the A4R theory does not require a knowledge of who is appealing the 
decision and why a resource allocation decision is being challenged. It is unclear if the 
Board decision was appealed for procedural or substantive distribution reasons. In 
summary, the A4R appeals condition to make available a mechanism for challenging a 
resource allocation decision is established in the legislative context within which the 
Board operates. Thus the appeals condition is present.  
 
 
                                                 
342
 based on 2009 Rules s.21.2(1). 
343
 HIA, Supra Note 4 at s.24(1). 
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Publicity Condition 
According to the A4R‘s ‗publicity‘ condition, decisions by the decision maker must be 
publicly accessible. The publicity condition as it relates to the Board is weakly met, 
according to the author, due to the difficulties in electronically accessing the decisions 
that corresponded to the study period. These difficulties in electronically accessing the 
decisions are outlined in more detail in the methodology chapter of this thesis. The Board 
decisions analyzed for this study, were retrieved in 2009 from the Board‘s public website. 
It is unknown if the study period decisions were available online or through the Board 
office prior to 2009. The Board‘s decisions were posted on CanLII as of August 2, 
2010.
344
 
 
The core research element for this study – Board decisions – did not indicate if the 
hearing was attended by members of the public other than those involved in a given case. 
Thus, it is difficult to determine from the data within the decisions if the hearings were 
attended by the public. Even if the decisions and hearings were / are public, it is 
important – for future research – to analyse whether the public experiences and perceives 
the hearings and the decisions to be accessible. The public may be encountering barriers 
to access that are not captured in the study. Overall, the publicity condition is present. 
 
Enforcement Condition 
The A4R theory‘s condition of ‗enforcement‘ requires the regulation of the process to 
ensure the conditions of publicity, relevance and appeals. Board decisions may be 
appealed to the courts. Through the oversight mechanism of judicial review of 
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  185       
administrative action, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the courts have the jurisdiction to 
review the Board‘s decisions. In a review of the Board‘s procedures, the court may 
examine the conditions of publicity and appeals – and infrequently the substantive 
conditions of relevancy. However, this judicial review oversight by the court takes place 
only if a Board decision is appealed to the courts. Few tribunal decisions are appealed to 
the courts. As such, there is only the enforcement condition of judicial review if an 
appeal is granted by the court. 
 
Currently, according to the legislative scheme, there is a requirement that the Board 
reports its activities to the Minister of Health annually. It is possible that this requirement 
could provide an enforcement condition. However, there is no requirement that the Board 
report the conditions of publicity, relevance, appeals or enforcement to the Minister or 
any member of the public. Overall, the enforcement condition is present. 
 
Relevance Condition 
The A4R relevance condition requires that the evidence be based on what fair minded 
parties agree is relevant. In the opinion of this author, the relevance condition is 
challenging for two reasons. First, the relevance condition requires evidence. Second, the 
evidence is based on what fair minded parties agree is relevant. In this study, the parties 
before the Board do not agree on what evidence is considered relevant. For example, 
OHIP may consider the evidence of the medical necessity of out of country treatment 
only if it is provided by a physician. The patient may consider their own non medical 
assessment of the medical necessity of out of country treatment to be relevant evidence. 
  186       
Patients may feel that their own evidence of medical necessity outweighs the medical 
necessity determination of physicians – either their own physicians or the physicians 
providing evidence for OHIP. The challenge is who decides what is relevant evidence 
upon which resource allocations are to be made? Currently, it is the lay Board that makes 
the final decision on medical necessity and insured out of country health services. 
Overall, it is unclear to the author if the relevance condition is met. 
 
Problems Comparing A4R Theory to the Empirical Research Results:  
The application of the A4R theory to the actual resource allocation decisions of the Board 
was difficult. The difficulty arises for several reasons.  
 
First, in addition to the dearth of empirical research specifically with respect to tribunals, 
it is the opinion of this author that there is no research or theoretical model on the 
interplay between tribunal procedures, submissions by the parties before the Board and 
the Board‘s resource allocation decision. Although the A4R theory deals with the process 
of resource allocation decision making – in the author‘s opinion -- it is incomplete as it 
does not address the substantive arguments of the parties or the interaction of the 
procedures and the tribunal‘s decision. It also does not address who is appearing before 
the resource allocation decision making body or the reasons for this appearance.  
 
Second, three of the four A4R conditions - publicity, appeals and enforcement were not 
included in the tribunal‘s written decisions – the main data source for this research. The 
conditions of appeals and enforcement had to be analyzed relative to the legislative 
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scheme outlined in Chapter 2. The appeal condition does not examine the applicant – in 
this case the patient – and why a decision is being appealed. The condition of publicity 
was analyzed relative to the author‘s assembly of Board decisions located on the Board‘s 
public website. As a result, three of the four conditions for the A4R were not part of the 
quantitative study that was undertaken. Only the fourth condition of the A4R theory, the 
relevance of evidence condition, could apply to this quantitative study. Thus, from the 
initial analysis of the empirical study results relative to the theory there was the 
expectation that the theory did not apply to the majority of the study. 
 
Third, the ‗relevance‘ condition of the A4R can be reviewed based on data analyzed for 
this study. However, the relevance condition deals with the acceptability of evidence that 
is considered relevant by fair minded parties. Evidence supports substantive arguments. If 
this analysis is correct, there is a contradiction with the purpose of the theory and the 
components of the theory. The purpose for the A4R theory is to provide a process for 
making acceptable resource allocation decisions when the society cannot agree on 
substantive distribution. The theory does not purport to deal with substantive issues. 
Evidence is a substantive issue. As such, the A4R theory moves to the realm of 
substantive distribution. It is unclear how the agreement between the parties regarding 
what evidence is acceptable is to take place. The results of this study indicate there is not 
agreement between the parties or the Board regarding what evidence is acceptable.  For 
example, in the study, one party – OHIP – may only accept medical evidence provided by 
physicians regarding the medical necessity of an OCCNEIHS. The patient may rely on 
medical evidence that is provided by non-physician sources. There may be disagreement 
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between the patient and their own physician(s) – what is termed in this study as 
―Disagreement within Team Patient‖ - regarding the medical necessity of a given 
OCCNEIHS for that patient. Thus the evidence submitted by the parties at the tribunal 
hearing – is not considered relevant by all parties. As such, this author questions whether 
the relevance condition is an assessment of acceptable procedures or if it is an assessment 
of the submission of the parties before the Board.   
 
Fourth, this author is of the opinion that the A4R theory is a general replication of legal 
process undertaken by the courts and tribunals.
345
 Each of the A4R conditions of 
publicity, appeals, enforcement and relevance of evidence are seen in judicial and quasi-
judicial resource allocation decision making. For example, court proceedings and 
decisions – unless sealed – are ‗publicly‘ accessible. Unless outlined otherwise by statute, 
all court decisions can be ‗appealed‘ to a higher court. Preliminary court proceedings and 
appeal courts can ‗enforce‘ the conditions of publicity, appeals and the relevance of 
evidence. The courts also give extensive consideration to relevance, admission and 
weight of evidence. In fact, extensive rules of civil procedure, rules of criminal 
procedure, case law and academic discussion are available to guide the determination of 
what evidence is relevant.  
 
Fifth, based on the quantitative data in this study, the A4R theory itself is a traditional but 
limited theory to analyse the procedural factors in this study of the Board - for several 
reasons. The main reason is that the A4R theory does not address key significant factors 
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 In a criminal proceedings for first degree murder, for example, the court decision may not be agreed 
with but if the process for determining the decision is considered fair and transparent the decision will be 
accepted. 
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in decision making that are only evidenced through quantitative research. For example, 
according to Heise, traditional approaches of theory and doctrine are important, but they 
cannot identify issues and shed light on key issues that are more amenable to empirical 
research.
346
 For example, the A4R does not capture who is requesting the appeal, why the 
appeal is being requested, the influence of specific procedural factors on the Board‘s 
resource allocation decisions (Research Question #1) and the substantive arguments of 
the parties (Research Question #2) on the Board‘s decision. The use of empirical research 
is necessary to support theory and doctrine. Bok states that the development of good 
theories is difficult without the benefit of good data.
347
 Posner states that the lack of an 
empirical footing poses a threat to legal theory‘s persuasiveness and influence.348 
 
Why is this empirical research important? It is important because it provides a more 
holistic understanding of what is taking place before the Board relative to the Board‘s 
decisions. The empirical research provides a holistic analysis that is essential to 
accurately support recommendations of what should ideally be the resource allocation 
decision making mechanism versus what currently is the resource allocation decision 
making mechanism.  
 
This study identified many trends that were not evident from the A4R theory. 
Additionally, the empirical results of this study did not map easily onto the A4R theory. 
An attempt was made by the author to integrate the empirical research into the A4R 
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 Heise, Supra Note 102 at 834. 
347
 Bok, Supra Note 112 at 581. 
348
 Posner, Supra Note 113 at 3. 
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theory. In this respect, the study‘s empirical results regarding the patient profile, and the 
procedures of the Board could be analyzed relative to the appeal condition of the A4R 
theory. The study‘s empirical results regarding the substantive arguments of the parties 
could be analyzed relative to the relevance condition. However, instead of attempting to 
force the research results into a limited theory, the author analyzed the results according 
to their original categories of patient profile, the procedures and the substantive 
arguments of the parties. The results, listed in detail in the previous chapter, are analyzed 
below: 
 
Empirical Analysis: 
Patient Profile Analysis 
Why is data on the patients‘ age, sex, residence location, diagnosis, requested treatment, 
geographic treatment location and specific facility of importance to this thesis? This 
thesis critically examines what is currently taking place regarding the granting or denial 
of OCCNEIHS by the Board. While Chapter 2 outlines the larger context within which 
the Board operates in response to an appeal request - little is known about the party which 
activates the appeal process or why they are appealing a resource allocation decision.  
 
To address this gap in information, patient data referred to in the decisions during the 
study period was coded and analyzed. Based on this analysis of patients‘ factors, several 
patterns and novel issues emerged. The first three factors – patient age, sex and residence 
– did not highlight any major patterns or novel issues. This lack of patterns or novel 
issues may be the result of under reported data within the decision. However, in the 
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analysis of the patients‘ diagnosis, requested treatment, requested location and facility for 
treatment, certain patterns and novel issues began to emerge.  
 
Patient Age 
Approximately 60% (58.7%) of the cases did not provide the age of the patient. This may 
be due to the development of privacy legislation at the provincial and national level that 
may have heightened the need to protect personal health information. Thus, the role of 
external legislation to the HIA may have influenced the data recorded within the decision. 
This lack of data makes any potential patterns or themes questionable.  
 
Patient Sex 
With approximately an even split between male and female requests, there does not 
appear to be a significant difference between the sexes in the ability to access the Board. 
The success rates of male versus female requests are beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
the data is available for statistical analysis. 
 
Patient Residence 
The residence of the patient coming before the Board may be a proxy indicator for 
political, cultural, philosophical and economic factors – which require further study.349 350 
                                                 
349
 Residence may be one proxy indicator of different geographic variations in OCCNEIHS diagnosis, 
referral patterns and ‗access to health‘ philosophy by the medical profession.  For example, it is difficult to 
say why patients in Southern and Western Ontario appeal most frequently to the Board. Southern Ontario 
may be geographically closer to the Board‘s oral hearings based in Toronto making access to the Board 
easier. The West is farther away from the Board than parts of Eastern Ontario, yet Western Ontario has 
almost double the rate of Eastern Ontario cases before the Board. The West may be tempted by health care 
services closely accessed in the United States relative to those available domestically and thus appealed to 
the Board for OHIP funding more frequently than the East. In terms of the East, it may be that the East is 
satisfied with their access to domestic health care services. It may also signal a barrier – such as a language 
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Patient Diagnosis  
Unlike the under reporting of patient age, sex and residence, only 1% of patients did not 
know their diagnosis. This low percentage of unknown diagnosis would indicate that 
99% of patients who knew their diagnosis had some form of contact with the health care 
system in order to receive a diagnosis. This raises an important issue of ‗who‘ is 
assessing the patient and determining the patient‘s diagnosis.  
 
In terms of the actual diagnosis, the highest percentage of patients appealing to the Board 
have a collection of ‗Other‘ conditions (21.6%),351 with ‗Cancer‘ (15.6%) ranking 
second. Of interest in this data is the high percentage of pain
352
 cases. If one adds the 
Back Pain category (11.4%) with the General Pain category (7%), pain ranks second 
(18.7%) as the diagnosis for the patient wanting to go out of country for health care 
services – ahead of the category of cancer (15.6%).  
 
‗Pain‘ is an interesting category. Pain is often considered a patient‘s subjective 
experience rather than an objective, quantifiable medical diagnosis by a physician. The 
high percentage of ‗pain‘ cases reported coupled with the lack of objective, quantifiable 
                                                                                                                                                 
barrier - to accessing the Board. Further analysis and focus group or key informant surveys may distill this 
information. 
 
350
 The Board decisions did not reference the duration of residence or previous residence. For example, 
university students seeking OCCNEIHS may reside within a geographic area for the duration of their 
education while previously and in the future reside is a different geographic location. Such information is 
important to understand the history and culture.  
351
 See Appendix G: Patient Profile – Diagnosis and Pain. Appendix G provides a list of the ―Other‖ 
conditions which comprise the 21.6% of cases.  
352
 It should be noted that while all categories may include pain – such as pain with cancer or pain with 
degenerative hips – pain was only ranked as a category if it was the primary health concern. Thus, cancer 
was not ranked in a pain category but rather in the ‗cancer‘ category. Similarly, a painful degenerative hip 
was ranked in the ‗joints‘ category rather than in the ‗pain‘ category.   
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medical diagnosis by the physician may lead to a discrepancy between the patient and the 
physician regarding generally acceptable treatment and the urgency or delay in receiving 
the treatment. This possible correlation requires further research. 
 
Patient Requested Treatment 
Almost half of the out of country requests were for surgery (49.2%) followed by medical 
assessments (14%), treatment (13.3%), and diagnostic procedures such as an MRI, 
CTscan etc. (12.4%). The combination of categories dealing with counseling, drug 
treatment, (9.2%) of cases and only 1.9% of the requests dealt with transplants.
353
 
 
It is interesting to note that the potentially most expensive health care services – surgery 
and transplants – occupy spots for both the most (surgery) and least (transplant) requested 
health care services. As will be discussed later, the Ontario judicial decisions dealing 
with transplants (for example, live liver transplant) provided some of the most detailed 
judicial direction at interpreting the legislative criteria of s.28.4(2). In other words, 
despite being the least requested service – less than 2% of all cases -- the transplant 
category has provided judicial interpretation guidance on s.28.4(2) for 98% of the other 
requested out of country cases.  
 
Requested Location for Treatment 
Country: 
Based on the data, the current OCCNEIHS issue is clearly one of health care sought in 
the USA. While the numbers of non-USA out of country coverage requests are currently 
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  See Table 1: Patients‘ Requested Procedure 
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very small, a preliminary review of the non-USA cases appears to indicate a ‗family of 
origin‘ link. For example, a patient may request out of country coverage from OHIP for a 
medical procedure in China. The relatives in China may have arranged the Ontario 
patient‘s visit to a Chinese specialist in China who subsequently conducts the medical 
procedure in China. The Ontario patient‘s follow up home care may also be undertaken in 
China by Chinese relatives. In this respect, requests for out of country health care service 
may be based on family and or friend origin as well as factors such as the reputation of 
physicians/facilities/procedures, physical proximity, access to websites or peer networks, 
etc. – rather than based only on an Ontario physician‘s determination of medical 
necessity.  
 
Geographic Location and Treatment Requested  
It appears that out of country cases under s.28.4(2) are predominately seeking American 
treatment (84%) with almost half of Ontario patients before the Board requesting 
treatment in the northern USA (44%) – specifically in Minnesota, Michigan and Ohio. 
Thus, as of 2003/04-2007/08, OHIP‘s out of country program is based largely on requests 
for treatment in a few northern states. Overall, patients are requesting out of country 
surgery approximately half the time (49%) followed by Assessments (14%), Treatment 
(13%), Diagnostics (12%) and a Combination of medical care (9%). Organ transplants 
only represent 2% of cases.
354
 
                                                 
354
 Again, caution must be used in interpreting the geographic location and treatment requested as these 
variables were not standardized across the case decisions or OHIP medical codes. Ideally the out of country 
locations for each treatment requested – standardized based on Ontario medical codes - should be cross 
tabulated with the Board‘s granting or denying of OHIP funding. This data is available within the database 
constructed for this thesis and is an area for further research.  
 
  195       
 
Patients know, very clearly, what their diagnosis is, what treatment they want and the 
facility they want to go for that treatment. In this respect, patients are not going to the 
State but to the health care facility within the State.  Another way to look at the data is 
that patients are requesting different States for different treatment e.g. Mayo Clinic 
(Michigan) for assessments, the Cleveland Clinic (Ohio) for surgery, followed by the 
Detroit and Royal Oaks also for surgery. Of note is the highest request for surgery 
(‗Other‘ category) where the facility was not stated in the Board‘s decision. 
 
Conclusion - Patient Profile Analysis  
The research revealed several patterns and novel issues with respect to diagnosis, 
treatment requested, and requested location of treatment. For example, 99% of patients 
knew their medical diagnosis, desired treatment and where the treatment was offered. 
Almost 50% of requests were for surgery. Patients are predominately seeking American 
treatment (84%) and requested different States and health facilities for different health 
services. Interestingly, pain was significantly reported as a reason for requesting 
OCCNEIHS. The analysis raises the question - who is determining the patients‘ medical 
diagnosis and treatment and according to what standard? This data may inform the type 
of expertise required to assess medical conditions, the quality, location and availability 
procedures and those procedures which are insured by OHIP.  
  
The volume of locations and services requested by the patients implies that health care 
resources themselves are not scarce. Health care out of country appears to be plentiful. 
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Thus, it is questionable if the theory of ‗scarce health care resources‘ is accurate for this 
situation. The scarcity appears to be the limitation on domestic public tax dollars to fund 
the out of country care. As such, the decision whether or not to publicly fund out of 
country health care may be more of a public policy decision than one of procedural 
fairness and medical necessity. 
 
The specificity of the patients‘ requests also implies that the patients had contact with an 
out of country medical system and/or had likely conducted some of their own research 
into their condition and treatment options and facilities – this research appears to have 
taken place through friends, family and/or the Internet – not necessarily through the 
medical profession in Ontario. This raises interesting questions regarding the role of the 
patient and the role of the patient‘s medical professional(s) in the out of country treatment 
of the patient. The patient may be playing a greater role in determining their medical 
treatment than was previously assumed. However, the Ontario legislative criteria for out 
of country coverage appeared to be aimed – for the study period -- at the opinion of the 
medical profession in Ontario. If research regarding the medical facility, the treatment 
research and request for this treatment is conducted predominantly by the patient and not 
the physician, the evidence presented to the Board would likely be that of the patient and 
not the physician. The theory that physicians are determining the appropriate medical 
care for a patient and are assessing the delay in accessing this care may not be valid. 
Patients may be attempting to determine the medical care they are to receive and whether 
or not there is a delay in accessing this self determined care – either because of 
dissatisfaction with the medical professional, gaps within the medical system, the 
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increased use of technology such as the internet to access medical options and/or a 
development in our culture to think and access resources globally. If both the patient and 
physicians are independently determining medical care and assessing medical delay, the 
medical system has two sets of ‗gatekeepers‘ – patients and physicians -- attempting to 
access publicly funded health care services.   
 
Alternatively, if physicians are acting in a fiduciary role for their individual patient by 
supporting the patient‘s request for out of country treatment, OHIP and then the Board 
are forced to take on a greater gate keeping non-fiduciary role in allocating resources. 
The fiduciary role and gate keeping role of the individual‘s physicians are conflicting and 
require new theoretical discussions which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Ideally, the contextual patient factors would be cross referenced with the Board‘s 
granting or denial of OHIP funding. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, it is 
recommended that this further study by undertaken.  
 
 
 
Procedures Analysis 
The A4R theory suggests that, in the absence of consensus, the procedure for making 
difficult resource allocation decisions is critical. According to the theory, parties that are 
unable to achieve consensus on substantive elements should accept the outcome if the 
procedure for determining the outcome is considered fair and legitimate. The following 
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analyses show the actual as opposed to the theoretical decision-making results. 
Significant trends were found for the variables of legal representation, forum and 
administrative requirements. 
 
Duration Appeal is at the Board: 
It is important to note two facts about tribunals and procedure time. First, access to a 
tribunal and the resulting decision is commonly thought to be a faster process than access 
to the courts and the resulting decision. Second, unlike some tribunals, the Board is not 
required by statute or regulation to receive, hear and issue a decision within a specified 
time.  
 
From the data, case Decisions in 2008 took significantly longer from Hearing Date to 
Decision Date. So, what happened in 2008 that made this significant difference in the 
number of days a case was within the system between the Hearing Date and the Decision 
Date? Among many possible explanations, three in particular come to mind.  
 
First, in 2008, the leadership of the Board changed. The transition from the old Chair of 
the Tribunal to the new Chair of the Tribunal may have affected the timing of the review 
of the Decisions by the Chair and thus the release of Decisions.  
 
Second, two Boards – the Health Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) and the 
Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) were amalgamated and fell 
under the same Chairperson. Many of the members of one Board were then cross-
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appointed to the other Board. This administrative procedure and new member learning 
curves may have influenced the release of Decisions.  While the focus of Administrative 
Law is on the procedural fairness a Tribunal provided to the parties, it may be 
underestimated how important Tribunal internal processes are on procedural fairness in 
terms of the ability to conduct timely Hearings and release Decisions.  
 
Third, several key s.28.4(2) cases were before the courts in mid 2008 – after the study 
period‘s completion. The author speculates that Board‘s Decisions regarding out of 
country coverage that were before the courts may have influenced the timing of the 
release of further Board Decisions e.g. the Board may have wished to wait for judicial 
guidance on s.28.4(2) cases before releasing its Board Decision. 
 
Overall, this empirical study found that the results for one year – 2008 – cannot be 
generalized to all years. This is important because recommendations for an ideal decision 
making mechanism must examine data over time to accurately address issues. If only the 
data results from 2008 were used for example, the results would inaccurately reflect what 
has been taking place in the other four years.  
 
Type of Hearing Relative to Disposition: 
If a Hearing was oral, the application was granted significantly more times (77.4%) than 
expected (60.8%) but only for one year (2006). Again, this analysis points to the fact that 
significance cannot be generalized but rather one year – 2006 but not 2004 -- may be 
accounting for the importance of the oral hearing. This is important because any 
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procedural changes must accurately address issues not blips in the data that are 
generalized. 
 
The importance of oral hearings in 2006 raises a number of interesting questions – was 
the increased number of Grants a function of the Year 2006, the cases themselves, the 
oral advocacy at the Hearing, the Panel deciding the case or other factors? The 
exploratory research nature of this project does not propose to answer the question but 
recognizes that further research needs to be done on the Year and influencing factors 
rather than just on type of Hearing. 
 
 
 
Parties: Representation by Lawyer or Self-Represented 
Statistical analysis of the data indicated that legal representation was significant for the 
patient relative to the grant of an Appeal. A number of issues come to mind regarding 
legal representation.  
 
First, the presence of a lawyer representing the applicant/patient and arguing against an 
OHIP lawyer appears to lead to an increased chance of the appeal being granted in favor 
of the patient. It is unclear, based on the data, if it is the presence of a lawyer for the 
patient or the actual argument of the lawyer for the patient that results in a higher Grant 
rate. One might also speculate if a lawyer acts as an initial filter by only representing 
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cases before the Board which are considered ―strong‖ cases which may result in a grant 
of resources. 
 
Second, the legal representation by both parties may move the argument from the 
patient‘s compelling circumstances argument and OHIP‘s physician/medical argument to 
a more legal argument about the s.28.4(2) Test. Legal representation may not only affect 
how the arguments are delivered but also the relevancy of the evidence used to support 
the arguments. In this respect, legal representation may move the s.28.4(2) argument to 
become more of a legal argument rather than a focus on a medical opinion – in essence, 
changing the focus of the test based on the capacity and skill of the party – in this case 
the lawyer.  
 
Third, the representation by both parties before the Board may indicate that the nature of 
the actual case is of legal significance.  
 
Fourth, at s.28.4(2) Board Hearings, the patient was always arguing against OHIP. OHIP 
was typically not represented by a lawyer. OHIP was typically represented by the OHIP 
General Manager -- or his designate -- overseeing out of country applications. The 
General Manager or his designate is a physician. OHIP is consistently represented at all 
s.28.4(2) Hearings before the Board. While not ranking as representation by a lawyer, the 
OHIP representatives would have had successive experiences over the five year study 
period with s.28.4(2) which might give them a legal knowledge advantage over the 
patient who had no representation. In other words, the fact that OHIP was not represented 
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by a lawyer at the Hearings should not indicate they were not proficient in the legal 
arguments that may have been put forth by legal representation.   
 
Fifth, OHIP appears to match or exceed the patient lawyer with an OHIP lawyer in all but 
4 cases out of 315 cases – the 4 cases where the patient had a lawyer but OHIP did not. In 
a relatively small number of cases -- 14 cases -- OHIP had a lawyer and the patient did 
not. This low number needs to be taken in the context of the OHIP General Manager or 
his designate consistently arguing OHIP‘s case in 273 cases in front of the Board. Given 
the 273 cases argued by OHIP, it may no longer be accurate to say OHIP is unrepresented 
but instead has specialized knowledge. 
 
Interpreter 
The study found that Interpreters were seldom used in Hearings. Only 3 cases -- 1% of 
the time -- used Interpreters. One fundamental aspect of natural justice is the ability to 
understand the case being put forward. If a patient did not understand the procedural or 
substantive case being put forward there could be a significant denial of natural justice. 
An official Interpreter, in the language of the patient‘s choice, is arranged and provided in 
advance of the Hearing to the patient by the Board – free of charge. It is up to the patient 
to determine if an Interpreter is needed. Given the availability of these resources to 
address any financial and/or language barrier, it is interesting why more parties do not 
request an Interpreter. Parties in need of an Interpreter may either be unaware of this free 
service or those in need of an Interpreter are not coming forward with appeals to the 
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Board. More research needs to be done on this area as it represents a possible barrier to 
access justice. 
 
Type of Appeal: Prior Approval, Reimbursement or Both 
As with all administrative tribunals, the Board must operate within its statutory 
jurisdiction. The Board cannot decide on issues outside its jurisdiction. As of January 
2009, the Divisional Court of the Ontario Superior Court, in the case of C.C.W. clarified 
the Board‘s jurisdiction. The Court determined that OHIP has no discretion to grant out 
of country coverage for cases that have not received prior approval from OHIP. Thus, 
OHIP can only grant prior approval for out of country coverage. The Board, as of January 
2009, only hears cases that deal with Prior Approval for a health care service outside the 
country that have been denied by OHIP. Based on the court‘s direction, the Board does 
not have discretion to grant cases that request reimbursement without prior approval for a 
health care service outside the country. In other words, a case may fulfill the criteria 
s.28.4(2) but may then not be eligible for actual funding because Prior Approval from 
OHIP according to s.28.4(5) was not received. It is important to note that this Prior 
Approval requirement under s.28.4(5) always existed in the regulation. However, the 
enforcement of this regulation did not come into prominence until the later Decisions in 
the study period. Thus the extent of enforcement of an existing legislated provision was a 
key factor. 
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The time frame for this study was before the Ontario Court of Appeal‘s ruling of January 
2009 on Prior Approval. This study of the Board‘s Decisions therefore analyzed cases 
that had Prior Approval and those that did not.  
 
Early study period cases made little reference to s.28.4(5) criteria or the lack of discretion 
OHIP had to approve out of country coverage health care service if the Patient‘s request 
came in after the Patient had received out of country treatment. The author observed that 
there was a gradual tightening up of s.28.4(5) criteria such that it became more of an 
issue in the written Decisions as the years progressed. In essence, the one part test of 
s.28.4(2) – a determination if the health care service was insured by OHIP -- has evolved 
into a two part test which included not only the medical assessment of s.28.4(2) but also 
the administrative assessment of s.28.4(5) – the requirement for prior approval. This two 
part test for out of country coverage – s.28.4(2 and s.28.4(5) -- represents a key shift in 
focus. Instead of the s.28.4(2) criteria of ‗medically necessary, based on medical opinion, 
an out of country  health care service was being denied on administrative basis – 
requiring Prior Approval under s.28.4(5). Where initially the focus was on determining if 
a health care service was an ―insured service‖, now a grant of out of country coverage 
under s.28.4(2) may be denied if the patient did not request administrative approval 
before accessing the health care service under s.28.4(5).  
 
In terms of analysis, the author speculates that there may have been an influx of 
applications to OHIP where patients had researched and accessed the out of country 
treatment on their own without physician assistance or even approval. Physicians may 
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also have abdicated their referral role to patients because they didn‘t have the time, 
networks and/or the technology to seek out of country services or to assess the 
availability of domestic services. In terms of health care costs, it may have been easier for 
the government and the courts to tighten up an administrative regulatory process rather 
than to tighten up the medical opinion process. It is also important to note that most 
privately funded health care plans also require Prior Approval for the funding of non-
emergency procedures. In this respect, the tightening up of s.28.4(5) to require Prior 
Approval was in line with the private health care insurance plans.  
 
It is of interest, but beyond the scope of this current study, to analyze the number of cases 
granted approval as OHIP insured services under s.28.4(2) but ultimately denied for not 
receiving Prior Approval as required in the legislation s.28.4(5).
355
  
 
Review Requests 
This ‗Review‖ request is a form of a second appeal to the Board. Given that only one 
Review was requested during the five year study, it is assumed by the author that parties 
either take the decision of the Board as the final decision on the matter or proceed to 
judicial review of the matter through Divisional Court. Alternatively, it is speculated by 
the author that, having been denied by the Board, the patient will then access their private 
                                                 
355
 A further analysis was undertaken of the 17 Prior Approval-Reimbursement cases which the Board had 
granted thus overturning OHIP‘s Decision. The majority of the Decisions for the 17 cases took place in 
2006 (n=9) and 2007 (n=6). This is interesting because although the Divisional Court clarified the Prior 
Approval-Reimbursement issue under s.28.4(5) in its 2009 ruling, the three combined cases before the 
Court in 2009 received Decisions from the Board in 2006 and 2007. The Board in those three cases ruled 
that only prior approved health care service would receive OHIP funding. Yet at the same time there 
appears to be Prior Approval-Reimbursement cases also being granted by the Board. Hence, the Board was 
not consistent with its application of the legislation and judicial interpretation was sought. 
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insurance coverage once they have, at the request of the insurer, attempted to have the 
health care service paid for by government public insurance rather private insurance. If 
this is correct, corporations – such as the private health insurance companies -- are using 
the Board as a screening method for out of country coverage.  
 
Conclusion – Procedures 
Research Question #1: 
Do procedures statistically affect resource allocation decisions of the Board?  
If so, what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect?
 
 
 
Answer  
Yes, procedures statistically affect resource allocation decisions. There is a statistical 
correlation between certain Board procedures and Board decisions. The elements of the 
type of Hearing (oral, written, teleconference), legal representation, and the enforcement 
of previously unenforced legislation create this statistical effect. 
 
The assumption of the procedural theory of A4R is that people will accept a substantive 
outcome if the procedure to determine the substantive outcome is considered fair. This 
research identifies that at the Board the procedure itself can influence the outcome. It is 
difficult to say if individuals would accept a substantive outcome if they understood the 
significant influence procedure had on the outcome. In essence, procedure is not neutral. 
If procedures are not neutral they may not be considered fair. If procedures are not 
considered fair, the substantive outcome may not be acceptable. On the other hand, it 
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may not be humanly possible for a tribunal to create a ‗fair‘ procedure – only to 
approximate ‗fairness‘. For example, a tribunal may in good faith attempt to facilitate 
access to a hearing by making the hearing forum available to those who cannot appear 
before the Board in person. In this respect, hearings may be available by teleconference, 
via written submissions or a combination of forums.  
 
Of interest is the tightening up of the interpretation of regulatory criteria during the study 
period such that the emphasis on compliance was not just the medically focused s.28.4(2) 
test but also the administrative requirement s.28.4(5) test – moving the test from a one 
part test to a two part test. It is interesting to note that the s.28.4(5) requirement for prior 
approval is an administrative requirement not a medical requirement. Thus, a patient may 
meet the medical criteria for out of country coverage but not meet the defining criteria of 
prior approval for the out of country coverage. In essence, the one part test for 
OCCNEIHS has moved from a medical necessity determination by physicians (s.28.4(2)) 
to a two part test that now includes administrative requirement (s.28.4(2) plus s.28.4(5)). 
 
The statistical relationships, it must be stressed, were correlations not causation 
relationship.
356
 In other words, the study cannot report that having legal representation at 
the hearing caused the Board to significantly grant insurance coverage for out of country 
health services. The study can only say that there was a correlation between the factors. 
As a correlation, the factors must be more closely examined in order to determine the 
                                                 
356
 For example, cases that had legal representation at the hearing were more likely to receive their 
requested resource allocation from the tribunal irrespective of the submissions of the parties before the 
decision maker 
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meaning behind this result. It is highly recommended that further qualitative research be 
undertaken to further explore the correlations. 
 
 
Substantive Argument Analysis 
Phase I – Overview of Arguments 
Screening Test: s.24(1)17 - ‗Experimental Treatment‘ Analysis 
According to the legislation, if a treatment is determined by the Board to be experimental 
it is automatically not funded by OHIP. It is therefore surprising that 4.8 % 
(approximately 5%) of patients argued that their requested treatment was experimental -- 
in essence, sealing their fate as there is no chance of OHIP funding.
357
 It is likely that the 
patient did not understand the legislation and/or that the jurisdiction of the Board does not 
allow the funding for a treatment that is determined to be experimental. If a patient had 
representation by a lawyer, the lawyer should have advised the patient of the inability of 
the Board to fund ‗experimental‘ procedures. Even if the patient was self represented, the 
pre-Hearing conference (PHC) should identify if the patient plans to argue that the 
treatment is experimental and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Hearing.  
 
Test Element #1 - s.28.4(2)(a) 
‗Generally Accepted in Ontario as Appropriate for a Person in the Same Medical 
Circumstances as the Insured Person‘ 
                                                 
357
 It is possible that a treatment was experimental at the time of the patient‘s request to OHIP but it is no 
longer the case at the time of the Board Hearing. In such a scenario, it would be questionable if OHIP 
would not have tried to settle the case before it appeared before the Board. However, the patients‘ argument 
was coded at the time of the Hearing making it unlikely that the health care service was not currently 
experimental 
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This element of the s.28.4(2) test – whether the out of country treatment is generally 
accepted as appropriate for the particular patient (GA) -- is of critical importance. If an 
out of country procedure is not considered generally acceptable for the patient, the 
s.28.4(2) test stops here. The legislation will not fund a patient‘s procedure that medical 
professionals have determined not to be appropriate for the given patient. The patient 
who fails on this element of the test will not be eligible for consideration under the 
identical/ equivalent or delay elements of the test.  
 
 
 
Automatic Denial: 
It is unclear why approximately 5% of patients would argue that the requested procedure 
is not generally accepted as appropriate.
358
 Several thoughts come to mind upon 
reviewing this result.  First, the patient may not understand that he/she will not receive 
funding for a requested procedure if they argue the procedure is not appropriate for their 
condition. This misunderstanding should be clarified at the Pre Hearing Conference.
359
 
The fact that it is not clarified prior to the Hearing leads one to question the 
                                                 
358
 It is not possible, from the written Decisions, to know if the patient had a disagreement one or more 
physicians as to the appropriateness of the treatment but chose not to present this medical opinion at the 
Hearing.  
 
359
 Pre Hearing Conference Screen 
Pre Hearing Conferences are held prior to the Hearing so that the parties – the patient and OHIP – can 
assess each other‘s arguments as well as allowing for any questions or assumptions to be clarified. Because 
Pre Hearing Conference information is not available to the Board Panel for the Hearing and is not 
contained within the written Decision, it is unclear if the discrepancy within Team Patient was evident at 
the time of the Pre Hearing Conference. This area – the Pre Hearing Conference – needs to be further 
investigated to determine if Team Patient discrepancies are evident at this stage of the process and need to 
be addressed before proceeding to the Hearing stage. 
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successfulness of the Pre Hearing Conference as a means of screening cases for 
compliance with the Board‘s jurisdiction. Second, the Pre Hearing Conference may 
accurately communicate the Board‘s jurisdiction but the patient may choose to make a 
policy argument that the treatment should be covered by OHIP. Again, policy arguments 
such as this are outside the jurisdiction of the Board. Third, the patient may present a 
medical opinion – that the treatment is not appropriate – but the patient may be in 
disagreement with that medical opinion.
360
  
 
 
OCCNEIHS Sought but Not for an Ontario Delay: 
An interesting issue arises here – and again in the ‗discrepancies in team patient‘ section -
patients may not be requesting to go out of country solely for ‗delay‘ reasons. Patients 
may be requesting out of country treatment because Ontario physicians do not deem the 
treatment appropriate for the patient. For example, the patient argues the treatment is 
generally accepted 81% of the time while OHIP agrees that the treatment is generally 
accepted 49% of the time. This 30% difference is a significant difference of opinion 
between the patient and OHIP. This is an interesting finding because the popular belief is 
that patients are going out of country for treatment because of domestic delay when, in 
reality, patients may be seeking treatment that is not medically considered by Ontario 
physicians as being appropriate for them.  
 
Lay Board versus OHIP Medical Expertise 
                                                 
360
 The patient may also present a medical opinion from a physician from an out of country institution 
indicating the treatment is medically necessary thus countering the Ontario physician‘s opinion.  
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The lay Board is overturning medical expertise of OHIP‘s Decision in 19% (68% Board -
- 49% OHIP=19%) in favor of the patient. If OHIP has medical expertise to assess if an 
OCCNEIHS is or is not generally accepted by physicians in Ontario as being appropriate 
for the patient and the Board is a lay panel without this expertise, the 19% overruling 
must be based on the quality of the parties‘ medical evidence coming before the Board 
and/or its interpretation of that medical evidence.
361
 
  
Test Element #2 – s.28.4(2)(b)(i)  
‗Treatment that is Not Performed in Ontario by an Identical or Equivalent Procedure‘ 
There is a significant difference between the patient (30%) and OHIP (5%) whether the 
treatment is not available in Ontario. This may be due to the nature of the test (proving a 
negative) and/or the fact the treatment is available in Ontario but not available for the 
specific patient. 
 
Evidentiary Difficulty: 
In this element of the test, the patient must prove a negative – that the identical/equivalent 
treatment is NOT performed in Ontario. It is unclear how the patient is to know and thus 
to prove that a treatment is NOT performed in Ontario. This element is very difficult to 
prove if there is no access to a centralized database.
362
 For example, OHIP appears to 
                                                 
361
 – given that the Board‘s jurisdiction does not allow for financial, compassionate grounds or Charter 
claims. 
 
362
 If the patient must rely on the doctor for treatment or for a referral, the doctor may or may not have the 
knowledge or the network to know where – if at all – the treatment is performed in Ontario. It is unrealistic 
– with the current technology available to general practitioners - to expect a practitioner to know what 
treatments are available throughout the province of Ontario. The practitioner, in acting in the interest of the 
patient and with the limited resources of time and technology, may state that there is – to the practitioner‘s 
knowledge – no identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario. From the cases reviewed, it was unclear what 
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have OHIP billing records that substantiate that a treatment is performed in Ontario. 
However, in 29% of cases, OHIP does not state a position whether the treatment is 
identical/equivalent in Ontario. Given the OHIP billing records, OHIP should have an 
idea if the treatment is performed in Ontario -- as they are paying for the treatment.  
 
The difficulty proving this element of the test may cause patients to rely on the alternate 
criteria of domestic ‗delay‘ as the reason for requesting GA out of country coverage. 
 
 
Available – but not for the Patient:  
Even if an identical or equivalent treatment is performed in Ontario, the physicians at the 
treatment location may override the general practitioner or specialist‘s referral and state 
they will not perform the treatment on the given patient – perhaps because they do not do 
enough of the procedure to keep up their skill, they consider the patient too risky for the 
procedure or they consider another out of country location a better option for the patient. 
In all cases, the treatment would be available in Ontario and generally acceptable as 
appropriate for the patient – but just not available to the patient.363 Again, the patient may 
                                                                                                                                                 
evidence could be used by the patient to substantiate the argument that there was no identical/equivalent 
performed in Ontario i.e. was evidence based on the number of attempts to determine if an 
identical/equivalent existed – or – the actual total number of treatment services offered. 
 
363
 An interesting question arises whether an identical/equivalent treatment performed in Ontario that is 
privately insured qualifies as an identical/equivalent treatment performed in Ontario for OHIP‘s out of 
country purposes. The understanding may have been that only OHIP treatment is considered. This is not 
clear from the legislation and there was been no judicial direction from the courts on this matter. OHIP has 
argued that non-OHIP treatment in the private sector qualifies as an identical/equivalent treatment 
performed in Ontario.
363
 The Board disagrees with this position taken by OHIP and has ruled that only 
OHIP identical/equivalent treatment qualifies as identical/equivalent treatment.  
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have difficulty proving this element of the test and choose to rely on the alternate criteria 
of domestic ‗delay‘ as a reason for requesting out of country coverage. 
 
Test Element #3 – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)  
‗Treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured person travel out of 
Canada to avoid a delay that would result in death or medically significant irreversible 
tissue damage‘ 
Significant Differences: 
It is interesting to note that approximately half the time, delay is not argued by the patient 
– 59.7% do not argue a delay would cause death, 44.8% do not argue that a delay would 
cause MSITD. When the patient does argue delay, a delay causing death (25.7%) and/or a 
delay causing MSITD (45.1%) significantly differs from OHIP‘s agreement that a delay 
would cause death (0.3%) and/or MSITD (1.0%). Clearly, OHIP and the patient are not in 
agreement over the question of a ―delay‖. This may point to a difference in expectations 
as to the amount of time that constitutes a ―delay‖.  
 
How Delay is Measured: 
The difference in expectation as to what constitutes ‗delay‘ may be a function of how 
delay is measured. For example, the test for ‗delay‘ is a prospective assessment of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
This element of the test also raises the question whether ‗identical‘ treatment is the same as ‗equivalent‘ 
treatment. It also raises the question who determines if the given treatment is ‗identical‘ and/or 
‗equivalent‘? Currently, it appears to be the patient arguing against OHIP. It is also unclear when a 
treatment no longer is deemed ‗identical‘ or even ‗equivalent‘. For example, in a treatment for tumor 
removal, the medical procedure for tumor removal may be via traditional surgery or traditional surgery 
using a different surgical technique. In this example, is the tumor removal the identical? Is it equivalent? Or 
is it the technique to remove the tumor? Currently, it is the lay panel of the Board that must determine, 
based on the evidence presented by the patient and by OHIP, whether the treatment is identical or 
equivalent.  
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impact of delay on the patient‘s health. This would be particularly difficult if a health 
problem – such as chronic pain – was diagnosed based on a subjective report or if a 
health condition had a little known etiology – such as in the case of rare diseases.  
 
The data also raises the question ‗when does the delay start‘? Where delay is reported, it 
appears to occur at the level of getting an appointment with an Ontario specialist and 
getting an Ontario surgery appointment. However, the Ontario Wait Time Strategy lists 
wait times from the time the specialist recommends a treatment i.e. surgery. The wait 
time does not include the time the patient incurs waiting to see his/her GP, to get 
diagnostics for the GP, to get a referral from the GP for an appointment with a SP, to wait 
for the appointment with the SP, to meet with the SP, to have diagnostics done for the SP 
– all of which may be months to years – before the SP determines the treatment is 
required, or not. This additional time may be what the patient refers to as ‗delay‘ rather 
than just the delay experienced on the waitlist for treatment. The patient, OHIP and the 
Board may be operating on different definitions of ‗delay‘. In essence, there may be at 
least two types of delay – one delay as defined by medical professionals in the Wait Time 
Strategy and another delay based on the experience and expectations of the patient.  
 
Phase II: Discrepancies within Team Patient  
Team Patient discrepancies in Years 1 through 5 were not coded initially for one main 
reason -- the author made the assumption in designing this research study and code 
book that if the patient appeared before the Board then there would be a medical 
necessity determined by a physician. In this respect, it was assumed that there were no 
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discrepancies within Team Patient.  In other words, the patients and the physicians 
were in agreement regarding the criteria for s.28.4(2). It became clear, while analyzing 
the cases, that this was not the case. By Year 5 cases, the author was attuned to these 
discrepancies. The voided assumption of ‗no Team Patient discrepancies‘ led to the 
development of a more detailed coding system for Year 5 patient arguments.  
 
The rate of discrepancies within Team Patient – between patients and their own 
physicians -- is remarkable because the legislative grounds for granting out of country 
coverage are based on medical opinion for medically necessary services. The 
discrepancies had an effect on the Board‘s granting of out of country coverage in that the 
Board appears to grant primarily in favour of the medical opinion. Although this is 
preliminary exploratory data, the difference of patterns warrants more investigation 
beyond this study. 
 
Conclusion:  
A key finding of this research is the Board‘s five year study denial rate of 80%. However, 
this means that in 20% of the decisions the lay Board overruled the medical expertise of 
OHIP. This raises the question -- what element or elements of the s.28.4(2) test caused 
the Board to overrule OHIP‘s decision?  
 
Research Question #2: 
What substantive arguments affect resource allocation decisions made by the Board?
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Answer  
All substantive arguments are correlated resource allocation decisions but most clearly 
when there was a discrepancy between patients and their own physicians. For example, 
the research found a significant number of discrepancies within Team Patient at all levels 
of the s.28.4(2) Test. The patients were, in essence, seeking out of country treatment 
when it was not medically approved by their own physicians. When there was a 
discrepancy within Team Patient, the Board appears to side with the medical opinion.  
 
It is important to note that the appearance of a pattern of ‗discrepancies‘ between the 
patient and his/her doctors regarding treatment out of country may be signaling a 
challenge to medical opinion as the gatekeeper to medical resources. Patients now have 
multiple sources of medical information and social networks to assist them in 
determining medical options. This discrepancy within team patient may reflect a 
significant change in the doctor-patient relationship.  
Discrepancies within Team Patient may also be evidence of an indirect method of health 
care resource allocation. For example, if a physician does not consider a medical 
procedure to be GA for the patient, the physician may state that the procedure is not 
immediately available – as it is not immediately required medically for the patient. This 
may be interpreted by the patient as a ‗delay‘. In another example, the patient‘s physician 
may actually state to the patient that the treatment requested is not GA but the patient still 
wishes to proceed. In this respect, the patient and the patient‘s physician disagree on GA 
but the patient still requests OCCNEIHS from OHIP.  
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Three other trends are worth noting. First, across all study years, the patient only argued 
‗delay‘ approximately 50% of the time. However, patients did argue GA over 80% of the 
time. This may indicate patients are requesting OCCNEIHS for treatment not considered 
GA in Ontario rather than solely for the popular belief that OCCNEIHS are sought 
because of delay in accessing Ontario care.  
 
Second, patients clearly see ―delay‖ differently than OHIP or the Board. There appears to 
be at least two perspectives on ‗delay‘ – one delay time considered by medical 
professionals and one delay time considered by the patient.  
 
Third, there is a complete absence in the decisions of economic discussions, cost-benefit 
analysis, official medical and political consensus regarding OCCNEIHS that are covered 
by OHIP, regulations specific to OCCNEIHS, or algorithms to calculate coverage.  
 
It is important to note that there was no requirement under s.28.4(2) or s.28.4(5) or 
anywhere else in the legislative scheme that required evidence to be presented  regarding 
the financial costs of the OCCNEIHS. It is understandable, therefore, that the Board 
would not require evidence regarding the financial cost of the OCCNEIHS or make 
reference to financial costs in Board decisions. No submissions regarding financial costs 
were presented by the parties. There was no indication that the Board considered – either 
implicitly or explicitly – the cost of the OCCNEIHS. The cost per patient or the cost to 
society was not discussed as an element in the resource allocation decision making.  
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Overall Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the academic discussion regarding the lack of empirical research in 
legal analysis – specifically in terms of tribunal decisions. The lack of Canadian 
empirical research relative to the overabundance of theories reflected the author‘s 
research experience. This chapter also reviewed the A4R theory regarding the process of 
making resource allocation decisions. The author analyzed each of the four conditions of 
transparency - publicity, appeals, enforcement and relevance - relative to the study data 
and found that the four conditions were present but were not ‗fine grain‘ enough to 
identify procedural factors which statistically influenced Board decisions. The author 
concluded that the A4R theory does not represent the complexity of the tribunal resource 
allocation decision making in terms of the influence of a tribunal‘s procedures. For this 
analyses, empirical research was needed. 
 
The empirical data of tribunal decisions was analyzed to determine if correlations and 
trends could be established. The data was analyzed relative to the categories of patient 
profiles, procedures and substantive argument. This was done in order to accurately 
determine what was currently taking place and what an ideal resource allocation decision 
making mechanism should entail. The empirical results found numerous correlations and 
trends that were not identified by the A4R theory.  
 
In term of a Patient Profile, the analysis revealed patients know what diagnosis they have 
and are requesting specific facilities for specific treatment. Overall, Ontario‘s 
OCCNEIHS issue is largely based on patients requesting surgery in northeastern USA. 
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Of interest was the large number of ‗pain‘ cases. Why is this important? Pain, unlike 
many other health conditions, is very subjective. It is not easily diagnosed by, for 
example, MRIs or blood tests. There may be a connection – while beyond the scope of 
this thesis – between a patient‘s subjective experience of pain and their attempt to seek 
treatment which often is at odds with the approval of that treatment by their own Ontario 
physician. 
 
In terms of Procedures, the analysis revealed a correlation between legal representation 
and the resource allocation of OCCNEIHS in the Board‘s decisions. As discussed earlier, 
oral hearings and delays between hearing date and decision release were found to be 
significant – but only for one year – 2006 and 2008 respectively. While the empirical 
results highlighted trends – such as the influence of legal representation – it also 
highlighted that there was no data to analyse regarding cost considerations. 
 
In terms of Substantive Arguments of the parties before the Board, the empirical research 
highlighted a number of interesting issues including:  
- a number of experimental and unnecessary medical cases that did not fall within 
the Board‘s jurisdiction;  
- patients – rather than solely physicians - played a significant role in determining 
OCCNEIHS;  
- administrative requirements, such as prior approval, could overrule treatment that 
qualified under medical requirements; 
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- counter to public perception, more patients were arguing that a OCCNEIHS was 
GA rather than arguing that there was a Delay to access that treatment;   
- patients appear to be defining one of the legislative criteria – delay – differently 
than the medical authorities.  
 
The empirical research also identified the lack of reference to economic factors when 
determining resource allocation. This lack of reference to economic factors included: the 
absence of cost-benefit analysis of treatment and non-treatment. There was also a lack of 
reference to medical expert consensus on approved treatment and treatment protocols or 
to multi-disciplinary panels of experts to assess ethical/medical/fiscal issues. There was 
also no reference to a separate regulation that specifically dealt with OCCNEIHS or an 
alternate forum to the Board where patients could bring their concerns about the health 
care system in general. Given that these factors – economic factors, expert consensus on 
approved treatment, treatment protocols, multi-disciplinary panels of experts, separate 
regulations or alternate forums for patient concerns – were not the HIA or in Regulation 
552, it is not surprising that they were not included in the Board‘s decisions. 
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Chapter 11 
WHAT IT SHOULD BE 
Research Question #3: 
The Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making Mechanism 
 
A revised resource allocation decision making mechanism may mean different things to 
different people. For this thesis, a revised decision making mechanism would be based on 
empirical data, expert consensus on multiple relevant factors and would involve a clear 
process that produced decisions that are acceptable to the parties affected and society in 
general.  
 
In order to develop a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism, it was 
necessary to assess what system currently existed. The previous chapters examined 
procedural and substantive resource allocation theories, analyzed the current resource 
allocation decision making mechanism of HSARB relative to the A4R theory, and 
reviewed the academic discussion regarding the need for empirical legal research. It also 
analyzed the existing qualitative and quantitative empirical studies. While the scholarship 
indicated that resource allocation decision making was difficult, it did not provide 
guidance or analysis of the interaction between procedures, substantive arguments 
guidance and resource allocation decisions. The scholarship did not propose a revised 
resource allocation mechanism.  
 
A4R 
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The scholarship did present several theories for determining acceptable resource 
allocations. This thesis focused on one of these theories - the A4R theory. The 
assumption behind the A4R theory is that due to a lack of consensus on substantive 
distribution principles, a fair, transparent resource allocation process is necessary in order 
to create the acceptance of a resource allocation decision. This author analyzed each of 
the A4R theory‘s four conditions relative to the study results and found that the four 
conditions were present but did not identify several factors identified by the empirical 
data results of this study. If the A4R theory did not capture these complexities of the 
Board‘s decision making process, the A4R would not accurately inform Question #3 – 
What should a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism entail?  
 
Empirical Research 
As a result, this author undertook an empirical analysis of current activities taking place 
at HSARB hearings – as documented in Board decisions - in order to accurately identify 
what procedural and substantive factors currently influenced Board decisions. Based on 
this analysis, factors were identified that should and should not be added to a revised 
resource allocation decision making mechanism. The current HSARB system was 
analyzed with respect to: what patients were coming before the Board and why and what 
the Board‘s procedures were in an attempt to create a neutral, fair proceeding which 
focused on the substantive arguments, as well as the substantive arguments put forth by 
the parties. The Board‘s procedures and the parties‘ substantive arguments were analyzed 
relative to the Board‘s decision to grant or deny resources. The analysis of these factors – 
the patient profile, the Board‘s procedures and the actual substantive arguments of the 
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parties. This impact of these factors on Board decisions what analyzed. This analysis 
informed the following proposed resource allocation decision making mechanism.  
 
Patient Profile 
The empirical analysis revealed that patients knew their diagnosis and were requesting 
specific facilities for specific treatment. These results indicate that the patients were very 
motivated and had undertaken extensive research not only of their own diagnoses but also 
of the services available to address their diagnosis.  
 
Importance of Patient Input 
Instead of assuming that patients are subverting physicians as the assessor of medical 
necessity by inserting the patient‘s own opinion of appropriate medical necessity, patients 
need to be included in the determination of OCCNEIHS. Their expectations, experiences 
and their attempts to problem solve difficult health care situations are, in effect, an 
invaluable evaluation of the system. Ideally, patients are not only able to provide insights 
into the existing system but they are also well positioned to contribute ‗bottom up‘ 
solutions. In this respect, the experiences, formal and informal networks, information 
sources, research and ideas of patients needs to be more closely examined and 
incorporated into a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism. A revised 
resource allocation decision mechanism therefore includes the patient‘s diagnosis, 
experience attempting to attain the required health service, the type of treatment sought 
and its location, patient expectations and information sources, insights, and proposed 
‗bottom up‘ solutions.   
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Importance of Specialized Medical Expertise Relative to Diagnosis 
Of particular interest arising from the empirical analysis of patient diagnosis was the 
large percentage of patients experiencing pain and seeking OCCNEIHS. Pain is a 
subjective medical experience which may not lend itself to objective diagnosis by 
physicians. The issue of pain may be signaling that not all medical conditions are suitable 
for traditional objective physician medical necessity assessment. Future research should 
analyse whether patients with difficult to diagnose medical conditions – such as pain – 
are significantly more likely to apply for OCCNEIHS. If this is the case, there will need 
to be policy discussions regarding subjective/difficult to diagnose medical conditions, the 
current domestic system and OCCNEIHS. In terms of a revised resource allocation 
decision mechanism, specialized expertise should be included in the area of highly 
prevalent subjective medical conditions such as pain.  
 
Procedures 
Importance of Time Series Empirical Research 
The empirical research undertaken for this study identified that specific procedural 
factors had a significant effect on the Board‘s resource allocation decisions. For example, 
across all years, the presence of legal representation was correlated with positive resource 
allocation decisions. The empirical research also identified certain year-specific 
variations in the data, such as the significant effect of oral hearings on resource allocation 
decisions – but for only one year. These two trends – legal influence over all years and 
oral format influence for one year – point to the need to undertake time series empirical 
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research in order to correctly assess what is currently taking place and what ideally 
should take place. For example, if the research only examined the year and found that 
oral formats influenced decisions, the research might conclude that oral formats always 
influenced decisions. This would be incorrect and misleading. Only an empirical time 
series would identify ongoing versus time limited trends. Thus, a revised resource 
allocation decision mechanism must include a time series of data in order to correctly 
identify trends.  
 
Elimination of Non Neutral Procedural Factors 
The fact that the empirical results indicated that procedures were not neutral changes any 
assumptions and theories. For example, the A4R theory, as it currently stands, states that 
if agreement cannot be reached on substantive distribution principles, people are more 
likely to accept a substantive distribution decision if the process is considered fair. In 
other words, according to the theory, it is the substantive argument that influences the 
resource allocation decision, not the process. However, if the Board‘s procedures are not 
considered neutral with respect to legal representation such that it is disadvantaging non-
represented parties, would the decision still be accepted? If the procedures of the Board 
are not neutral but could affect the resource allocation decision, it is questionable if such 
procedures should be required at all. Possibly not. The challenge would be to create a 
revised resource allocation decision making mechanism that decreased or eliminated the 
influence of procedural factors while still attempting to ensure the procedures were fair 
and neutral. The resource allocation mechanism would ideally depend on factors 
available to all current and potential parties. Thus, a revised resource allocation 
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mechanism would eliminate the influence of procedures on decision outcomes and ensure 
that all information was available to the parties.  
 
It is important to note that the research not only identified trends in the present data but 
also identified that certain factors were not present. These missing factors included: the 
lack of a separate regulation that specifically dealt with OCCNEIHS and the lack of 
discussion of economic factors such as the cost and the cost-benefit of OCCNEIHS.  
 
Separate OCCNEIHS Regulation 
A revised resource allocation decision making mechanism should have a separate and 
specific regulation regarding OCCNEIHS within the HIA. Within the regulation, key 
definitions, the criteria to apply to OHIP for an OCCNEIHS, the criteria to appeal an 
OHIP decision to HSARB, the jurisdiction of HSARB and the factors which HSARB 
uses to assess an OHIP decision should be clearly outlined. Such an OCCNEIHS 
regulation should clarify the role of HSARB and patients‘ expectations.  
 
Further Stratification of ―Delay‖ 
One of the issues, discussed in this thesis, is the concept of ‗delay‘ and the difference in 
the understanding of this term. This difference of understanding can lead to conflicting 
expectations. For example, patients are defining the ‗delay‘ accessing treatment 
significantly differently than OHIP or medical experts. Patients begin to experience 
‗delay‘ from the time they have an appointment with their family doctor. OHIP may 
define ―delay‘ as the time between a specialist‘s recommendation for treatment and the 
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actual delivery of treatment. The gap – the time between seeing a family doctor and the 
actual treatment versus confirmation by a specialist that treatment will proceed and the 
actual treatment – may result in appeals before the Board. Thus, the clarification of terms 
and expectations via a separate OCCNEIHS regulation should address this discrepancy 
and potentially decrease the number of appeals before the Board. 
 
Economic Factors 
If a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism must consider whether or not 
public funds should be allocated to an OCCNEIHS, it should consider economic factors 
related to this OCCNEIHS. For example, there is no discussion in the data or the 
regulation regarding the cost of a particular treatment, the cost of the OCCNEIHS relative 
to the domestic equivalent treatment or an economic benefit of such a treatment. Thus, a 
revised resource allocation decision making mechanism that determines the allocation of 
public funds should consider the cost and benefit economic factors related to the 
OCCNEIHS and how these factors are evaluated, not just the medical necessity of the 
OCCNEIHS.  
 
Substantive 
The empirical research highlighted a number of interesting substantive issues including: 
the number of experimental and unnecessary medical cases that did not fall within the 
Board‘s jurisdiction but were not screened out before the hearing process; the increasing 
role of patients and administrative requirements in determining OCCNEIHS; the 
definition of ‗delay‘ – as discussed earlier -was significantly different between patients 
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and OHIP; and more patients were requesting OCCNEIHS because they felt the treatment 
was generally acceptable for their situation rather than because there was a delay 
accessing the treatment domestically. A revised resource allocation decision making 
mechanism would screen out appeals that did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Board. 
For example, cases where both the patient and OHIP agreed that the OCCNEIHS was not 
appropriate for the given patient would not proceed to appeal. The administrative 
requirements – such as the requirement to receive prior approval from OHIP before 
receiving an OCCNEIHS – would, as discussed earlier, be clearly established. Including 
the increased role of the patient, as discussed earlier, is an essential evaluation tool of the 
current system. A revised system would also clearly establish how and who determined 
the medical necessity of OCCNEIHS. Currently, there appears to be some confusion 
whether the patient, the general practitioner, the specialist, an out of country physician or 
some combination of these individuals, determines if an OCCNEIHS is required. A 
revised resource allocation decision making mechanism would continue to include the 
actual patient diagnosis by an Ontario physician, but would require that the actual 
diagnosis be mapped to the official treatment consensus statements of medical experts in 
order to determine the required medical treatment.  
 
It is important to highlight three essential factors that should be taken into account in a 
revised resource allocation decision making mechanism: political uncertainties, variations 
in medical consensus over time and unforeseen circumstances. For example, a newly 
elected provincial political party may have a different perspective on the extent of 
OCCNEIHS provided. Medical technology may evolve for a particular medical condition 
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such that a disease like cancer would no longer require surgery but be treated by generic 
drugs. This development in the medical technology would influence the medical 
consensus on treatment. Unforeseen circumstances, such as social unrest or natural 
disasters, may divert expertise and funding away from a revised OCCNEIHS mechanism. 
Each of these factors would need to be continually updated.  
 
Computer Assisted Algorithm as a Decision Making Mechanism 
It is unrealistic to assume that the current lay Board has the expertise in multiple relevant 
considerations – such as medical, administrative, economic and political factors. Each of 
these factors requires a significant level of expertise and the field of expertise has its own 
internal challenge in achieving consensus. A revised resource allocation decision making 
mechanism would use the expert consensus on each factor rather than trying to establish 
consensus about the factor. Given that expert consensus evolves over time, the resource 
allocation decision making mechanism would be a ‗living tree‘ based on criteria and 
consensus information available at the time of decision making.  
 
Given the potential extensive developments within each factor, the multitude of factors 
and potential variations, uncertainties and interactive complexities, it is recommended by 
this author that a revised resource allocation decision making algorithm be developed and 
utilized to allocate resources. The algorithm should include the following variables with 
respect to the OCCNEIHS: screen out any factors which do not fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Board, physicians diagnosis of the patient in question, expert consensus on medical 
treatment for a given diagnosis, the OCCNEIHS administrative requirement in order to 
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qualify for OCCNEIHS review, the cost-benefit analysis of OCCNEIHS treatment, fiscal 
budget for the given time period, patient feedback including their experience, insight and 
ideas regarding potential solutions as well as political issues and/or uncertainties. All of 
these factors would vary over time as unforeseen circumstances arose and factors 
developed. The complexity of this algorithm would require computer assistance for 
continually updating each factor. In this respect, one decision making body is not 
required to have expertise in all areas that may influence the resource allocation decision. 
Rather, the combined expertise of multiple factors would influence the resource 
allocation decision.  
 
This expert consensus and the algorithm itself would be made available to health care 
professionals and the public. In this respect, interested parties could assess the probability 
of being granted resource allocation. Individual patients and their doctors could request 
that OHIP apply and provide reasons why the algorithm resulted in the approval or denial 
of an OCCNEIHS. Algorithm denials could be appealed to HSARB.  
 
Jurisdiction of HSARB 
One of the key issues of this study was the jurisdiction of HSARB. The study identified – 
as part of Question #1 – that the Board‘s procedures were inadvertently not neutral and 
may, in and of themselves, have affected the Board‘s decision. This was true of legal 
versus non legal representation. The study also identified that, for a certain year, an oral 
hearing format significantly influenced the Board‘s decision. To avoid these inadvertent 
influences, this author recommends that the jurisdiction of HSARB change. HSARB 
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would no longer be required to hear de novo evidence from lawyers or non-lawyers in an 
oral format. Rather, HSARB would review whether OHIP had utilized the algorithm, 
discussed above, in making their decision to grant or deny an OCCNEIHS. The lay 
HSARB Board would be well positioned to review OHIP‘s compliance with the 
algorithm, while not being required to have expertise in any of the algorithm factors.   
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CHAPTER 12 
Conclusion  
 
Our current understanding of tribunal resource allocation decision making has been 
through the analysis of judicial review of tribunal decisions and/or the capacity, 
independence and appointment process of tribunal members. This analysis of tribunals 
provides incomplete information. This thesis sought to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of tribunal resource allocation decisions by empirically analyzing whether   
a tribunal‘s procedures and the substantive arguments of the parties affected the tribunal‘s 
decision. In terms of procedures, the public perception is that the tribunal‘s procedures 
are neutral and did not affect the tribunal‘s decision. A leading theory, Accountability for 
Reasonableness (A4R), is based on the assumption that resource allocation decisions are 
acceptable even when society does not agree on the substantive distribution principles if 
the process for arriving at the decision is fair and transparent. If the procedures are not 
fair, transparent or neutral, the author questions whether resource allocation decisions 
would still be accepted. If there is a statistical effect of the tribunal‘s procedures on the 
tribunal‘s decision, it was of interest to know what factor(s) caused this effect and how a 
revised decision making mechanism can deal with the factor(s).   
An extensive review of the literature did not identify a theory that applied to three key 
elements of the Board‘s decisions- a profile of the patient before the tribunal, the 
procedures of the Board and the substantive arguments of the parties. Given the lack of 
applicable theory and the academic need for legal empirical research,  a research 
methodology had to be developed, tested and implemented in a case study of 
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approximately 400 HSARB decisions over a five year period. The empirical research 
methodology developed for this thesis is a preliminary but significant contribution to the 
understanding of tribunal resource allocation decision making. The analysis of the 
research results identified the following key trends with respect to patient profiles and the 
effect of the Board‘s procedures and the substantive arguments of the parties on Board 
decisions.  
Patient Profile 
In terms of a Patient Profile, the analysis revealed patients know what diagnosis they 
have and are requesting specific facilities for specific treatment. Overall, Ontario‘s 
OCCNEIHS issue is largely based on patients requesting surgery in northeastern USA. 
The specificity of the patients‘ requests also implies that the patients had contact with an 
out of country medical system and/or had likely conducted some of their own research 
into their conditions and treatment options and facilities. Unlike the statutory requirement 
for physicians to determine medical resource allocations, patients appear to be playing a 
major role in determining and advocating for their own OCCNEIHS. Of interest was the 
large number of ‗pain‘ cases and a possible connection between a patient‘s subjective 
experience of pain and their attempt to seek treatment which often at odds with the 
approval of that treatment by their own Ontario physician. 
 
Research Question #1:  
Do procedures statistically affect the resource allocation decisions of the Board? If so, 
what elements of the procedures create this statistical affect?
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It is important to note that the majority of procedures did not affect resource allocation 
decisions. It is also important to note the analysis of data over time is critical to 
identifying trends across all study years versus trends which may have only taken place in 
a specific year, For example, using quantitative methods, the author‘s statistical analysis 
found that the Board‘s procedures significantly affect resource allocation decisions with 
respect to self-representation and, for specific years, oral hearings. These identified trends 
were not evident from the A4R theory. If the quantitative analysis correctly identified 
elements of the Board‘s procedure which significantly influenced the Board‘s decision, 
these elements of the Board‘s procedures were not neutral. If this element of the 
procedure was known not to be neutral, it is questionable if the decision outcome would 
be acceptable to those affected. 
 
The author analyzed the procedural quantitative research results relative to the A4R 
theory‘s four procedural conditions of transparency – appeals, publicity, enforcement and 
relevancy of evidence. The author concluded that the four conditions were present, but 
that the A4R theory does not represent the complexity of the tribunal resource allocation 
decision making in terms of the influence of a tribunal‘s procedures.  
 
Research Question #2:  
What substantive arguments affect the resource allocation decisions of the Board?
 
 
 
While all substantial arguments affect resource allocation decisions, the empirical 
research highlighted a number of interesting issues including: the number of experimental 
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and unnecessary medical cases that did not fall within the Board‘s jurisdiction; patients 
and administrative requirements – rather than solely physicians - played a significant role 
in determining OCCNEIHS; counter to public opinion, more patients were arguing that a 
OCCNEIHS was generally accepted as appropriate for the patient rather than arguing that 
there was a delay to access that treatment; patients appear to be defining one of the 
legislative criteria – delay – differently than the medical authorities. As with the 
importance of identifying the above trends, the empirical research also identified the lack 
of trends including: the absence of discussion of economic factors, of cost-benefit 
analysis of treatment and non-treatment, medical expert consensus on approved treatment 
and treatment protocols or multi-disciplinary panels of experts to assess 
ethical/medical/fiscal issues. There was also no reference to a separate regulation that 
specifically dealt with OCCNEIHS or an alternate forum to the Board where patients 
could bring their concerns about the health care system in general.  
 
Research Question #3 
What It Should Be 
What Should Be a Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making Mechanism?  
 
Based on the research results of this study, the thesis asked: What Should the Revised 
Resource Allocation Decision Making Model Be? The revised resource allocation 
decision making mechanism would eliminate the procedural elements which influence 
the resource allocation decision – such as oral forums and legal representation. The 
jurisdiction of the Board should be revised such that the Board would review the resource 
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allocation decisions of OHIP for compliance with agreed upon guidelines. The guidelines 
would be multi factorial and based on expert consensus and include medical, 
administrative, economic and political factors as well as patient input and unforeseen 
developments. These multi factorial guidelines would be available publicly. Given the 
extensive potentially varying factors, the multi factorial guidelines would take the form 
of an algorithm. OHIP would apply the algorithmic equation to requests for OCCNEIHS. 
Parties could appeal OHIP‘s decision to HSARB if it fell within the jurisdiction of the 
Board. HSARB would conduct a review – as opposed to a hearing – to ensure that OHIP 
had utilized the factors which comprise the algorithm and the decision of OHIP was 
reasonable given the algorithm results. In this respect, the Board would depend on the 
expert consensus on the evidence rather than attempting the near impossible task of 
determining OCCNEIHS based on the evidence presented at the hearing. In this respect, 
the role of the Board would be significantly narrowed.  
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CHAPTER 13 
Final Thought 
 
 
The focus of this research is on tribunal resource allocation decision making based on a 
five year case study of HSARB OCCNEIHS decisions. This thesis reveals several 
challenges with respect to the effect of the Board‘s procedures and the substantive 
arguments on the decision to allocate health care resources. These challenges are not 
solely those of the Board. The challenges reflect many systemic problems in domestic 
health care. The issue of OCCNEIHS can be seen as embedded within the systemic 
problems.  
 
However, the issue of OCCNEIHS also presents an opportunity to research, innovate and 
evaluate the assessment and delivery of health care services.
364
 Researchers and policy 
analysts could use OCCNEIHS to pilot test a number of innovative algorithms and 
service delivery models for the following reason: OCCNEIHS is outside the jurisdiction 
of the CHA and the requirements for provincial governments to receive federal health 
care financial support. OCCNEIHS is also outside the established contractual 
negotiations and fee-schedule of the Ontario government and Ontario Medical 
Association. As such, OCCNEIHS is a discretionary provincial program free of the 
                                                 
364
 For example, a ―heat map‖ could be created and updated continually regarding OCCNEIHS patients 
age, sex, geographical residence, diagnosis, requested treatment and requested facility out of country. This 
information could be ‗mapped‘ onto utilization of the domestic health care system and health outcomes. 
Such information could be analyzed relative to the municipal, provincial and federal political and economic 
environment, historical medical practices, cultural norms and population emigration and immigration.  
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federal and provincial governments and medical association constraints. As a unique 
subcomponent of publicly funded health care system, OCCNEIHS should be used to 
guide research and policy developments at the provincial, national and international level.    
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CHAPTER 14 
EPILOGUE 
Recent Changes to Regulation 552 s.28.4(2) 
 
During the course of the research for this thesis, several major changes were made to 
Regulation 552 with respect to the OCCNEIHS test criteria under section 28.4(2). These 
changes to Regulation 552 took place in April 2009 and in April 2011 – subsequent to the 
Ontario courts issuing decisions in the Flora case of 2008 and the CCW case of 2009.
365
 
The changes clarified that in order to receive OCCNEIHS, a specialist practicing 
medicine in Ontario must approve the requested medical service as being medically 
necessary. The changes also clarified that OCCNEIHS requests must be approved by 
OHIP as insured services before the services are rendered. 
 
Changes in 2009: 
The author‘s analysis of the 2009 changes to Regulation 552 found physicians practicing 
in Ontario (s.28.4(2)(a)) must deem the OCCNEIHS medically necessary (s.28.4(2)(b)) 
for the specific patient. The services can also be provided by a health facility not just a 
hospital. 
 
 
Section 28.4(2) - as of 2009 - stated:  
                                                 
365
 Flora, Supra Note 5. 
C.C.W., Supra Note 100.  
  240       
 
(2)  Services that are rendered outside Canada at a hospital or health facility are 
prescribed as insured services if, 
(a) the service
366
 is generally accepted by the medical profession
367
 in Ontario as 
appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances as the insured 
person; 
(b) the service is medically necessary;
368
 
(c) either, 
(i) the identical or equivalent service is not performed in Ontario, or 
(ii) the identical or equivalent service is performed in Ontario but it is 
necessary that the insured person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay 
that would result in death or medically significant irreversible tissue 
damage;  
(d) in the case of a hospital service or a service rendered in a health facility 
described in clause (a) of the definition of ―health facility‖ in subsection (1), 
the service, if performed in Ontario, is one to which the insured person would 
be entitled without charge pursuant to section 7 in the case of an in-patient 
service or section 8 in the case of an out-patient service; and 
                                                 
366
 Previously ―treatment‖ is now listed as ―service‖ 
367
 Previous ―generally accepted in Ontario‖ is now listed as ―generally accepted by the medical profession 
in Ontario‖ 
368
 This test – ‗the service is medically necessary‘ – is a new criteria for s.28.4(2) 
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(e) in the case of an in-patient service, in Ontario, the insured person would 
ordinarily have been admitted as an in-patient of a public hospital to receive the 
service. O. Reg. 135/09, s. 4. 
 
In essence, the OCCNEIHS criteria changed in April 2009. This new criteria – requiring 
an Ontario medical professional - may have arisen following section 28.4(2) 
interpretation by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the July 2008 cases of Flora
369
 – which 
endorsed an Ontario standard for determining the general acceptability of an 
OCCNEIHS.
370
  
 
Changes in 2011: 
In April of 2011, Regulation 552 changed again to clarify that specialists practicing in 
Ontario - as defined by the Ministry-Ontario Medical Association jointly negotiated 
Schedule of Benefits (or a general practitioner if the services requested are within their 
scope of practice) - must approve the OCCNEIHS for the specific patient. Section 
28.4(7)2 states: 
 
28.4(7) 2. The application mentioned in paragraph 1 includes written confirmation 
that the conditions set out in clauses (2) (a) and (b) and one of the conditions 
set out in clause (2) (c) are satisfied, from, 
                                                 
369
 Flora, Supra Note 5. 
370
  Under s.28.4(2)(a) 
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i. a physician who is a specialist, as defined in the schedule of benefits, in 
the type of service for which approval of payment is sought, 
ii. a general practitioner, if the type of service for which approval of 
payment is sought is within the general practitioner‘s scope of practice, 
or 
iii. in emergency circumstances, a physician who practices medicine in 
Ontario or an emergency patient referral service. 
As such, the regulation now endows the specialist with the responsibility of gatekeeping a 
patient‘s access to OCCNEIHS.  
 
Section 28.4(4)1 – as of 2011 – also states: 
 
28.4(4)  Despite anything in this section as it read before April 1, 2009, a 
service is not, and is deemed never to have been, an insured service under this 
section unless the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. For services rendered in circumstances that are not emergency 
circumstances, 
i. written approval of payment of the amount for the services is 
granted by the General Manager before the services are rendered, 
and 
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ii. the services are rendered within the time limit set out in the written 
approval. 
 
As such, there is no discretionary power to approve an OCCNEIHS retroactively.  This 
author speculates that the regulatory changes were based on the court‘s direction in 
C.C.W. v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2009 CanLII 712 (ON S.C.D.C.) that prior 
approval was required for an OCCNEIHS.  
 
Absence of Attention to Changes: 
In final reflection on the changes to Regulation 552, this author notes an absence of 
attention and debate by academics, the Legislature, the media and the public at large. 
Given the extensive debates about health care, this author would have expected more 
public discussion. However, Regulation 552, as with all regulations but unlike statutes, 
can be amended by the government without approval by the Legislature and therefore 
without public debate. This lack of attention to changes in Regulation 552 is in 
opposition to the media attention given to high profile cases seeking OCCNEIHS and the 
extensive public discussion regarding public health insurance and the delays accessing 
insured care in Ontario.
371
 
                                                 
371
 While not directly related to this thesis, the biggest change to s.28.4(2) is the addition of (d) which deals 
with the provision of insured services by a ‗health facility‘. The section refers to s.28.4(1)(a) which states: 
 
―health facility‖ means, 
(a) a health facility licensed as a health facility by the government in whose jurisdiction the health 
facility is situated in which complex medical and complex surgical procedures are routinely 
performed, 
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(b) whether or not described in clause (a), a facility licensed by the government in whose 
jurisdiction the facility is situated with whose operator the Minister has entered into a 
preferred provider arrangement; 
It is questionable if the ‗health facility‘ referred to in s.28.4(1)(a) are bound by the CHA and the Ontario 
contractual fee schedule agreement for insured services.  
 
So, what are the ‗insured services‘? The new s.28.4(2)(d) also refers to s.7 of Regulation 552 which is the 
insured inpatient services in Canada – previously directed at ‗hospital insured services‘. Section 7 states: 
 
7.  Subject to section 10, the in-patient services to which an insured person is entitled without 
charge are all of the following services: 
1. Accommodation and meals at the standard or public ward level. 
2. Necessary nursing service, except for the services of a private duty nurse who is not engaged 
and paid by the hospital. 
3. Laboratory, radiological and other diagnostic procedures, together with the necessary 
interpretations for the purpose of maintaining health, preventing disease and assisting in the 
diagnosis and treatment of any injury, illness or disability. 
4. Drugs, biologicals and related preparations that are prescribed by an attending physician, oral 
and maxillofacial surgeon or midwife in accordance with accepted practice and administered 
in a hospital, but not including any proprietary medicine as defined from time to time by the 
regulations made under the Food and Drugs Act (Canada). 
5. Use of operating room, obstetrical delivery room and anaesthetic facilities, including necessary 
equipment and supplies. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 552, s. 7; O. Reg. 794/93, s. 2; O. Reg. 345/01, 
s. 2. 
 
Basically, section 7 covers diagnostics, prescriptions and operating facilities in addition to nursing services 
and ward accommodations. Why is section 28.4(2)(d) so important?  
 
Because of its reference to section 28.4(1)(a) and section 7, section 28.4(2)(d) allows health facilities in 
Ontario to provide insured services – diagnostics, prescriptions, operating facilities, nursing services and 
ward accommodations - but leaves open the question of ‗top up‘ incurred by the provincial government. If 
the provincial government ‗tops up‘ insured health care services for private health facilities, the patient 
does not encounter a ‗two tiered‘ extra billing/user fee health care system based on ability to pay and contra 
indicated by the CHA. The cost of private health care is directly incurred by the province and not by the 
patient. The provincial government is not bound by the Schedule of Benefits for insured services or the 
CHA conditions for transfer payment funding if the provincial government pays the ‗tops up‘ out of 
discretion. This author speculates while health care is funded through tax dollar allocations or new 
additional taxes, the patient is not directly experiencing extra billing counter to the CHA but is indirectly 
subsidizing extra billing. This author further speculates that the provincial government may wish to keep 
Ontario tax dollars used to fund health care public insurance within Ontario and not lose those tax dollars to 
health care services out of country.  
 
In summary, this obscure, difficult to understand amended regulation s.28.4(2) may have introduced a 
novel way to address the public-private health care insurance debate, the demand for health care and the 
interest in out of country health care options. 
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APPENDIX A – HSARB Search Engine Results 
Original Search Results 
Health Services Appeal and Review Board 
March 2010 
1. HIA Out of Country Coverage Search Terms 
HIA Out of Country Coverage,  
Section 28.4(2) 
No Dates No Matches 
HIA Out of Country Coverage 
Section 28.4(2) 
No Dates No Matches 
HIA Out of Country Coverage No Dates 4 Cases 
2. Prior Approval Search Terms 
HIA Prior Approval s.28.4(2) No Dates No Matches 
HIA Prior Approval s.28.4 No Dates No Matches 
HIA Prior Approval No Dates 704 Cases 
3. Geographic Location Search Terms 
HIA Windsor No Dates 62 Cases 
HIA Winsor s.28.4(2) No Dates No matches 
4. Out of Country Facility Search Terms 
HIA Mayo Clinic No Dates 89 Cases 
5. Regulation “Test” of s.28.4(2) Search Terms 
HIA Medically Significant Tissue Damage No Dates 509 Cases 
HIA Generally Accepted in Ontario No Dates 555 Cases 
HIA Identical / Equivalent No Dates 595 Cases 
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ACTUAL CASES 
Five (5) Year Breakdown: April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2008 
Year 1 April 1/03-March 31/04  
83 Cases Year 2 April 1/04-March 31/05 
Year 3 April 1/05-March31/06 84 Cases 
Year 4 April 1/06-March 31/07 104 Cases 
Year 5 April 1/07-March 31/08 101 Cases 
SUBTOTAL CASES April 1/03-March 31/08 372 Cases 
Duplicate/Not Relevant   - 58 Cases 
TOTAL CASES   
314 Cases 
 
NOTE: The Database Search string of ―HIA 28.4(2)‖ produced 353 cases while the 
previous search strings of ―HIA Out of Country Coverage‖ and ―HIA Out of Country 
Coverage s.28.4(2)‖ the same database produced 4 cases and no cases respectively. Thus, 
the search engine for the database was variable based on the search string. 
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APPENDIX B – Code Book February 28, 2011 
 
EXCEL Code Book  
Tribunal (HSARB) Case Decisions (n = approx. 315)
372
 
2003-2008 
 
NOTE: ―3‖ = not accepted cases373 
 
Case Identification
374
 
A) Case #     Hard copy decision (off by 1) 
B) File Number     Year 
C) File Number     Legislation375 
D) File Number     Office Code Number 
 
E) HSARB Hearing Date   Day (―9‖ = unknown)376 
F) HSARB Hearing Date   Month 
G) HSARB Hearing Date   Year 
 
                                                 
372
 Note: Word Count for Cases will be done for Phase II selected cases but not for this Phase I study 
373
 There are 6 cases in this database that appeared in the online search of s28.4(2) cases but were 
subsequently not accepted typically b/c the Applicant misused s28.4(2) ie for out of province but within 
Canada claims – as such, all columns will have ―3‖ if the case is not accepted for analysis. The 6 not 
accepted cases are line 11/case 25=5-149; line 23/case 38=4-134; line 50/case 69=3-267; line 65/case87=2-
57; line273/case330=6-298; line 295/case 352=6-431 – ‗not accepted cases‘ moved to Excel Sheet 2 and 
deleted from Sheet 3 to avoid complication with stats concerning ‗3‘s 
374
 File Number – focus on primary issue not Joiner files 
Date Heard – only initial Hearing Date recorded even if Hearing covered more than one date 
375
 Legislation category will always be HIA  
376
 This happens for one case = CCW Part II 
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AS) HSARB Decision Date   Day 
AT) HSARB Decision Date   Month 
AU) HSARB Decision Date   Year 
AV) Explanation    Details 
**) HSARB Repeat Case    ―1‖ = yes ―0‖= no/otherwise377 
 
Parties 
H) Applicant Represented by Lawyer  ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no378 
I) Respondent Represented by Lawyer  ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no 
J) Interpreter     ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no379 
 
Type of Hearing 
K) Oral Hearing     ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no 
L) Teleconference Hearing   ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no 
M) Written Hearing    ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no 
  
                                                 
377
 At this stage of analysis, Repeat Cases will refer to both the same patient with the same health condition 
as well as the same patient with an additional health condition – this category was not used in coding as it 
was unclear which cases were repeat OHIP cases 
378
 Representation by ‗Agent‘ or Friend/Family Member will be coded as ―0‖=no representation 
379
 If number of Interpreters is significant, Phase II will investigate the language of Interpreters 
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Request 
N) Prior Approval    ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no380 
O) Reimbursement    ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no381 
P) Review     ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no382 
Q) Accept Case     ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―3‖=not accepted 383 
 
Patient 
R) Patient‘s Diagnosis    Text if known384 ―9‖=unknown/na 
S) Patient Age      actual age, ―99‖=unknown,  
―65‖= retired/senior, ―17‖=minor 
T) Patient Sex     1=male ‗5‘=female ―9‖=unknown/na 
U) Patient Residence    Text= known,385 Not 
Stated=unknown  
 
Treatment 
V) Requested Treatment    Text if known,   ‗9‘=unknown/na 
W) Requested Treatment Location  Text if know,  ―9‘=unknown/na 
 
Patient Reason for Out of Country Treatment Request  
                                                 
380
 ‗Prior Approval‘ cases include cases where an Application Form was submitted requesting or prior to 
departure for out of country treatment 
381
 ‗Reimbursement‘ cases include a request for coverage after the out of country treatment was received.  
382
 Applicants or Respondents may request a ‗review‘ of the HSARB decision by another panel of HSARB 
members. This request may/not be granted by HSARB. A Party is not required to have a case reviewed in 
order to proceed to the next step of entering the Court system 
383
 Accepted Cases are further reviewed for this s.28.4(2) study 
384
 ‗C-P‘= cut and paste 
385
 Actual residence location state by Decision or extrapolated from Office location of Family Physician 
and/or Place of Employment 
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X) Experimental     ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
Y) Generally Accepted for patient  ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
Z) No Identical or Equivalent in Ontario―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
AA) Delay resulting in Death   ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
AB) Delay resulting in MSITD   ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
AC) Delay to see GP    ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
AD) Delay to see Ontario Specialist  ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
AE) Delay to get Ontario TMT/Surgery  ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
AF) Other     ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable                                                                                             
       or Text 
  
 
OHIP Decision 
AG) Experimental     ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
AH) Generally Accepted for patient  
AI) No Identical or Equivalent in Ontario  
AJ) Delay resulting in Death  
AK) Delay resulting in MSITD  
 
Health Services Appeal and Review Board Decision 
AL) Experimental     ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable 
AM) Generally Accepted for patient  
AN) No Identical or Equivalent in Ontario  
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AO) Delay resulting in Death  
AP) No Delay resulting in MSITD  
AQ) HSARB – Deny    ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖=not applicable 
AR) HSARB – Grant  
 
 
―Categorized Data‖ 
 
1. Age Categories - BA, BB columns 
 
a) Column BA = raw age actually cited in case (same as column ―S‖) 
 
b) Column BB = coded / grouped raw ages based on Canada Census 2006, Stats Canada 
categories: 
0-17  = 1
386
 
18-24  = 2 
25-44 = 3 
45-64 = 4 
65-79 = 5 
80+ = 6 
Unknown = 99
387
 
                                                 
386
 Census and Stats Canada use 0-14 and 15-24 categories – I have adjusted this age category to 0-17 and 
18-24 b/c many cases state age as ‗a minor‘ which is defined in legislation to be under age 18 [. If I kept the 
category of 0-14 and 15-24, I would not know if ‗17‘ referred to a minor or the age of 17 – thus possibly 
falling w/in two categories 
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2. Patient‘s Residence - BC, BD columns 
Based on LHINS boundaries
388
 
389
 
 
a) Column BC = raw Patient Residence cited in cases (same as column ―U‖) 
 
b) Column BD = coded / grouped raw Patient Residence based on LHINS Boundaries of 
North, South, East, West: 
 
North  = 1 
- North Simcoe, Muscoka LHINS 
- North East LHINS 
- North West LHINS 
 
East  = 2 
- Champlain LHINS 
- South East LHINS 
- Central East LHINS 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
387
 Case not accepted – defined originally as ―3‖ were transferred out to Excel Sheet 2 and deleted from 
Sheet 3 to avoid numeric confusion 
388
 http://www.centrallhin.on.ca/map.aspx 
389
 LHINS Legislation Local Health System Integration Act, 2006    
http://www.centrallhin.on.ca/ontariolhinslegislation.aspx  
LHINS population, health utilization  
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South  = 3 
- Central LHINS 
- Toronto Central LHINS 
- Mississauga-Halton LHINS 
 
West = 4 
- Central West 
- Hamilton/Niagara/Haldimand Brant 
- South West 
- Erie St Clair 
 
Not Stated  = 99 
 
 
3. Patient‘s Requested Treatment Location - BE-BJ columns  
Based on global geography 
 
a) Column BE – raw Requested Treatment Location cited in case (same as column ―W‖) 
 
b) Column BF – coded / grouped raw Global geographic Location 
 
c) Column BG – coded / grouped raw Global geographic Location converted into 
numeric code 
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 1 = USA 
 2 = Europe
390
 (including UK
391
) 
 3 = India 
 4 = China 
 6 = Israel 
 7 = Other
392
 
 9 = unknown / not provided by the case 
 
d) Column BH – coded USA geographic location: North, East, South, West 
 
North = Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Philadelphia, Montana, Idaho, 
Illinois 
 
East = New York, Maryland, Massachusetts, Connecticut 
 
South = Florida, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, 
Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Virginia 
 
West = California, Oregon 
 
9 = Not in USA 
                                                 
390
 About half of the category 2/‘Europe‘ cases appear to be Belgium and Germany 
391
 The UK originally had its own category but the sample size was very low – so the UK – which had been 
coded as ―5‖ was recategorized as ―2‖ and lumped in with ‗Europe‘ – thus, no ‗5‘ exists in this category 
392
 ―Other‖ includes: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Argentina, South Africa, Chile, Pakistan, Mexico, Iran, and 
South Korea 
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e) Column BI = actual USA State Name cited in case 
 Or 
 9 = Not in USA 
 
f) Column BJ = actual Global Health Facility +/ City
393
 cited in case 
 Or 
 9 = Not Given 
 
 
4. Patient‘s Diagnosis/Condition 
 
a) Column BK = raw Patient‘s diagnosis/condition as listed in the case (same as column 
―R‖) 
 
b) Column BL = coded Patient‘s Condition  
 1 = Cancer (breast, colon, prostate…) 
 2 = Heart Disease/Circulation 
 3 = Back Pain 
 4 = General Pain 
                                                 
393
 Excel Dbase Line 147 05-HIA-0180 = says both ‗Feng Clinic + Mayo Clinic‘ – coded as ‗Mayo Clinic‘ 
Minnesota 
Excel Dbase Line 293 06-HIA-0444 = does not indicate campus location of Mayo Clinic – coded as ‗May 
Clinic, Minnesota‘ 
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 5 = Obesity 
 6 = Addictions/Mental Health/Anorexia 
 7 = Joints (hips, knee, shoulder, joint – surgery, replacement, pain, arthritis)394 
 8 = Head (eye, ear, headache, cataract, memory loss)
395
 
 9 = Unknown 
10 = Other (transplant, gastro, renal)
396
 
 
 
5. Patient‘s Requested Treatment 
 
a) Column BM = raw Patient‘s requested Treatment as listed in the case (same as column 
―V‖) 
 
b) Column BN = Coded Patient‘s Requested Treatment 
 
                                                 
394
 Joint category (7) and General Pain category (4) very similar – I may try to analyze both separately and 
together(collapsing 7+4) – eg A patient may have hip or shoulder pain which could be categorized as either 
Joint (7) or General Pain (4) – where the patient indicated more than two cites for pain (e.g. hip and groin 
pain) I categorized under General Pain (4). Where a specific joint pain was stated (e.g. hip pain)  I 
categorized under Joint (7). It may be unlikely that a Joint related health problem was not accompanied by 
some general pain – thus making it difficult to separate the two categories 
395
 ―8 = head‖ also includes migraines, brain tumor, brain surgery, dyslexia, cranial nerves, ‗no sense of 
smell‘, acoustic neuroma 
396
 ―10=Other‖ also includes: pneumonia, CP, MS, Fabre Disease, Leukemia, Falls, 
Hernia, vertigo, gynecological, asthma, reconstruction after mastectomy, birthmark 
infection, lymph nodes, bowel polyps, stent, multiple (health issues), neuropathy in feet, 
gallbladder, gastrointestinal issues, liver, kidney, urine blockage, urine fibroids, 
endometriosis, Menier‘s Disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, lesions, abdominal complaints, 
hereditary condition, genetic disease, menstrual disorder, lymphoma, MRI of the breast, 
nerve function, laryngeal issue, myelodysplasia, scleroderma morphea, pevic organ 
prolapse, Wegener's Granulomatosis 
  
  259       
1= Surgery
397
 
2 = Treatment
398
 
3 = Transplant 
4 = Diagnostics (e.g. MRI, XRay, CT, PET) 
5 = Assessment (medical opinion)
399
 
6 = Counseling 
7 = Drug Treatment only
400
 
8 = Follow up
401
 
9 = Unknown 
 
 
 
                                                 
397
 ‗1=Surgery‘ includes ‗cyber knife therapy‘ which is actually a surgery and not a ‗therapy‘‘ ‗Gucci 
Procedure‘, myomectomy, 
398
 ‗2=Treatment‘ includes chemotheraphy, radiation, angioplasty, angiogram, scleroderma, drug Herceptin,  
399
 ‗5=Assessment‘ includes ‗diagnostics and assessment‘, vertigo, second opinion, surgical consult but not 
the surgery 
400
 ‗7=Drug Treatment only‘ was not used for coding purposes 
401
 ‗8=Follow up‘ was not used for coding purposes – follow up or ‗redoing the surgery‘ was factored under 
2=treatment or 1=surgery respectively. I believe there were only a few such cases actually stating a return 
to an OC health professional but I suspect there was a greater number of patients returning to the original 
OC health professional 
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APPENDIX C – Three Research Questions and Cross Tabulations 
 
THREE MAIN QUESTIONS and CROSS TABS: 
 
1. Profile of Patients/Applicants coming to the Tribunal (HSARB) 
 
2. Position of the Patient/Applicant, OHIP and ultimately the Tribunal and how these 
may differ  
 
3. Administrative questions regarding the Tribunal Hearing 
  
 
DETAILS: 
 
1. PROFILE of PATIENT 
a) Profile of Patients/Applicants coming to the Tribunal (HSARB) 
- Age (BB) 
- Sex (T) 
- Residence (BD) 
- Diagnosis (BK) 
- Requested Treatment (BN) 
- Requested Location of Requested Treatment (BF, BG, BH, BI, BJ) 
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Profile of Patient Cross Tabs 
Where People are, what they have and where they want to go 
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) 
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Age (BB) 
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Requested TMT (BN) 
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Requested Location (BG, BH) 
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Requested TMT (BN) x Requested Location (BG, 
BH) 
  
 
2. POSITION OF PATIENT, OHIP, TRIBUNAL AND TRIBUNAL‘S ULTIMATE 
DECISION 
a) Patient Position Totals 
Experimental (X) 
Generally Accepted (Y) 
Identical/Equivalent (Z) 
Delay causing Death (AA) 
Delay causing Medically Significant Tissue Damage/MSITD (AB) 
Delay to see Ontario General Practitioner/GP (AC) 
Delay to see Ontario Specialist/SP (AD) 
Delay to Ontario TMT/Surgery (AE) 
Other (AF) 
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Patient Cross Tabs 
 
Date x Test in s.28.4(2):  
In a given year, why are people asking for Out of Country Coverage from OHIP? 
Decision Date [AU] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally Accepted (Y) x 
Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)] 
 
 
Residence x Test:  
Based on the patient‘s geographical setting, why are people asking for Out of Country 
coverage from OHIP? 
Patient‘s Residence [BD] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally Accepted (Y) x 
Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)] 
 
Diagnosis x Test:  
For a given diagnosis, why are people asking for Out of Country coverage by OHIP? 
Patient‘s Diagnosis [BL] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally Accepted (Y) x 
Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)] 
 
TMT Location Out of Canada x Test:  
Based on a requested procedure location, why are people asking for Out of Country 
coverage by OHIP? 
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TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally Accepted (Y) x 
Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)] 
 
Requested TMT and TMT Location Out of Canada x Test:  
Based on a requested procedure and procedure location, why are people asking for Out of 
Country coverage by OHIP? 
TMT Requested [BN] x TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally 
Accepted (Y) x Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)] 
 
 
b) OHIP Position Totals 
Experimental (AG) 
Generally Accepted (AH) 
Identical/Equivalent (AI) 
Delay causing Death AJ) 
Delay causing MSITD (AK) 
  
OHIP Cross Tabs 
 
Date x Test:  
In a given year, what is OHIP‘s position on each test factor?  
Decision Date [AU] x Test [Experimental (AG) x Generally Accepted (AH) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AI) x Delay Death (AJ) x Delay MSITD (AK)] 
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Residence x Test:  
Based on where the patient lives/geographical setting, what is OHIP‘s position on each 
test factor? 
Patient‘s Residence [BD] x Test [Experimental (AG) x Generally Accepted (AH) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AI) x Delay Death (AJ) x Delay MSITD (AK)] 
 
Diagnosis x Test:  
For a given patient diagnosis, what is OHIP‘s position on each test factor? 
Patient‘s Diagnosis [BL] x Test [Experimental (AG) x Generally Accepted (AH) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AI) x Delay Death (AJ) x Delay MSITD (AK)] 
 
TMT Location Out of Canada x Test:  
Based on a requested procedure location, what is OHIP‘s position on each test factor? 
TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (AG) x Generally Accepted (AH) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AI) x Delay Death (AJ) x Delay MSITD (AK)] 
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c)Tribunal Position Totals 
Experimental (AL) 
Generally Accepted (AM) 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) 
Delay causing Death (AO) 
Delay causing MSITD (AP) 
  
 
Tribunal Cross Tabs 
 
Date x Test:  
In a given year, what is the breakdown for the test factors considered by the Tribunal?  
Decision Date [AU] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] 
 
 
Residence x Test:  
Based on the patient‘s location/geographical setting and the test factors considered by the 
Tribunal, does the Tribunal ‗grant‘ or ‗deny‘ the patient‘s request? 
Patient‘s Residence [U] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Grant (AR) 
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Patient‘s Residence [U] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Deny (AQ) 
 
 
Diagnosis x Test:  
Based on the patient‘s diagnosis, and the test factors considered by the Tribunal, does the 
Tribunal ‗grant‘ or ‗deny‘ the patient‘s request? 
Patient‘s Diagnosis [BL] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Grant (AR) 
 
Patient‘s Diagnosis [BL] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Deny (AQ) 
 
 
TMT Location Out of Canada x Test:  
Based on a requested procedure location, and the test factors considered by the Tribunal, 
does the Tribunal ‗grant‘ or ‗deny‘ the patient‘s request? 
TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Grant (AR) 
 
TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Deny (AQ) 
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d) Tribunal Decision Totals 
Deny (AQ) 
Grant (AR) 
 
Tribunal Cross Tabs 
Decision Date (AU) x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Grant (AQ) 
 
Decision Date (AU) x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x 
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Deny (AR) 
 
 
3. ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS REGARDING TRIBUNAL HEARING 
 
a) Dates: Hearing Requested, Hearing Date, Decision Date 
File Submitted to Office (B, C, D) 
Hearing Date (E, F, G) 
Decision Date (AS, AT, AU) 
 
Total days it takes from when a file is submitted to the office till a Hearing is held and a 
Decision is rendered 
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Total Days = File Submission Date (B,C,D) – Hearing Date (E,F,G) – Decision Date 
(AS,AT,AU) 
 
 
b) Legal Representation  
Representation by Counsel/Lawyer 
Applicant (H) 
Respondent (I) 
 
Cross Tab 
What are characteristics of an Applicant represented by Counsel/Lawyer? 
Applicant Represented (H) x Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Requested TMT (BN) x 
Requested Location (BG, BH) 
 
  
c) Language 
How many times is an Interpreter used at the Hearing? 
Interpreter Present (J) 
 
Cross Tab 
Based on the patient‘s residence/geographical location, how many times is an Interpreter 
used at the Hearing? 
Interpreter Present (J) x Residence (BD) 
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d) Type of Hearing Totals 
Oral (K) 
Teleconference (L) 
Written (M) 
 
Cross Tab 
How many times is a Hearing conducted either orally, in writing or by teleconference? 
Oral (K) x Written (M) x Teleconference (L) 
 
Does the fact that a Hearing is conducted orally, in writing or by teleconference effect 
whether the Tribunal ‗grants‘ or ‗denies‘ the patient‘s request? 
Oral (K) x Deny (AQ)  
Oral (K) x Grant (AR) 
Teleconference (L) x Deny (AQ) 
Teleconference (L) x Grant (AR)  
Written (M) x Deny (AQ)  
Written (M) x Grant (AR)  
  
 
e) Payment Requested 
  270       
Does the patient request OHIP coverage before (prior) or after (reimbursement) the out of 
country procedure? 
Prior Approval Payment (N) 
Reimbursement (O) 
 
Cross Tab 
Based on the year, does the Tribunal ‗grant‘ or ‗deny‘ a patient‘s requests if they are 
‗prior requests‘ or ‗reimbursement‘ requests? 
Grant (AQ) x Prior Request (N) x Decision Date Year (AU) 
Deny (AR) x Prior Request (N) x Decision Date Year (AU) 
 
Grant (AQ) x Reimbursement (O) x Decision Date Year (AU) 
Deny (AR) x Reimbursement (O) x Decision Date Year (AU) 
 
f) Accepted Case 
Accept case for analysis (Q) from total cases (n=315) 
 
g) Reviewed cases 
Reviewed cases (P) 
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APPENDIX D: Example of Excel Spreadsheet Coding
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APPENDIX E – Definition of s.28.4(2) Test Elements: Standard of Proof / Onus-
Burden / Evidence 
 
a) Introduction  
This section seeks to examine the legal aspects of the s.28.4(2) Test – specifically, if the 
Definition of each element of the s.28.4(2) Test, the Standard of Proof, the Onus/Burden 
of the Proof, and the Evidence required by the Board regarding the s.28.4(2) Test affect 
the determination of resource allocation.  
 
In analyzing the Decisions, it became clear that the s.28.4(2) Test was greatly affected by 
the s.24(1)17 arguments - whether or not a treatment was deemed to be ‗experimental‘ 
and thus not meeting the criteria for OHIP funding. As a result of this assessment, the 
Definition, the Standard of Proof, the Onus/Burden of the Proof, and the Evidence 
regarding the ‗experimental‘ nature of a treatment under s.24(1)17 were also analyzed in 
addition to the s.28.4(2) Test.  
 
Overall, the Standard of Proof for all aspects of the s.28.4(2) Test, was a civil standard of 
a balance of probabilities. In terms of Onus/Burden of Proof, the onus for the screening 
‗experimental‘ test (HIA 24(17)) is on OHIP as it has denied the patient‘s out of country 
request, the s.28.4(2) Test. The onus flips to the patient to prove the test‘s elements.402 403 
The Board‘s jurisdiction allows it to hear new evidence presented at the Hearing: 
 
                                                 
402
 06-HIA-0444 BS at 12. 
403
 06-HIA-0430 at 6. 
  273       
―… the Appeal Board conducts a hearing de novo, which is a fresh determination 
of the issues based upon the evidence at the hearing.―404  
 
The evidence required to prove the s.28.4(2) test regarding ‗generally accepted as 
appropriate for the patient‘ (GA), ‗identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario‘ (I/E), 
and/or ‗delay causing death or medically significant tissue damage (D) appears to initially 
be based on the Prior Approval Form signed by an Ontario physician and submitted by 
the patient‘s physician or by the patient themselves. OHIP has stated that the Prior 
Approval Form must be based on a medical opinion and that medical opinion must come 
from an Ontario physician. Medical opinions from physicians outside of Canada are not 
accepted. The Prior Approval Form submitted by the patient may be counteracted by 
OHIP. OHIP may submit evidence based on their own medical expertise or it may 
contract with field experts to provide medical opinions on GA, I/E and/or D. Patients may 
clarify their evidence for GA, I/E and/or Delay with the submission of additional 
correspondence from their physician. This additional correspondence can also be 
contradicted by OHIP. In very rare situations does the patient‘s physician attend the 
Board Hearing either in person or by teleconference. The patient may also produce 
information on out of country procedure success rates, journal articles, patient 
testimonials, etc. OHIP will counter argue each of these submissions.  
 
 
b) Experimental 
i) Definition of ‗Experimental‘ 
                                                 
404
 06-HIA-0191 MB at 5. 
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As stated earlier, if a treatment is found to be experimental, it is not funded by OHIP and 
does not qualify for review under s.28.4(2). The case Decisions appear to be using the 
following definition for ―experimental‖ originally cited in A. v. General Manager, OHIP 
(HSARB File No. 04-HIA-0040): 
 
The term ―experimental‖ is not defined in the Act or in the regulations. While the 
Appeal Board is not bound by definitions applied in earlier Appeal Board 
Decisions, in assessing the evidence, it is helpful to consider those definitions. In 
A. v. General Manager, OHIP (HSARB File No. 04-HIA-0040), the Appeal 
Board applied the following definition of experimental, supported by the 
Respondent in that case: ―a therapy is experimental when the effects are unknown 
and are not understood‖ and that ―conversely a treatment which is not 
experimental must be one which is accepted practice within the medical 
profession and one that is proven to have beneficial results‖ and that ―these results 
must be based on objective standards and not the subjective view of a patient‖.405  
 
 
Overall, the definition of ―experimental‖ is challenging and determined by a lay Board. 
The definition is very broad, not linked to experimental definitions under regulatory 
authorities for drugs, medical devices and medical research. It is the author‘s opinion that 
the determination of ‗experimental treatment‘ is a very technical area of medicine and 
highly regulated by the scientific and governmental sphere. It is unclear how the lay 
                                                 
405
 Definition also used in 06-HIA-0287 MS.  
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Board‘s assessment of the evidence fits with the scientific and governmental regulation of 
experimental treatment. It would be beneficial to the Board and to the parties if a 
technical body could review the treatment in question and determine if it was 
‗experimental‘ or not at the time of the patient‘s request.  
  
ii) Onus / Burden of Proof 
According to the Decisions, the onus/burden of proof to establish that a procedure is 
‗experimental‘ under s.24(17) lies with the party advocating that the treatment is 
experimental. It is not the Appellant [the patient in that case] who must establish that the 
treatment is not experimental.
406
 On an appeal to the Board of an OHIP denial to fund an 
out of country health care service, the onus rests with OHIP to show that a treatment is 
experimental.
407
  
 
iii) Standard of Proof 
The civil standard of a ‗balance of probabilities‘ is required for OHIP to prove that a 
procedure is experimental and thus not fundable.  
 
iv) Evidence Required 
OHIP must use evidence to prove a procedure is experimental. Typically, OHIP will use 
the information from the patient‘s GP and/ SP from their Prior Approval Form. If the 
                                                 
406
 06-HIA-0383 at 7. 
407 In the case analysis, when OHIP, or the patient, has not argued the out of country health care service is 
experimental, the author has assumed that the out of country health care service was not experimental and 
thus potentially fundable by OHIP. 
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Prior Approval from the GP and/or SP states that the out of country health care service is 
experimental then OHIP will define the procedure to be experimental.  
 
The evidence for experimental determination is not only technical but it is often subject 
to conflicting, changing and unclear statements from medical practitioners. As of April 
2011, the Regulation for s.28.4(2) requires SP evidence from on Ontario based physician. 
While this stipulation renders debates regarding GP, SP and/or out of country SP moot, it 
still raises the question regarding SPs who provide conflicting information on the 
‗experimental‘ nature of the treatment. The Board must still weigh the evidence provided 
by the SP on the Prior Approval Form and any subsequent submissions from the SP.
408
 
Given the evolving nature of experimental treatments, the possible fluctuations of the 
patient‘s medical condition and the time period from an initial request to OHIP through to 
the release of a Board Decision, the definition and the related evidence need to be 
precise. A precise definition of ‗experimental‘ is not in the regulations. The medical 
evidence to meet this definition and the expertise to assess the medical evidence are 
variable across the Decisions. It is assumed that this makes the determination of the issue 
before the Board very difficult. 
 
 
c) Generally Accepted as Appropriate for Patient 
i)  Definition 
Under s.28.4(2), a treatment must be ‗generally accepted as appropriate‘ for the given 
patient. For example, a coronary bypass may be treatment/procedure that is generally 
                                                 
408
 Such as subsequent letters from the SP and/or oral testimony from the SP 
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accepted if a patient has a blocked coronary artery. However, if the patient is not likely to 
survive the coronary bypass surgery because of their specific condition – let us say, 
hypothetically, that the patient is 120 year old, in extremely poor health and is mortally 
allergic to the anesthetic that would be used in the surgery – the medical opinion would 
be that the coronary bypass surgery would not be appropriate for the given patient.  
 
The definition of GA in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical 
circumstances as the patient raised a number of questions regarding ‗who‘ decides the 
GA – the patient, the medical community at large or more specifically the medical 
community in Ontario. It was first established in the Decisions that it is the medical 
community that determines if an out of country treatment is generally accepted as 
appropriate for the patient: 
.  
―The Appeal Board finds that the words ―generally acceptable‖ in the context of 
section 28.4(2) to mean approval of a treatment as a rule, or usually, by the 
medical community.‖409  
 
The ‗medical community‘ was further defined by Ontario Courts as the medical 
community in Ontario. In the Decision 06-HIA-0343, the following was clarified: 
 
―In a recent decision of the Ontario Divisional Court, Flora v. General Manager, 
Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 1 (1 [2007] O.J. No. 91) Justice Epstein 
                                                 
409
 06-HIA-0266 EC at 8. 
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considered the rationale for this reference to an Ontario standard in some detail. In 
particular, she said: 
 
‗Adopting an Ontario standard for determining funding ensures that limited public 
monies are only spent on medical treatments that (i) are accepted by doctors of a 
recognizable standard; (ii) are accepted as deserving of public funding in 
accordance with Ontario‘s values and laws; and (iii) are provided in accordance 
with the ethics and values of Ontarians.‘410  
 
―As set out in Flora, this reference to an Ontario standard is important for, among 
other reasons, the protection of Ontario citizens seeking medical services in other 
jurisdictions.‖411  
 
There has been much discussion in the Decisions as to ‗medical community‘ in Ontario. 
The key issue in this discussion is ‗who‘ within the Ontario medical community 
determines if the out of country treatment is GA for the patient. Several of the Decisions 
accept the opinion of the patient‘s Ontario GP. Several of the Decisions accept the 
opinion of the patient‘s Ontario SP.  
 
 
ii)  Onus / Burden of Proof 
                                                 
410
 Flora, Supra Note 5 at para 102. 
411
 06-HIA-0343 at 6. 
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The onus/burden of proof lies with the patient to establish all elements of the s.28.4(2) 
Test:
412
 
 
―The onus is on the Applicant to establish that the treatment in question is 
generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in his medical 
circumstances, and is not performed in Ontario by an identical or equivalent 
procedure and that there was a delay in receiving medical services. Whether or 
not the evidence adduced is sufficient to discharge the onus on the Appellant is a 
question of fact.‖413  
 
OHIP can submit that the patient has not met the burden of proof with the evidence:  
 
―To satisfy the criteria for insured out-of-country medical services that are set out 
in section 28.4 of Regulation 552, the treatment must be generally accepted in 
Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances as the 
insured person. The Appellant bears the burden of establishing that this provision 
has been satisfied. The Respondent submits that the evidence provided by the 
Appellant does not meet this burden.‖ 414 
 
The Decisions seem to be quite clear that the onus for proving GA is on the patient. The 
challenge for the patient is to establish this onus based on Ontario medical opinion. This 
                                                 
412
 06-HIA-0430 at 6. 
413
 06-HIA-0434 at 8. 
414
 05-HIA-0318 at 5 – see also 06-HIA-0417 at 6 ―It is the Respondent‘s position that the Applicant has 
not shown that intensive inpatient residential treatment was generally accepted for a patient in these clinical 
circumstances.‖ 
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is a difficult burden given that the majority of patients are self represented and Ontario 
medical opinions are only presented in writing – which may be unclear or non-existent. 
 
iii) Evidence Required 
When the onus is not met by the patient based on the evidence provided, the Board will 
deem that the out of country treatment is not GA: 
 
―The onus for establishing that a treatment is generally considered appropriate is 
on the Applicant. In the absence of any evidence to support such a conclusion, the 
Appeal Board finds that the treatment received by the Applicant is not generally 
accepted in Ontario as appropriate.‖415  
 
Where the evidence does not support GA, the Board can choose not to continue with the 
s.28.4(2) Test: 
 
―There is insufficient evidence to find that the arthroscopic surgery performed on 
the Appellant in Florida is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for 
someone in his medical circumstances. It is therefore not necessary for the Appeal 
Board to address the issues of whether the surgery is performed in Ontario and if 
so, if there would have been a delay in receiving it.‖416   
 
                                                 
415
 06-HIA-0444 at 12. 
416
 06-HIA-0231 at 10. 
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Thus, the GA test appears to screen cases which may or may not go on to the next steps 
of the s.28.4(2) Test.  
 
The medical opinion evidence typically comes from the patient themselves in the form of 
website materials and/or medical journals as well as evidence from GPs, SPs and out of 
country SPs. The patients‘ argument appears to be strongest when the patient presents 
evidence that an Ontario SP agrees that the out of country treatment is GA. When OHIP 
argues against the patient‘s GA request for out of country treatment OHIP‘s opinion is 
typically based on medical expertise in the area of the out of country treatment in 
question. However, the OHIP medical expert may not have viewed the patient directly. 
The OHIP expert may have expertise in the treatment area but may have never had 
contact with the patient or review the patient‘s medical file.  
 
One example of conflicting medical opinion evidence from an Ontario SPs and out of 
country SPs took place in the case of 06-HIA-0434. That case involved a request for 
nerve block treatment out of country. The patient‘s GP provided a medical opinion that 
the out of country treatment was GA. The Board stated that the GP was not a SP. The 
opinion of Ontario SP #1 declined to comment on OHIP‘s question whether the out of 
country treatment was GA. The opinion of Ontario SP #2, in his two letters to OHIP, was 
interpreted by the Board to not be GA because of the Board‘s assessment of SP #2‘s 
qualifications and treatment of the patient. Letters of support for the patient were 
provided by an American SP. Despite the medical opinion of the GP, the Ontario SP#2 
and the USA SP, the Board deemed that there was insufficient evidence that the out of 
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country treatment was GA. The Board quoted the Ontario Divisional Court
417
confirming 
the need for an Ontario standard for determining GA.  
 
In another case, 06-HIA-0472 AD, the Board examined medical opinion evidence from 
an Ontario GP. In that case, the patient, the patient‘s GP and the patient‘s USA SP 
provided evidence that the medical treatment was GA. The Ontario SP, according to the 
GP, was ―unwilling to provide this service‖ so the Board accepted the medical opinion of 
the GP.
418
 According to the Decision, OHIP did not ‗seriously‘ contradict the evidence 
provided by the patient. The Board deemed the out of country treatment was GA. So, in 
this case, the Ontario GP and the USA SP evidence convinced the Board the out of 
country treatment was GA for the patient, over the evidence of OHIP. This finding differs 
from the previous case where the evidence of Ontario GPs was not considered 
knowledgeable enough and the American SP was considered irrelevant for determining 
the‗in Ontario‘ criteria.  
 
The Board appears to take a variable stand on the evidence required of the patient. In 
some cases, the medical opinion of an Ontario SP was required. In some cases, the 
medical opinion of the Ontario GP was sufficient. If OHIP opposes the patient‘s GA 
request, the medical experts for OHIP may not have seen the patient or the patient‘s 
medical history. The variability of medical opinions accepted as evidence by the Board 
may have encouraged cases to come forward to the Board as it was unclear when and on 
what evidence the Board grants or denies GA.  
                                                 
417
 Flora (2007), Supra Note 5 at para 102. 
418
 06-HIA-0472 AD at 8. 
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The stakes are quite high for the patient at this early stage of the s.28.4(2) Test. If the 
patient does not meet the onus through their evidence, the case does not proceed. The 
challenge for the patient is to produce evidence which supports their request for GA. The 
patient is not only dependent on Ontario medical opinions, the patient is typically self 
represented before the Board and no medical opinion provider is present. As such, the 
Board must depend on the print medical opinion(s) provided by the patient.  
 
Because the evidence requirement at this point of the Test is so crucial in order to 
proceed with the Test, it raises the question of how many medical opinions are accessed 
by the patient before the evidence of GA can be established. The criteria encourages 
accessing multiple SPs until the evidence requirement of GA is established. There is no 
patient follow up to determine if the treatment requested out of country is or is not 
appropriate for the patient.  
 
 
d) Identical or Equivalent Treatment in Ontario 
i) Definition 
There are possibly two elements to the definition of Identical or Equivalent found in 
s.28.4(2)(b)(i) - that the treatment out of country being requested is 'identical' or the 
treatment out of country being requested is 'equivalent' to treatment that is offered in 
Ontario. From the definition, it appears that the two elements - identical and equivalent - 
can be interchanged i.e. the section uses the term "or" rather than "and". Board decisions 
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state that the definitions for 'identical' and 'equivalent' are not outlined in the Statute or 
the Regulation. As such, the Board turns to the dictionary definition. The Board states: 
"The dictionary definition of "equivalent" is "similar or identical in value, 
meaning or effect". In deciding whether the procedures are equivalent, it is 
appropriate to look at the relative quality and results of the procedures....".
419
  
In another Decision the Board states: 
"There is no dispute that total knee replacement surgery is performed in Ontario. 
At issue is whether the total knee replacement surgery performed in Ontario is 
equivalent to the total knee replacement surgery performed in Kentucky ... The 
dictionary definition of "equivalent" is "similar or identical in value, meaning or 
effect." In deciding whether the surgical procedures are equivalent, it is 
appropriate to look at the relative quality and results of the procedures. The 
evidence comparing relative quality and results of the procedures in this case is 
thin. We will now examine that evidence. ...".
420
  
The Board states that it uses the "Canadian Oxford Dictionary" and it was suggested by 
an Appellant that the Board take note of the fourth definitions: 
1.(often followed by to) equal value, amount importance, etc. 2. corresponding or 
having the same relative position or function. 3. (of words) having the same 
meaning. 4. having the same result or effect ... (emphasis added) ...  
421
 
                                                 
419 06-HIA-0266 EC 
420 07-HIA-0068 N.A. at 6 
421 06-HIA-0351 at 1 
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The Board does outline the definition for 'identical'  it used - also based on a dictionary 
definition: 
"In the absence of an elaboration of the terms "identical or equivalent" in the 
Statute, the Appeal Board relied on dictionary definitions to determine whether 
the Ontario eating disorder programs were identical or equivalent in their 
treatment approaches. The term "identical" would require that the treatment 
approaches to be similar to that of the South Coast program. In order to be 
"equivalent", the treatment would consist of a program being of equal value or 
having the same result."
422
  
The Board turns to the common dictionary to derive the definition for 'identical' and 
'equivalent' - and as seen from the Decisions above - the Board may quote the definition 
slightly differently. The Board may also not review the evidence relative to both 
'equivalent' or 'identical' but may conduct the review only relative to 'equivalent'.  In 
terms of the definition itself, the Board does use a medical dictionary or a legal 
dictionary.  
The Board indicates, from its use of the dictionary definition, that it is looking at "quality' 
and "the results of the procedures". The author is concerned that a lay Board is looking at 
"quality" and "the results of the procedures". If a comparison between the Ontario 
treatment and the out of country treatment is made on the basis of quality and results, a 
number of possible errors may be made. For example, the comparison may be made 
based on the different health status patient samples. An out of country treatment facility 
                                                 
422 06-HIA-0204 at 8 
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may select very healthy patients while the Ontario treatment facility may be required to 
take all patients including very sick patients who may have a different negative treatment 
result. The health professional may perform a perfect treatment yet the results of the 
treatment may be negative for the patient sample that was initially in poorer health.   
Currently, the comparison is between Ontario and the out of country treatment. The 
comparison is not between the out of country treatment and the treatment available in 
Canada. It may be more cost effective to seek treatment outside Canada before inside 
Canada because of geographic distance to the treatment -as in the case of Windsor 
residents accessing treatment in Detroit rather than in Quebec or Manitoba. However, in 
terms of medical necessity, the CHA allows for the portability of provincial health 
insurance when treatment is not available in the patient's home province but available in 
another province within Canada. Under the current I/E Test, if a treatment is not available 
within Ontario it can be funded by OHIP outside of Canada - there is no requirement to 
assess whether there is I/E treatment available first within Canada. This is interesting 
because within Canada treatment is still paid for by Canadian tax dollars. If the treatment 
is out of country, Canadian tax dollars also go out of country.  
ii) Onus / Burden of Proof 
The onus is on the patient to prove that there is no 'identical or equivalent' treatment in 
Ontario compared to the out of country treatment. The challenge for the patient is how to 
know what treatments are available in Ontario, and if available whether the treatment is 
identical or equivalent both in delivery and in its results. This appears to be a very 
difficult burden for the patient to meet. If the patient is relying on their physician, the 
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physician must also submit testimony on these factors.  
iii) Evidence Required 
In the cases analysed, patients tended to present comparison evidence [comparing the out 
of country treatment to the domestic treatment] or the absence of domestic treatment to 
support their argument that there was no identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario. Of 
the many 'identical or equivalent' evidence arguments presented in the Decisions, three 
evidence arguments are of particular note: the 'type of other patients argument', 'the 
insufficient effort' argument, the 'private health care' argument. 
In the 'Type of Other Patients' Argument the patient argued that the patients attending the 
domestic treatment were different from the patients attending the out of country 
treatment. The Board did not accept this argument as evidence that the out of country 
treatment was not identical or equivalent to the domestic treatment. The Board stated: 
"Dr. Hoffer also argues that the mix of patients at Portage [Ontario] is a basis for 
distinguishing it from High Frontier [out of country]. Again, without more than a 
bald assertion, we are not prepared to accept Dr. Hoffer's opinion on this point. 
He does not explain why this mix of patient population would be harmful for this 
particular patient; in the absence of an explanation, we are not prepared to find 
that Portage is not equivalent for this reason."
423
  
In the ‗Insufficient Effort‘ argument OHIP argued that the patient has made insufficient 
effort in attempting to seek treatment in Ontario before requesting out of country 
treatment funding from the government. The Board did not accept this argument by 
                                                 
423 06-HIA-0351 at 14 
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stating the Regulation did not require effort on the part of the patient to access domestic 
treatment before seeking out of country coverage. 
In the ‗Public vs. Private Health Care‘ Argument, OHIP argued the legislation 
only required be 'identical or equivalent' treatment in Ontario and did not specify 
that this Ontario treatment was not required to be insured by OHIP. In other 
words, there could be identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario that was offered 
through the private sector/insurance. The Board did not accept that the legislation 
referred to all pubic and private health care in Ontario. 
 
The author sees a number of challenges with this element of the Test. One on the most 
challenging aspects is if the GP and or the SP do not know what actual treatment should 
be provided to the patient. If the medical professionals do not know the treatment, they 
are not able to provide domestic-out of country comparison evidence or the lack of 
available domestic treatment evidence. For example: 
"The Respondent [OHIP] questioned how Dr. Hart [for the Appellant] could 
know that the treatment was not available in Canada if he did not know what the 
treatment was."
424
  
In this respect, if the patient requires treatment but the treatment is unknown and thus not 
comparable to a domestic treatment, it is possible that the evidence of I/E would not be 
submitted and the onus not met and - as a result - the patient would not meet the 
requirement of s.28.4(2)(b)(i) and would not quality for OHIP out of country coverage.  
                                                 
424 06-HIA-0444 B.S. at12 
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e) Delay in Ontario  
i) Definitions: Death and MSITD 
The Board does not consider ‗delay‘ itself to be a reason for out of country coverage by 
OHIP. The delay must be anticipated to result in the death of the patient or in medically 
significant irreversible tissue damage to the patient.  
 
―Section 28.4(2) requires that there be not only evidence of delay but also 
evidence that the delay ‗would‘ result in death or medically significant tissue 
damage.‖425  
 
While the definition of patient ‗death‘ is not in question, the definition of what constitutes 
‗MSITD‘ to the patient is more difficult. The definition of MSITD is not in the 
legislation. It is also important to note two features of the delay causing death or MSITD 
definition – first, the definition is prospective. The definition requires the Appellant to 
project into the future that the delay would also cause D or MSITD. This may be very 
difficult for a medical practitioner to project. It also raises the question ‗who‘ should 
project this outcome – the GP, the SP or the patient.  
 
Officially, the Ontario Wait time bases its ‗delay‘ for Ontario treatment from the time a 
SP confirms a treatment is needed to the time the treatment is received. The Ontario Wait 
time does not include the time period for the patient to see a GP, the time from GP 
appointment to appointment with the SP or the time from appointment with the SP to the 
                                                 
425
 06-HIA-0191 M.B. at 11 
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time a SP confirms a treatment is needed. In this respect, the ‗delay‘ experienced by 
patients may be further broken down. Further research is needed to locate the 
subcomponent of delay the patients are experiencing. For example, if the majority of 
patients are experiencing delay between the time they see their GP and the time they are 
first able to secure an appointment with a SP and are therefore going out of country for 
diagnostics and/or out of country SP, that is a different Wait time issue than the delay 
from SP confirmation of treatment need to the treatment itself. In terms of diagnostics, 
patients may be going out of country for diagnostics in order to maintain their Ontario SP 
appointment. Patients also may be generating additional Ontario treatment requests if out 
of country diagnostics show the need for treatment.  
 
What is not clear from the Decisions is if there is a ‗tiered delay‘.426 In a tiered delay, 
patients receiving Ontario based health care may have a different delay experience than 
Ontario patients returning from out of country health care. Those returning from out of 
country care may experience delay as medical professionals may not want to follow up 
on non-domestic treatment. It is also unclear if patients receiving out of country treatment 
are in fact increasing medical requests within Ontario in the form of follow up and/or 
ongoing care. 
 
One disturbing feature of the Delay-MSITD definition is the criteria of ‗tissue damage‘. 
Tissue damage may not result from significant pain.  In the case of patients experiencing 
pain, there is not always an objective diagnostic tool to assess the level of pain and which 
may not show ‗tissue damage‘. 
                                                 
426
 ‗tiered delay‘ is the author‘s term 
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―The Appeal Board notes that the Appellant has been in significant pain and that 
his ability to function has been impaired while waiting some time for surgery; 
however, the legislation stipulates that in order for the surgery to qualify as an 
insured service, it must be established that the delay would result in ―medically 
significant irreversible tissue damage‖. The Appeal Board finds there is 
insufficient evidence that the delay would result in medically significant tissue 
damage and the requirements of section 28.4(2)(b)(ii) have not been satisfied.‖427 
 
Pain may be severely incapacitating and - according to Decision data analyzed in Phase I 
- pain is a major reason for seeking out of country treatment. In such a scenario, the 
patient/Appellant may seek out of country treatment for pain which may be GA and I/E 
in Ontario but it does not meet the criteria of Delay causing MSITD. Thus, the criteria of 
‗tissue damage‘ may be putting a limitation on pain treatment as well as certain mental 
health conditions where it is difficult if not impossible for the patient/Applicant to 
establish ‗tissue damage‘.  
 
ii)  Onus / Burden of Proof 
As previously cited, the Onus is on the Appellant/Patient to prove that the delay 
accessing identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario would result in death or MSITD.
428
  
 
iii) Evidence Required 
                                                 
427 06-HIA-0357 at12 
428 06-HIA-0434 at 8 , 06-HIA-0430 at 6  
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The Board requires that ‗delay‘ be established in order to further consider the criteria of 
s.28.4(2)(b)(ii) – delay causing D or MSITD: 
  
―Finally, it is not possible to posit a causal connection between the suggested 
damage and the delay faced by the Applicant where there is no solid evidence of 
the actual delay that he faced for an urgent MRI.‖429 
 
It is also important to note that the evidence required by the Board is based on medical 
judgment of the patient‘s probable future health condition as a result of the delay:  
 
―The Health Insurance Act is a statutory scheme to provide insurance against the 
cost of ―insured services‖ to insured persons. For the most part those services are 
medical treatments delivered in Ontario and the insured person is living in 
Ontario. There are a few, well-defined exceptions to that general rule, section 28.4 
is one of them. The conditions set out in section 28.4 require a medical judgment 
about a patient‘s future, in situations where it is very difficult to predict the future. 
Against this backdrop, we are [sp] the view that ―would‘ does not mean 
―inevitable‖, however, it does require some degree of certainty of the outcome. In 
our view, the word ―would‖ in this context is synonymous with ―probably‖; thus, 
the question in this case is whether, in view of the Applicant‘s circumstances, 
death or medically significant tissue damage would probably result if she had to 
wait a year for surgery.‖430  
                                                 
429 06-HIA-0208 A.S. at 10 
430 06-HIA-0191 M.B. at 11 
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According to several Board Decisions, the patient/Appellant must first show evidence of 
attempting to access I/E within Ontario before advancing a Delay causing D and/or 
MSITD argument: 
 
― As the Appellant did not attempt to proceed with the equivalent surgery with Dr. 
Izukawa or any other Ontario surgeon, it is impossible to determine whether there 
was delay.‖431 
 
―Because the Appellant did not return to Ontario with his second opinion to try to 
get a surgery date in Ontario, we do not know whether a date for surgery could 
have been obtained earlier than the fall of 2006 … we do not know what the 
Appellant‘s family physician would have done for the Appellant had he or she 
known all of the facts.  …‖432 
 
In this latter case, it is interesting to note that approval for out of country diagnostics may 
also generate demand for out of country treatment.  
 
The Board did not accept evidence obtained on the patient‘s health after the out of 
country treatment. The Board stated: 
 
                                                 
431 06-HIA-0383 at 13 – this raises the question that if a patient/Appellant is not assesses on the sufficiency of their attempts to access I/E in Ontario, how is 
accessing I/E assessed? 
432 06-HIA-0395 at 9 – the  diagnostics may create an unexpected demand for services 
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― … Dr. Langley [OHIP representative] urged the Board not to rely on the 
evidence gleaned following surgery. He stated on an earlier decision of the 
Board1 [WM 06-HIA-0001] in which the Panel observed: 
 
…the provision … To find that this question is properly answered with 
evidence available only after treatment has been obtained would render 
the language of the clause absurd, because the criterion could never be 
satisfied in advance, as it should be with prior approval
433
 …. . 
 
We agree that it would not be appropriate to rely exclusively on evidence gleaned 
after the surgery …434 435  
 
It is not clear whether a ‗delay‘ experienced in accessing treatment is actually a 
physician‘s decision making regarding medical necessity. In other words, are patients 
experiencing ‗real‘ delay or are physicians priorizing patient issues based on ‗real‘ 
medical necessity. For example, a patient requesting bariatric surgery in Ontario for 
obesity may be told, based on their medical condition (perhaps the need to lose a portion 
of the weight prior to surgery or to stabilize a diabetic or mental health condition) that 
there will be a 3-5 year wait for bariatric surgery. The patient/Appellant‘s submission to 
the Board is that the surgery is GA, that there is I/E in Ontario but that there is a Delay 
                                                 
433
 Italics as reported in actual case 07-HIA-0018 at 5 
434 07-HIA-0018 at 5 
435 It is interesting to note that the Board preferred the evidence of the patient‘s GP over the evidence of the patient‘s SP
 ―We prefer the evidence of 
Dr. Whishinsky [the patient‘s GP not the SP]‖ 07-HIA-0018 at 5. Earlier in the decision, the Board states 
―The views of a specialist are often highly persuasive and perhaps more persuasive than those of a family 
physician on matters concerning surgery; however, this is not always the case. It is a question of fact 
whether the surgeon‘s opinion has more weight than that of a family doctor.‖ 07-HIA-0018 at 4.  
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that will cause MSITD in the form of weight on the joints, increased prospective risk of 
heart disease and uncontrolled diabetes.  In this scenario, perhaps the patient is 
experiencing a delay as they see it but the delay is justified based on medical assessment. 
On the other hand, the patient may be experiencing actual delay even if the treatment is 
deemed medically necessary.  
 
j) Summary of Analysis  
This section sought to examine the legal aspects of the s.28.4(2) Test – specifically, the 
Definition of each element of the s.28.4(2) Test, the Standard of Proof, the Onus/Burden 
of the Proof, and the Evidence required by the Board regarding the s.28.4(2) Test for GA, 
I/E and D causing D and/or MSITD. The author found that how the elements of s.28.4(2) 
are defined had a major impact on what evidence was required to establish the given 
element. It is of interest that the s.28.4(2) Test definitions were not outlined in the statute 
or regulations. The Board had to resort to common dictionary definitions to define the 
element of the s.28.4(2) Test. The definition for the first element of the Test – GA 
s.28.4(2)(a) – was further judicially defined by the court in 2006 in the case of Flora but 
there were still gaps in the definition that led to different weighting of evidence by the 
Board.
436
 It is also of interest that the evidence of physicians is required yet physicians 
rarely come before the Board in person with evidence – it is the patient who brings 
evidence to the Board and argues the evidence against OHIP. The evidence submitted by 
physicians is typically based on a government issued form. The medical opinion 
expressed on the form is typically difficult to understand and the evidence supporting the 
                                                 
436
 The author notes that in April 2011, the s.28.4(2) was further amended to include - among other aspects 
– the requirement for Ontario SP medical opinion as evidence to support a patient‘s request for of out of 
country treatment funded by OHIP. 
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medical opinion is rarely present. The substantiation of the medical opinion and the 
representation of that opinion by the patient and not the physician needs further 
exploration. 
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APPENDIX F: – Patient Age, Sex Residence 
 
It became clear in the case analysis that a significant number of Board Decisions did not 
state the age of the patient. If age was stated, it may have been stated as of the time of a 
health incident or at the time of application to OHIP rather than the Board Hearing. In 
cases where the age was stated as of the time of the health incident, that age was added to 
the date of the Board Hearing to approximate the age of the patient. Given that the date of 
Board Hearing was not the same as the date of the Board Decision, the age of the patient 
is an approximation of the age at the time of the Board Hearing not the date of the Board 
Decision.  
 
The data revealed a wide variation in patient age. Given this wide variation of ages, the 
raw data was subsequently grouped into the age categories used by the Canada Census of 
2006 and Statistics Canada. As such, the seven age groupings were 0-17 years, 18-24 
years, 25-44 years, 45-64 years, 65-79 years, 80 plus years or ‗Unknown‘. 
 
 
Age 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Age 0-17 23 7.3 7.3 7.3 
18-24 8 2.5 2.5 9.8 
25-44 32 10.2 10.2 20.0 
45-64 37 11.7 11.7 31.7 
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65-79 23 7.3 7.3 39.0 
80+ 7 2.2 2.2 41.3 
Unknown 185 58.7 58.7 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0  
 
It is assumed that data collected by OHIP, in order to process the patient‘s request 
relative to their OHIP number, could provide this information. 
 
There may be several reasons why only 40% of patients indicated their age. First, for 
privacy reasons, patients may not give their age as the Decisions become public - even 
though the Decisions only display the patient‘s initials and not by name. Second, the lack 
of age data may also be a function of Board Decision writing practices. The Board may 
have had this information but chose not include it in the Decision as it may not have been 
considered relevant information for the determination of the case. Third, the Board may 
have been influenced by provincial and federal health privacy legislation regarding the 
collection of personal health information. An informal look at the data indicated that 
early Decisions did list the age of the patient whereas later Decision typically did not list 
the age of the patient. Further analysis would be of interest to determine if there is a 
correlation between the year of the Decision not reporting age and the emergence of 
provincial and federal privacy legislation.  
 
Where the patient‘s sex was not given but deduced, the deduction was based on 
information within the Board Decision. For example, the pronoun ‗her‘ or ‗she‘ was 
taken to indicate the patient was female. In rare cases, the sex of the patient was deduced 
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from the diagnosis or requested procedure. For example, if the patient was diagnosed 
with ovarian cancer or who requested a hysterectomy, it was deduced that the patient was 
female. A deduction could not be made if the diagnosis or treatment requested was 
applicable to both sexes even if the condition was more probable in one sex than the 
other. An example of this would be breast cancer. 
 
Patient Sex 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Male 151 47.9 47.9 47.9 
Female 164 52.1 52.1 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0  
 
The patient‘s geographical residence was often not stated within the Decision. When it 
was clearly stated it was documented as such. In many cases, the patient‘s residence was 
not stated but the location of the patient‘s work and the location of the General 
Practitioner (GP) were stated. In such cases it was assumed that if these two factors 
coincided – the workplace and GP location – then they represented the residence location 
of the patient. However, if only the Ontario Specialist (SP) geographic location was 
given, the patient‘s residence was not assumed to be the same as the SP and the patient‘s 
residence was coded as ‗Not Stated‘. The reason of this coding was that a SP may have 
been outside the geographic area of the patient. For example, patients residing in Windsor 
may have been referred to SP in London, Hamilton or Toronto. Patients residing in 
northern Ontario may be referred to Ottawa or London, Hamilton or Toronto. The referral 
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location of the SP was assumed not to be specific enough to attribute it to the residence 
location of the patient. 
 
There was large variability in the raw data regarding patient residence. The raw data was 
re categorized into 15 areas based on the 14 Local Health Integration Networks (LHIN) 
boundaries and one category of ‗Not Stated‘. These 14 geographic LHIN based locations 
were then further re-categorized into 5 Ontario regions: North Ontario, East Ontario, 
South Ontario, West Ontario and ‗Not Stated‘. 
 
 
Patient Residence 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
LHIN North 35 11.1 11.1 11.1 
East 23 7.3 7.3 7.3 
South 48 15.2 15.2 15.2 
West 46 14.6 14.6 14.6 
Unknown 163 51.7 51.7 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0  
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APPENDIX G: Patient Profile - Diagnosis and Pain 
 
The patient‘s diagnosis and subsequent coding for this study was based on the 
information provided in the Decision. There was variability in the diagnosis description 
based on whether the patient used medical terms or lay person terms to describe the 
diagnosis. In several cases there was more than one diagnosis. In cases with more than 
one diagnosis, the predominate diagnosis was coded.  
 
The raw data showed huge variations in diagnosis. As a result, the raw data was 
summarized / categorized into 10 codes for diagnosis: cancer, heart disease/circulatory 
disease, back pain, general pain, obesity, addictions/mental health/anorexia, joints (hips, 
knee, shoulder – surgery, replacement, pain, arthritis), head (eye, ear, headache, cataract, 
memory loss), unknown and ‗other‘ (e.g. organ transplant). 
 
 
Patient Diagnosis 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
V
a
l
i
Cancer 49 15.6 15.6 15.6 
Heart/Circulatory 17 5.4 5.4 21.0 
Back Pain 36 11.4 11.4 32.4 
General Pain 22 7.0 7.0 39.4 
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d Obesity 22 7.0 7.0 46.3 
Addictions/Mental 
Health/Anorexia 
29 9.2 9.2 55.6 
Joints 34 10.8 10.8 66.3 
Head 35 11.1 11.1 77.5 
Unknown 3 1.0 1.0 78.4 
Other  68 21.6 21.6 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0  
 
Pain Diagnosis: 
The addition of Back Pain (11.4%) and General Pain (7.0%) equals 18.4% which is a 
greater percent than the leading diagnosis of Cancer (15.6%) 
 
The ‗Other‘ category included conditions not easily falling within the categories of 
cancer, heart disease/circulatory disease, back pain, general pain, obesity, 
addictions/mental health/anorexia, joints, head and ‗other‘ (transplant, gastro, renal). This 
collection of ‗Other‘ conditions included: pneumonia, CP, MS, Fabre Disease, leukemia, 
falls, hernia, vertigo, gynecological, asthma, reconstruction after mastectomy, birthmark 
infection, lymph nodes, bowel polyps, stent, multiple (health issues), neuropathy in feet, 
gallbladder, gastrointestinal issues, liver, kidney, urine blockage, urine fibroids, 
endometriosis, Menier‘s Disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, lesions, abdominal complaints, 
hereditary condition, genetic disease, menstrual disorder, lymphoma, MRI of the breast, 
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nerve function, laryngeal issue, myelodysplasia, scleroderma morphea, pelvic organ 
prolapse, and Wegener's Granulomatosis. 
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APPENDIX H: Requested Patient Procedure Global Locations 
 
The details of the requested treatment locations are further described in the Table below:  
 
Global Location – Detailed Chart 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
Argentina 1 .3 .3 .3 
Belgium 5 1.6 1.6 1.9 
Chile 1 .3 .3 2.2 
China 4 1.3 1.3 3.5 
France 4 1.3 1.3 4.8 
Germany 8 2.5 2.5 7.3 
Hong Kong 1 .3 .3 7.6 
Hungary 1 .3 .3 7.9 
India 9 2.9 2.9 10.8 
Iran 1 .3 .3 11.1 
Israel 2 .6 .6 11.7 
Italy 1 .3 .3 12.1 
Mexico 1 .3 .3 12.4 
Pakistan 2 .6 .6 13.0 
Poland 1 .3 .3 13.3 
South Africa 1 .3 .3 13.7 
South Korea 1 .3 .3 14.0 
Sweden 1 .3 .3 14.3 
Switzerland 1 .3 .3 14.6 
Taiwan 1 .3 .3 14.9 
UK 5 1.6 1.6 16.5 
USA 263 83.5 83.5 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0  
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APPENDIX I: Patient Requested USA Northern State and Requested Treatment 
 
Northern State  by  Patients‘ Requested Treatment  
Cross tabulation 
 
Patient's Requested TMT 
Total 
1 
Surgery 
2 
Treatment 
4 
Diagnostics 5 Assessment 
6 
Other 
State 
Code 
1 Michigan Count 32 6 5 6 0 49 
Expected 
Count 
24.3 6.6 5.4 12.0 .8 49.0 
% within 
State Code  
65.3% 12.2% 10.2% 12.2% .0% 100.0% 
2 Minnesota Count 15 6 7 23 1 52 
Expected 
Count 
25.8 7.0 5.7 12.7 .8 52.0 
% within 
State Code  
28.8% 11.5% 13.5% 44.2% 1.9% 100.0% 
3 Ohio Count 12 3 2 1 0 18 
Expected 
Count 
8.9 2.4 2.0 4.4 .3 18.0 
% within 
State Code  
66.7% 16.7% 11.1% 5.6% .0% 100.0% 
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4 Illinois Count 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Expected 
Count 
1.0 .3 .2 .5 .0 2.0 
% within 
State Code  
.0% 50.0% .0% 50.0% .0% 100.0% 
5 
Pennsylvania 
Count 2 1 0 0 0 3 
Expected 
Count 
1.5 .4 .3 .7 .0 3.0 
% within 
State Code  
66.7% 33.3% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
6 Montana Count 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Expected 
Count 
.5 .1 .1 .2 .0 1.0 
% within 
State Code  
.0% .0% .0% .0% 1.0E2
% 
100.0% 
7 Wisconsin Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Expected 
Count 
.5 .1 .1 .2 .0 1.0 
% within 
State Code  
100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
9 Not stated Count 1 0 0 0 0 1 
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Expected 
Count 
.5 .1 .1 .2 .0 1.0 
% within 
State Code  
100.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 63 17 14 31 2 127 
Expected 
Count 
63.0 17.0 14.0 31.0 2.0 127.0 
% within 
State Code  
49.6% 13.4% 11.0% 24.4% 1.6% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX J: File Date, Hearing Date, Decision Date  
 
In the future, it is recommended that the File Number include a day and month code to 
allow for analysis of total time a case was within the Tribunal system. 
 
 
Days from Hearing Date to Decision Date 
 
No. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Days 315 3.00 1220.00 159.9397 147.28111 
Valid N  315     
 
 
The following table assesses this skewness of the data: 
 
Days from Hearing Date to Decision Date 
 
Statistic Std. Error 
Days Mean 159.9397 8.29835 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 143.6123  
Upper Bound 176.2671  
5% Trimmed Mean 142.6173  
Median 122.0000  
Variance 21691.726  
Std. Deviation 147.28111  
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Minimum 3.00  
Maximum 1220.00  
Range 1217.00  
Interquartile Range 135.00  
Skewness 3.305 .137 
Kurtosis 17.739 .274 
 
Mean (159.9) and median (143.6, 176.2) should be close in value – but the analysis 
indicates they are not. The skewness (3.3) and kurtosis (17.7) statistics should be in the 
range of [+1 and -1] to be considered normal. The data analysis indicates that the 
skewness is 3.305 and the kurtosis is 17.739 – outside the normal distribution range. 
 
The data was also analyzed according to a box-plot where the line in the box is the 
median value and the box is drawn at 25 and 75 percentile points.  Anything outside the 
box can be regarded as outliers, i.e. those very unusual cases in terms of days from the 
number of days from Hearing Date to Decision Date. The data clearly indicates that the 
extreme higher values – those cases incurring more days between the Hearing Date and 
the Decision Date – affect the distribution - not the shorter day lengths.  
 
The case numbers for these extreme high values were identified - cases 88, 223 and 279. 
These are ―unique‖ cases from the point of view of number of days spent in the system. 
Further analysis is required to determine why these three cases were ‗unique‘. 
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Although data comparisons were based on the case day, month and year, only the year 
existed in the File Date. Therefore, comparisons could only be based on the File Date 
year. The relationship between File Date year and the Hearing Date year is very strong 
but suffers from the ‗year end‘ problem meaning that the File Date only gave the year 
date not the month and day date. If, hypothetically, a File Date year was 2005, that could 
mean the file came into the office as early as January 1, 2005 or as late as December 31, 
2005. If the File came into the office December 31, 2005 and the Hearing Date was 
scheduled for January 1, 2006, it will appear as though the File Date of 2005 was heard 
  311       
one year later in 2006. Thus the usefulness of the File Date as a start date to estimate time 
a case is within the Board‘s system is very limited. 
 
In terms of analyzing the data for File Date year to Hearing Date year, a ―perfect‖ system 
would have most cases falling within the diagonal of the table below. This appears to be 
the case except for File Date year 2005 (values 53, 47) and 2006 (values 55, 20). This 
signals that something is different for File Date years 2005 and 2006.  
 
File Year  by Hearing Year Cross tabulation 
Count 
 
Hearing Year 
Total 2 3 4 5 6 7 
File Year 2 8 9 1 0 0 0 18 
3 0 17 8 1 0 0 26 
4 0 0 29 16 1 0 46 
5 0 0 1 44 53 4 102 
6 0 0 0 1 47 55 103 
7 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 
Total 8 26 39 62 101 79 315 
 
This could have been explored more but given the challenges of ‗year end‘ problems with 
File Date, the focus of this study continued on the Hearing Date and Decision Date 
variables. 
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With this focus, an analysis was undertaken to determine if the Hearing Date year and the 
Decision Date year matched – in other words, did the date a case was heard coincide with 
the date a Decision was released: 
 
Hearing Date Year by Decision Date Year: Cross tabulation 
Count 
 
Decision Date Year 
Total 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Hearing Date Year 2 7 0 0 1 0 0 8 
3 10 12 4 0 0 0 26 
4 0 15 22 1 0 1 39 
5 0 0 27 35 0 0 62 
6 0 0 0 63 36 2 101 
7 0 0 0 0 65 14 79 
Total 17 27 53 100 101 17 315 
 
In a ―perfect‖ system, most cases would fall within the diagonal on the table below. From 
the data, it appears that all of these associations are highly significant, perhaps indicating 
that on a broad year-by-year basis, Hearing year and Decision Date year were associated. 
In other words, the Hearing Date year appears to be within the Decision Date year.  
 
Analysis was then done to determine the number of days a case was within the system – 
from Hearing Date to Decision Date - by year. In other words, did the number of days a 
case was within the system vary by year of Decision Date?  
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Number of Days by Year: Hearing Date to Decision Date 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3 17 183.0588 133.47728 32.37300 114.4311 251.6865 11.00 422.00 
4 27 162.0370 127.59566 24.55580 111.5619 212.5122 37.00 473.00 
5 53 182.8679 167.58546 23.01963 136.6757 229.0602 8.00 805.00 
6 100 136.8700 147.40816 14.74082 107.6210 166.1190 3.00 1218.00 
7 101 144.6139 88.35858 8.79201 127.1708 162.0570 17.00 454.00 
8 17 288.7647 286.61593 69.51457 141.4004 436.1290 59.00 1220.00 
Total 315 159.9397 147.28111 8.29835 143.6123 176.2671 3.00 1220.00 
 
37.  
ANOVA 
Days – Year: Hearing to Decision Date  
 
Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 396141.565 5 79228.313 3.816 .002 
Within Groups 6415060.289 309 20760.713   
Total 6811201.854 314    
 
According to the table above, the Decision Date Year is significant (.002) in terms of the 
amount of time a case was in the system (‗Between Groups‘). As such, which years are 
more important with respect to how long a case takes from the Hearing Date to the 
Decision Date? If the data was less than or equal to .05, the year was significant. The 
following table shows how the differences that 2008 contribute to the strength of this year 
effect: 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Days: Hearing - Decision  
(I) Decision Year  (J) Decision Year  
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Significance 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2003 4 21.02179 44.61091 1.000 -110.9462 152.9897 
5 .19090 40.16130 1.000 -118.6142 118.9960 
6 46.18882 37.79981 1.000 -65.6305 158.0082 
7 38.44496 37.77261 1.000 -73.2939 150.1838 
8 -105.70588 49.42102 .498 -251.9031 40.4913 
2004 3 -21.02179 44.61091 1.000 -152.9897 110.9462 
5 -20.83089 34.06797 1.000 -121.6107 79.9489 
6 25.16704 31.24936 1.000 -67.2748 117.6088 
7 17.42318 31.21645 1.000 -74.9213 109.7676 
8 -126.72767 44.61091 .072 -258.6956 5.2403 
2005 3 -.19090 40.16130 1.000 -118.9960 118.6142 
4 20.83089 34.06797 1.000 -79.9489 121.6107 
6 45.99792 24.48099 .918 -26.4217 118.4175 
7 38.25406 24.43897 1.000 -34.0413 110.5494 
8 -105.89678 40.16130 .132 -224.7019 12.9083 
2006 3 -46.18882 37.79981 1.000 -158.0082 65.6305 
4 -25.16704 31.24936 1.000 -117.6088 67.2748 
5 -45.99792 24.48099 .918 -118.4175 26.4217 
7 -7.74386 20.32631 1.000 -67.8731 52.3854 
8 -151.89471
*
 37.79981 .001 -263.7140 -40.0754 
2007 3 -38.44496 37.77261 1.000 -150.1838 73.2939 
4 -17.42318 31.21645 1.000 -109.7676 74.9213 
5 -38.25406 24.43897 1.000 -110.5494 34.0413 
6 7.74386 20.32631 1.000 -52.3854 67.8731 
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8 -144.15084
*
 37.77261 .002 -255.8897 -32.4120 
2008 3 105.70588 49.42102 .498 -40.4913 251.9031 
4 126.72767 44.61091 .072 -5.2403 258.6956 
5 105.89678 40.16130 .132 -12.9083 224.7019 
6 151.89471
*
 37.79981 .001 40.0754 263.7140 
7 144.15084
*
 37.77261 .002 32.4120 255.8897 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
 
In this respect, it may be helpful to have benchmarks for Tribunal procedural fairness in 
order to assist with internal tribunal processes. For example, a legislated period of time 
between receipt of a file (File Date) and the final Decision (Decision Date) may assist in 
designating existing and/or new tribunal staff and panel members to cases. 
 
It is important to note that the Hearing Date code does not indicate how many days the 
case was actually argued. While Hearings lasting more than one day are not the norm, it 
is possible that a case could be heard over several days. For example, a case may have 
been argued 3 hours or three days but would have been coded as of the first day of the 
Hearing. For example, case 02-HIA-0040 JD was argued October 13 and 14
th
, 2004 as 
well as August 11, 2005. In the case just referenced, the Hearing Date to Decision Date 
would have been estimated from the first Hearing Date of October 13
th
, 2004 rather than 
August 11, 2005.  If, hypothetically, the end of the Hearing was August 11, 2005 and the 
Decision was released September 1, 2005, it would appear that the case took 10 months 
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rather than half a month between hearing and Decision.  Thus the time between Hearing 
Date and Decision Date is just a rough estimate of the days a case was within the system.  
 
Further analysis should also be done to determine whether case time within the system 
was significantly related to the ultimate outcome of Granting or Denying the appeal. A 
cross tabulation regarding the substantive legal argument and patient profile may also 
render interesting data with respect to the time a case is within the system. 
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APPENDIX K: Type of Hearing (oral/written/teleconference/combination) relative 
to Disposition 
 
Percent of Oral Hearings 
Oral 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
No 123 39.0 39.0 39.0 
Yes 192 61.0 61.0 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Percent of Teleconference Hearings 
Teleconference 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
No 259 82.2 82.2 82.2 
Yes 56 17.8 17.8 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0 
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Percent of Written Hearings 
Written 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
No 230 73.0 73.0 73.0 
Yes 85 27.0 27.0 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Percent of Combination Hearings 
Oral – Teleconference Hearings  
Cross tabulation 
 
Teleconference 
Total No Yes 
Oral No Count 78 45 123 
Expected 
Count 
101.1 21.9 123.0 
Yes Count 181 11 192 
Expected 
Count 
157.9 34.1 192.0 
Total Count 259 56 315 
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Oral – Teleconference Hearings  
Cross tabulation 
 
Teleconference 
Total No Yes 
Oral No Count 78 45 123 
Expected 
Count 
101.1 21.9 123.0 
Yes Count 181 11 192 
Expected 
Count 
157.9 34.1 192.0 
Total Count 259 56 315 
Expected 
Count 
259.0 56.0 315.0 
 
 
Oral – Written Hearings  
Cross tabulation 
 
Written 
Total No Yes 
Oral No Count 42 81 123 
Expected 
Count 
89.8 33.2 123.0 
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Yes Count 188 4 192 
Expected 
Count 
140.2 51.8 192.0 
Total Count 230 85 315 
Expected 
Count 
230.0 85.0 315.0 
 
 
Teleconference - Written Hearings  
Cross tabulation 
 
Written 
Total No Yes 
Teleconferenc
e 
No Count 177 82 259 
Expected 
Count 
189.1 69.9 259.0 
Yes Count 53 3 56 
Expected 
Count 
40.9 15.1 56.0 
Total Count 230 85 315 
Expected 
Count 
230.0 85.0 315.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.925
a
 1 .003   
Continuity Correction 8.078 1 .004   
Likelihood Ratio 9.472 1 .002   
Fisher's Exact Test    .003 .002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
8.896 1 .003 
  
N of Valid Cases 314     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.29. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Format of Hearing relative to Disposition 
Year 2004: NOT significant 
 
Board-Grant of Appeal  vs. Oral Hearing  
Cross tabulation 
 
Oral 
Total No Yes 
Board-Grant No Count 10 13 23 
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Expected Count 9.4 13.6 23.0 
% Board-Grant 43.5% 56.5% 100.0% 
Yes Count 1 3 4 
Expected Count 1.6 2.4 4.0 
% within Board-Grant 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 11 16 27 
Expected Count 11.0 16.0 27.0 
% within Board-Grant 40.7% 59.3% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .482
a
 1 .488   
Continuity Correction .020 1 .886   
Likelihood Ratio .508 1 .476   
Fisher's Exact Test    .624 .455 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.464 1 .496 
  
N of Valid Cases 27     
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Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .482
a
 1 .488   
Continuity Correction .020 1 .886   
Likelihood Ratio .508 1 .476   
Fisher's Exact Test    .624 .455 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.464 1 .496 
  
N of Valid Cases 27     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.63. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Format of Hearing relative to Disposition 
BUT for 2006 the association was significant: 
 
Board-Grant of Appeal vs. Oral Hearing  
Cross tabulation 
 
Oral 
Total No Yes 
Board-Grant No Count 36 45 81 
  324       
Expected Count 31.3 49.7 81.0 
% within Board-Grant 44.4% 55.6% 100.0% 
Yes Count 3 17 20 
Expected Count 7.7 12.3 20.0 
% within Board-Grant 15.0% 85.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 39 62 101 
Expected Count 39.0 62.0 101.0 
% within Board-Grant 38.6% 61.4% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.867
a
 1 .015   
Continuity Correction 4.690 1 .030   
Likelihood Ratio 6.536 1 .011   
Fisher's Exact Test    .020 .012 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.809 1 .016 
  
N of Valid Cases 101     
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Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.867
a
 1 .015   
Continuity Correction 4.690 1 .030   
Likelihood Ratio 6.536 1 .011   
Fisher's Exact Test    .020 .012 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.809 1 .016 
  
N of Valid Cases 101     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.72. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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APPENDIX L – Procedures – Self Represented / Lawyer Represented Results 
 
Introduction 
Patients were often accompanied by friends or relatives who may or may not have had 
legal training. The level of legal training was not identified in the Decision. Patients who 
were represented by ‗agents‘ were coded as not being represented by a ‗lawyer‘ because 
determinations could not be made as to the level of legal training of the ―agent‖. Only 
licensed lawyers were coded as ‗represented‘. To be coded as a ‗lawyer‘ the party had to 
be identified as ‗Counsel‘ in the Decision section of ‗Appearances‘. In the case of minors, 
deceased parties, or other factors such as ill health, patients were typically represented by 
a guardian, the estate or a ‗friend‘. While it is possible that any party could have been a 
‗lawyer‘, they were only coded as being a lawyer if identified as such. It is also possible 
that patients received legal advice or had their written submissions to the Board vetted 
through a lawyer. This was information not available in the Decision. 
 
Representation 
Patient Represented by a Lawyer:  
 
Patient Representation 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V
a
Not 
Represented 
282 89.5 89.5 89.5 
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l
i
d 
Represented 32 10.2 10.2 99.7 
Unknown 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0  
 
 
OHIP Represented by a Lawyer: 
 
OHIP Represented 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
Not 
Represented 
273 86.7 86.7 86.7 
Represented 42 13.3 13.3 100.0 
Total 315 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
Cases where both the Patient and OHIP were Both Represented by Lawyers: 
 
Patient+OHIP Represented: Cross Tabulation 
Count 
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OHIP 
Represented 
Total No Yes 
Patient 
Represente
d 
No 268 14 282 
Yes 4 28 32 
Unknow
n 
1 0 1 
Total 273 42 315 
 
 
Details regarding Patient Representation Cases 
While beyond the scope of this study, the 28 cases having a grant rate of 32% were 
identified for further future analysis in order to determine the substantive arguments 
made by the parties and the Board‘s resulting position. 
 
The table below lists the 28 cases and whether they resulted in a grant of denial of the 
patient‘s appeal: 
 
Case Summaries 
 
Unique
_ID 
V1 Case 
number 
Patient 
Rep. 
OHIP 
Rep. 
HSARB-
Grant 
1 4.00 6 1 1 0 
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2 9.00 20 1 1 1 
3 15.00 32 1 1 0 
4 21.00 39 1 1 0 
5 23.00 44 1 1 1 
6 47.00 70 1 1 0 
7 55.00 78 1 1 0 
8 67.00 94 1 1 0 
9 104.00 134 1 1 0 
10 128.00 169 1 1 0 
11 129.00 173 1 1 0 
12 132.00 178 1 1 0 
13 144.00 198 1 1 0 
14 153.00 207 1 1 0 
15 154.00 208 1 1 1 
16 174.00 228 1 1 0 
17 188.00 242 1 1 1 
18 207.00 263 1 1 0 
19 218.00 274 1 1 1 
20 219.00 275 1 1 0 
21 223.00 279 1 1 0 
22 224.00 280 1 1 0 
23 228.00 285 1 1 1 
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24 236.00 293 1 1 1 
25 238.00 297 1 1 0 
26 265.00 328 1 1 9 
27 278.00 342 1 1 1 
28 315.00 382 1 1 1 
Total N 28 28 28 28 28 
a. Limited to first 100 cases. 
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APPENDIX M: Cross Tabulation Generally Acceptable Procedure for the Patient 
(GA) with Identical/Equivalent (I/E) and Delay-Death (D) or Medically Significant 
Irreversible Tissue Damage (MSITD) 
 
Section 28.4(2) Elements 
To examine s.28.4(2) further, patients requesting GA were cross tabulated with patients 
requesting I/E across the 50 cases. There was Team Patient agreement for both GA and 
I/E in 21 cases and Team Patient discrepancies for both GA and I/E 4 cases. There was 
Team Patient agreement on GA but discrepancies on I/E in11 cases. Interestingly, there 
was discrepancies on GA and agreement on I/E 14 cases.  
 
GA versus I/E  
Cross tabulation 
 
Patient Request- I/E in 
Ontario 
Total 
No 
Discrepancie
s 
Discrepancie
s 
Patient 
Request-GA  
No 
Discrepancies 
Count 21 11 32 
Expected Count 22.4 9.6 32.0 
% within Patient GA  65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
Discrepancies Count 14 4 18 
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Expected Count 12.6 5.4 18.0 
% within Patient GA  77.8% 22.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 35 15 50 
Expected Count 35.0 15.0 50.0 
% within Patient GA 70% 30% 100% 
 
From this data of 50 Team Patient discrepancies, in less than half the cases (n=21) there 
was agreement within Team Patient. However, there was some level of non-agreement in 
Team Patient regarding GA and I/E in 29 cases.  
 
The Patients‘ argument for GA was then cross tabulated with the Patient‘s argument for 
Delay causing Death and Delay causing MSITD. In Delay causing Death, 13 cases had 
agreement within Team Patient regarding both GA and Delay causing Death while 6 
cases discrepancies within both GA and Delay causing Death. Nineteen cases agreed on 
GA but disagreed on Delay causing Death. Six cases disagreed on GA but agreed on 
Delay causing Death.  
 
A similar pattern was seen regarding GA and Delay causing MSITD: 13 cases had no 
disagreement within Team Patient regarding both GA and Delay causing MSITD while 8 
cases discrepancies within both GA and Delay causing MSITD. Nineteen cases agreed on 
GA but disagreed on Delay causing MSITD. Ten cases disagreed on GA but agreed on 
Delay causing MSITD.  
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Patient Request-GA  versus Patient Request b/c Delay causing Death  
Cross tabulation 
 
Patient Request-
Delay=Death 
Total 
No 
Discrepancy Discrepancy 
Patient Request-
GA  
No 
Discrepancy 
Count 13 19 32 
Expected Count 16.0 16.0 32.0 
% within Patient 
Request GA  
40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
Discrepancy Count 12 6 18 
Expected Count 9.0 9.0 18.0 
% within Patient 
Request GA  
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 25 25 50 
Expected Count 25.0 25.0 50.0 
% within Patient 
Request-GA  
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Patient Request-GA  versus Patient Request b/c Delay causing MSITD  
Cross tabulation 
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Patient Request-
Delay=MSITD 
Total 
No 
Discrepancy Discrepancy 
Patient 
Request-GA  
No Discrepancy Count 13 19 32 
Expected Count 14.7 17.3 32.0 
% within Patient 
Request GA  
40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
Discrepancy Count 10 8 18 
Expected Count 8.3 9.7 18.0 
% within Patient 
Request GA  
55.6% 44.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 23 27 50 
Expected Count 23.0 27.0 50.0 
% within Patient 
Request GA  
46.0% 54.0% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX N: Substantive Argument – Team Patient Discrepancies  
 
Introduction  
Discrepancies in the patients‘ argument were not expected at the start of the study. Once 
identified as a trend, the discrepancies in the patients‘ s.28.4(2) argument were analysed 
relative to the determination of the Board whether or not to grant OHIP coverage for 
OCCNEIHS  
 
Discrepancies 
In Year 5 (2007/08), one hundred and six s.28.4(2) cases came before the Board. The 
patient and OHIP each presented their argument for and against the out of country 
treatment request. However, the patients‘ argument for s.28.4(2) out of country treatment 
in these Year 5 cases was not always cohesive in terms of medical necessity. 
Approximately 50 of the 106 cases showed discrepancy within the patient‘s s.28.4(2) 
argument – even before the counter argument of OHIP was presented and the subsequent 
determination of the Board. The author refers to these discrepancies as argument 
‗discrepancies within Team Patient‘ These discrepancies within Team Patient were found 
in every area of the s.28.4(2) test
437
 - s.28.4(2)(a) generally accepted as appropriate for 
the patient (GA), s.28.4(2)(b)(i) identical or equivalent treatment available in Ontario 
(I/E) and s.28.4(b)(ii) delay causing death (DD) or delay causing irreversible significant 
tissue damage (DM).    
 
                                                 
437
 Discrepancies within the ‗Experimental‘ screening element were not analyzed for the purpose of this 
paper but are available for future analysis 
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It is important to note that discrepancies within Team Patient may not have been 
referenced in the Decision in all cases across the five years of study. In other words, the 
Board may have not recorded the medical opinion differences in Team Patient‘s 
argument and/or the Board may have weighted the evidence to that evidence presented by 
the patient and not the medical opinions. If this was the case, there may have been more 
discrepancies within Team Patient than recorded in the Board‘s Decisions. The patient 
may also have appeared to have had no discrepancies within their argument as they may 
only have been presenting medical support evidence and not evidence were there was not 
medical support for the patient‘s position. These issues are not known based on the cases 
reviewed for the study.   
 
Discrepancies within Team Patient  
While Team Patient discrepancies may have occurred in Years 1 through 4, they were 
not coded as such for one main reason - the author had made the assumption in 
designing this research study and Code Book that if the patient appeared before the 
Board there was medical endorsement for the patient‘s request for out of country 
treatment – given that the Board‘s jurisdiction was not to assess medical costs or 
human compassion arguments but rather to assess medical necessity for the patient‘s 
treatment.  In this respect, it was assumed that there were no discrepancies within 
Team Patient – in other words, that the patients and the physicians were in agreement 
regarding s.28.4(2) - that the (a) the treatment was generally accepted in Ontario as 
appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances as the insured person; and 
(b) either,(i) that kind of treatment that was not performed in Ontario by an identical 
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or equivalent procedure, or (ii) that kind of treatment was performed in Ontario but it 
is necessary that the insured person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay that would 
result in death or medically significant irreversible tissue damage.  
 
It became clear, while analyzing the cases, that this was not the case. By Year 5 cases, 
the author was attuned to these discrepancies and the discrepancies were well 
documented in the Board‘s written Decisions. The voided assumption of ‗no Team 
Patient discrepancies‘ plus the clear documentation in Year 5 Decisions lead to the 
development of a more detailed coding system for Year 5 patient arguments.  
 
While there may also have been discrepancies within OHIP argument and dissent in 
the Board‘s determination, these were not recorded in the written Decision – only 
Team Patient discrepancies were reported and thus coded. In hindsight, this more 
detailed coding system should have been applied to Years 1 to 4 – but in the interest of 
time and exploratory nature of this study, only Year 5 was analyzed using the more 
detailed coding system. 
 
All s.28.4(2) Test Elements of Patients‘ Argument Assessed 
While initially an analysis of the first element of the s.28.4(2) test – GA - was 
assessed,
438
 this only represented 17 of the 50 cases. GA cases were analyzed for the type 
of discrepancy. Given the small sample size of 17 cases and the number of possible 
discrepancies, it was not possible to have significant findings. As a result, all 50 GA, I/E, 
                                                 
438
 the element s.28.4(2)(a) requiring the treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a 
person in the same medical circumstances as the insured person 
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and Delay cases were analyzed in order to increase the sample size and determine if any 
patterns could be seen. The results for each of the four elements of s.28.4(2) are listed 
below. Of the 50 cases, there were only 4 Grants of out of country coverage.
439
 The 
remaining 46 cases that had discrepancies within Team Patient were Denied by the 
Board. In hindsight, Year 1 to 5 cases should have been included in the analysis or – at a 
minimum – all 106 cases – not just the 50 cases for Year 5. 
 
Of the cases in Year 5, 41 (82%) were in 2007 Decisions and 9 (18%) were 2008 
Decisions. The 4 Granted Decisions were issued in 2007.  
 
HSARB Decision-Year 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V
a
l
i
d 
2007 41 82.0 82.0 82.0 
2008 9 18.0 18.0 100.0 
Total 50 100.0 100.0 
 
 
But if one looks at the file date of each of these 4 cases, 3 of the cases entered the Board 
system in 2006 and 1 in 2007. Why is this important? It is important because the patient‘s 
medical condition, the state of the comparable identical or equivalent treatment in 
                                                 
439
 Cases #292 (06-HIA-0047 L.S.), Case #322 (06-HIA-0265 D.A.M.), Case #329 (06-HIA-0293 D.K.), 
Case #362 (07-HIA-0018 S.F.) 
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Ontario and the delay experienced in the eyes of the patient must be, in the majority of 
Granted cases, seen as of 2006 and not 2007. At the end of 2005, the Ontario government 
began operationalizing its Wait Time Strategy (WTS) for five treatments/operations
440
 in 
an effort to decrease the delay patients were experiencing. For surgical wait times, the 
time is tracked between when a surgery is ordered and when the surgery is performed.
441
 
Standards were put in place as to how long a patient should have to wait, based on their 
medical condition, from the time surgery was ordered until the time surgery took place.  
 
The file date 2006 cases before the Board may not have had a chance to experience the 
decreased Wait Times as the policy came into effect in late 2005. On the other hand, even 
if it effectively reduced a delay between the order for surgery and the surgery itself, the 
Wait Time Strategy may not have been addressing the type of ―Delay‖ patients were 
experiencing. The concept of ―Delay‖ needs to be further broken down to determine 
where the delay is happening and why it is happening. It is unknown at this time if the 
implementation of Ontario‘s WTS lead to an increase in the number of patient 
experiencing delays in non-WTS procedures. This is a area for potential research. 
 
Out-of-Country ―Grants‖ by the Board 
In cross tabulation analysis table below of GA versus the Board‘s Grant of the out of 
country request by the patient, it can be seen that when there was a discrepancy in the 
argument of Team Patient, the Board did not Grant the patient‘s out of country request (in 
all 4 cases or 0%). If there was no discrepancy in the argument of Team Patient, the 
                                                 
440
 cancer, cataract, hip, knee surgery and angiography, angioplasty and CT Scans. 
441
 http://news.ontario.ca/mohltc/en/2010/06/ontarios-wait-time-strategy.html 
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Board did Grant the patient‘s out of country request (in all 4 cases or100%). Thus, even 
though the presence of Team Patient discrepancies resulted in denials, the only time the 
Board granted out of country coverage was if there was no Team Patient discrepancies.  
 
HSARB-Grant  versus Patient-GA  
 Cross tabulation 
 
Patient Request GA as 
appropriate 
Total 
No 
Discrepancy Discrepancy 
HSARB-Grant Deny Count 27 18 45 
Expected Count 28.5 16.5 45.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
Grant Count 4 0 4 
Expected Count 2.5 1.5 4.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 31 18 49 
Expected Count 31.0 18.0 49.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
63.3% 36.7% 100.0% 
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In cross tabulation analysis table below of I/E versus the Board‘s Grant of the out of 
country request by the patient, it can be seen that when there was a discrepancy in the 
argument of Team Patient, the Board did not Grant the patient‘s out of country request (in 
all 4 cases or 0%). If there was no discrepancy in the argument of Team Patient, the 
Board did Grant the patient‘s out of country request (in all 4 cases or 100%). Thus, as 
with GA, even though the presence of Team Patient discrepancies resulted in denials, the 
only time the Board granted out of country coverage was if there was no Team Patient 
discrepancies.  
 
 
HSARB-Grant versus Patient Request- I/E in Ontario  
Cross tabulation 
 
Patient Request- I/E in 
Ontario 
Total 
No 
Discrepancy Discrepancy 
HSARB-
Grant 
Deny Count 30 15 45 
Expected Count 31.2 13.8 45.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
Grant Count 4 0 4 
Expected Count 2.8 1.2 4.0 
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% within HSARB 
Grant  
100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 34 15 49 
Expected Count 34.0 15.0 49.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
69.4% 30.6% 100.0% 
 
This is the same pattern for GA (s.28.4(2)(a)) and I/E (s.28.4(2)(b)(i)) in terms of the 
Board Granting if there is no discrepancies in Team Patient‘s argument and not Granting 
if there is a discrepancy. The pattern is not significant given the sample size of 4 Grants. 
A larger sample size should be included to assess if this pattern is significant. Given that 
the focus at this point is on ‗patterns‘ as opposed to significance given the sample size, it 
is interesting to note that the pattern changes when analyzing Delay (s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)).  
 
Delay causing Death and Delay causing MSITD (s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)) both show the same 
pattern to each other which is different from the pattern shown in GA (s.28.4(2)(a)) and 
I/E (s.28.4(2)(b)(i)).  With Delay causing Death, the Board Grants or Denies the patient‘s 
request for out of country coverage approximately equally if there is agreement in within 
Team Patient or if there is discrepancies within Team Patient. In the Table below, 50% 
(n=2) the Board Granted if there was no discrepancy in Team Patient argument and 50% 
(n=2) the Board Granted if there was a discrepancy in Team Patient‘s argument. 
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HSARB-Grant versus Patient Request b/c Delay causing Death 
 Cross tabulation 
 
Patient Request-
Delay=Death 
Total 
No 
Discrepancy Discrepancy 
HSARB-
Grant 
Deny Count 22 23 45 
Expected Count 22.0 23.0 45.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
48.9% 51.1% 100.0% 
Grant Count 2 2 4 
Expected Count 2.0 2.0 4.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 24 25 49 
Expected Count 24.0 25.0 49.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
49.0% 51.0% 100.0% 
 
The same pattern can be seen with Delay causing MSITD. The Table below shows that 
the Board Grants or Denies the patient‘s request for out of country coverage 
approximately equally if there is agreement in within Team Patient or if there is 
discrepancies within Team Patient. In the Table below, 50% (n=2) the Board Granted if 
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there was no discrepancy in Team Patient argument and 50% (n=2) the Board Granted if 
there was a discrepancy in Team Patient‘s argument. 
 
HSARB-Grant versus Patient Request b/c Delay causing MSITD  
Cross tabulation 
 
Patient Request-
Delay=MSITD 
Total 
No 
Discrepancy Discrepancy 
HSARB-
Grant 
Deny Count 20 25 45 
Expected Count 20.2 24.8 45.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
44.4% 55.6% 100.0% 
Grant Count 2 2 4 
Expected Count 1.8 2.2 4.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 22 27 49 
Expected Count 22.0 27.0 49.0 
% within HSARB 
Grant  
44.9% 55.1% 100.0% 
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Granted Cases Year 5 
The following 4 cases were Granted by the Board. Each case is reviewed in more detail 
to determine where the discrepancy within Team Patient lied and over what element of 
s.28.4(2): 
 
1. Case 292 (06-HI-0047 L.S.) involved a second opinion regarding an eye 
condition. The discrepancy within Team Patient arose between the patient and the SP 
regarding the Delay causing MSITD element of s.28.4(2). 
 
The patient requested reimbursement for a consultation at the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio, 
USA. The patient had undergone various treatments and surgeries in Toronto and was 
under the care of a SP at Toronto Western Hospital. The patient‘s condition worsened 
and she, at her own expense, visited the Cleveland Clinic for a consult where immediate 
surgery was recommended. The patient returned to Ontario where SP then attempted 
surgery but it was unsuccessful.  The SP ‗recommended‘ the patient return to the 
Cleveland Clinic – which she did – but the Cleveland Clinic would not operate ‗because 
it was too late‘ because ‗he [the Cleveland Clinic SP] found irreversible tissue damage 
due to months of low intraocular pressure.‘   
 
The patient wanted to be reimbursed for her consult at the Cleveland Clinic. The patient 
and OHIP agreed on GA and I/E but disagreed on Delay causing MSITD. The patient‘s 
SP initially stated a delay would cause MSITD but then reversed his agreement with the 
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patient – not telling the patient - and stated to OHIP that a delay would not cause MSITD. 
The SP then became a proposed witness for OHIP but was not called at the Hearing.   
 
The Board stated it 
 
―… had the benefit of observing and hearing the Applicant [the patient] as she 
testified. She was forthright and entirely credible…. OHIP pointed out that the 
form was completed in two different handwritings, and questioned whether the 
Applicant had written some of the statements on the form. The Applicant testified 
that the information on the form was completed when she received it from Dr. 
Lam [patient‘s Ontario SP]. 
 
Since Dr. Lam did not testify, the inconsistent and contradictory information 
remains unexplained. ...‖442 
 
The Board concluded that it was too late for surgery – delay causing MSITD – but it was 
not too late for a consult out of country regarding the patient‘s condition. The Board also 
stated that the Prior Approval Form must be completed before the health care service out 
of country is received. However, in this case, the patient submitted the form to her SP but 
the SP did not complete the form before the consult despite the SP‘s endorsement that the 
patient should seek the consult. Thus, according to the Board, the patient had to wait for 
the SP to complete the form in order to quality for s.28.4(5) Prior Approval by OHIP. 
The Board granted the out of country coverage on the basis of Delay causing MSITD. 
                                                 
442
 06-HIA-0047 L.S. at10. 
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2. Case 322 (06-HIA-0265 D.A.M.) dealt with consultation and biopsies for foot 
pain at John Hopkins Hospital (JHH) in Baltimore, Maryland. The discrepancy within 
Team Patient arose between the P and the SP regarding the ‗experimental‘ element of the 
pretest to s.28.4(2). 
 
The patient‘s SP referred her to JHH. The Board admitted evidence that was submitted by 
the patient following the close of the Hearing. Recognizing that it was not the ordinary 
practice to file evidence after the conclusion of a Hearing, the Board found the evidence – 
a letter from a Professor of Neurology supporting the patient – to be relevant to the issue 
on appeal. Under the authority of the SPPS to control its own process, the Board stated it 
had the jurisdiction to admit the evidence. OHIP responded to the letter in submissions to 
the Board.
443
  
 
Initially, the patient‘s SP on the Prior Approval Form stated that the treatment was 
‗experimental‘. In a subsequent letter after OHIP had made its decision not to fund the 
request, the patient‘s SP stated: 
 
―In your application, I indeed indicated that the procedure is considered 
experimental in Ontario. At the time, I meant to indicate that this procedure is not 
offered as a regular diagnostic service. I indicated that the investigation is 
generally appropriate for a person in these medical circumstances.‖444 
                                                 
443
 06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at 2 
444
 06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at 8 
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In a second subsequent letter, the SP confirms he sent the patient on a referral to JHH but 
the diagnostic ―…is recognized worldwide as a reliable diagnostic procedure if done in a 
centre with expertise. …‖445 OHIP agreed with the SP‘s initial position that the procedure 
was experimental and stated: 
 
―It is the General Manager‘s position that the continued evidence from an Ontario 
expert shows that the procedure being requested out-of-country is considered 
experimental by Ontario standards and, in accordance with the previously notes 
sections of the Health Insurance Act, of Ontario, funding cannot be considered by 
the Ontario Health Insurance Plan for this form of investigation and testing.‖446  
 
Based on the evidence, the Board determined that the treatment was not experimental and 
thus within the jurisdiction of OHIP to fund. The patient and OHIP agreed on GA and no 
I/E in Ontario existed. It is interesting to note that the evidence for no I/E from the patient 
was a simple indication on the Prior Approval Form and a letter from the SP, uncontested 
by OHIP, which stated: 
 
 ―The technique of cutaneous nerve biopsy is not offered in Canada.‖447 
 
The Board stated that if the procedure is GA and not performed in Ontario, OHIP was to 
insure the out of country service. The Board stated that delay need not be considered: 
                                                 
445
 06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at 8 
446
 06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at 8 
447
 06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at10 
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 ―Having found that the requested treatment, cutaneous nerve biopsy, is not 
performed in Ontario by an identical or equivalent procedure, the Appeal Board need not 
consider this issue [whether Delay would cause death or MSITD]‖. 
 
3. Case 329 (06-HIA-0293 D.K.) dealt with reimbursement for back surgery at the 
Cleveland Clinic in the USA. The discrepancy within Team Patient arose between the P 
and the SP regarding the Delay causing M element of s.28.4(2). 
 
The patient and OHIP agreed on GA and I/E but not Delay causing MSITD. In addition 
to his GP, the patient contacted a number of SP in Ontario. One SP – Dr. D - gave a wait 
time for surgery consultation and another wait time for the actual surgery. The patient, 
patient‘s family and physicians explored surgery in Toronto, Hamilton, Windsor and 
Timmins but found a wait list of at least 6 months. The patient proceeded to have surgery 
at the Cleveland Clinic. The patient argued Delay causing MSITD. OHIP argued the 
Delay did not cause MSITD based on OHIP‘s conversation with Dr. D. - one of the 
patient‘s SP – who did not examine the patient. OHIP had contacted Dr. D‘s office and 
Dr. D‘s secretary reported that Dr. D had reviewed the patient‘s chart and the patient 
could wait for his appointment. The Board was not persuaded by this evidence and called 
it Hearsay.  
 
The Board took into account the evidence of Delay causing MSITD by one of the 
patient‘s Ontario treating SP,  and its consistency of the Cleveland neurosurgeon, the 
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patient‘s attempts to contact surgeons for surgery and subsequently Granted out of 
country coverage. 
 
4. Case 362 (07-HIA-0018 S.F.) dealt with a diagnosis of pancreatic cancer. The 
patient, a physician himself, was referred to 4 surgeons for a consult with one surgeon 
proposing surgery 6 weeks later. The discrepancy within Team Patient arose between the 
P and the SP regarding the Delay causing MSITD element of s.28.4(2). 
 
The patient investigated and pursued surgery in the USA and submitted a reimbursement 
request for surgery that had taken place at John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, USA in 
Dec of 2006. The patient and OHIP agreed on GA and I/E but disagreed on Delay. The 
patient argued that a 6 week delay for Ontario surgery would be a Delay causing MSITD. 
The patient‘s Ontario GP agreed but the patient‘s Ontario surgeon did not agree and felt 
that the 6 week delay would not have affected the tumor. Thus, there was conflicting 
views from Ontario physicians who had examined the patient. The Board stated: 
 
―The views of a specialist are often persuasive and perhaps more persuasive than 
those of a family physician on matters concerning surgery; however, this is not 
always the case. It is a question of fact whether the surgeon‘s opinion has more 
weight than that of the family doctor.‖448 
 
                                                 
448
 07-HIA-0018 at 4 
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The patient argued that little weight should be given to his specialist‘s opinion but instead 
the Board should weigh the observations of the USA surgeon conducting the operation 
and the recurrence of the cancer following the USA surgery. 
 
OHIP did not argue against the patient‘s statement that the cancer was ‗aggressive‘ but 
argued that the Board should not rely on evidence gleaned following the surgery.
449
 OHIP 
cited a previous Board case
450
 regarding evidence gleaned after a surgery: 
 
―… the provision is one of the criteria for funding of services obtained with prior 
approval. This also indicates that the question raised by the provision is whether 
at the time of the application for prior approval, there is evidence that it is 
necessary for a insured person to travel outside Canada to avoid a delay that 
would result in medically significant irreversible tissue damage. To find that this 
question is properly answered with evidence available only after treatment has 
been obtained would render the language of the clause absurd, because the 
criterion could never be satisfied in advance, as it should be with prior approval. 
Similarly, to find that one can satisfy a forward-looking criterion with hindsight 
presents an untenable proposition in terms of the medical assessment that must be 
performed to answer the question. A medical assessment of the necessity of 
obtaining early treatment to avoid tissue damage or death is not properly an 
                                                 
449
 07-HIA-0018 at 5  
450
 06-HIA-0001  
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assessment, but rather a self-fulfilling prophecy if based solely on knowledge of, 
and pronounced following, the outcome of the treatment. (emphasis added).‖451 
 
The Board agreed that it would not rely exclusively on evidence gleaned after surgery to 
determine Delay.  
 
It is important to note the role of the SP in these 4 cases granted in Year 5. In each case, 
the SP was acting as a ‗gatekeeper‘ and in 3 or the 4 cases where there was a discrepancy 
between the P and the SP regarding Delay causing MSITD – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii).  It is also 
interesting to note that the SP was not present at the Hearing to answer questions from the 
parties or the Board. 
 
 
Summary  
The discrepancies in the patients‘ s.28.4(2) argument were analysed relative to the 
determination of the Board whether or not to grant OHIP coverage for OCCNEIHS. In 
summary, of the 106 Year 5 cases, 50 cases showed discrepancies within Team Patient of 
which 4 cases were granted OHIP coverage. The rate of discrepancies within Team 
Patient is remarkable because of grounds for granting out of country coverage are based 
on medical opinion for medically necessary services. If there is a disagreement, it is 
between the patient and their medical professional(s) whether or not the criteria of 
s.28.4(2) are met. The Team Patient discrepancies could be GA, I/E or Delay causing D 
and/or M elements of s.28.4(2). The question becomes whether the discrepancies had an 
                                                 
451
 07-HIA-0018 at 5 
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effect on the Board‘s Granting or Denying of out of country coverage. The study is very 
limited in that only 4 cases out of 50 Team Patient discrepancy cases were granted. The 
remaining 46 Team Patient discrepancy cases were Denied by the Board. Of those 4 
Team Patient discrepancy cases granted, if the discrepancy was within the GA element or 
the I/E element of s.28.4(2) test, the Board appears to not grant the out of country 
coverage. If, however, there is a Team Patient discrepancy in Delay causing death and or 
MSITD, a different pattern emerges such that the Board still Granted the out of country 
coverage 50% of the time. Although this is preliminary, exploratory data, the difference 
of patterns warrants more investigation beyond this study. 
 
It is important to note that the s.28.4(2) elements of GA and Delay both apply directly to 
the patient‘s medical condition. In s.28.4(2), the element of I/E applies is a non-patient 
specific element as it assesses the availability of treatment in Ontario rather than any 
medical condition of the patient. 
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